Does reducing politicians’ control over public employees’ hiring and firing improve bureaucratic performance? Arianna Ornaghi answers this question exploiting population-based mandates for U.S. municipal police department merit systems in a regression discontinuity design. Merit system mandates improve performance: crime rates are lower in departments operating under a merit system than in departments under a spoils system. Changes in resources or police officers’ characteristics do not drive the effect, but Mr. Ornaghi provides suggestive evidence that the limitations to politicians’ ability to influence police officers are instead important.

Petter Lundborg's research portfolio spans labor economics, health economics, and family economics. Areas of particular interest include the intergenerational transmission of human capital, the impact of social and educational interventions, health care economics, and gender disparities in the labor market. Moreover, he has explored themes in household finance, including the transmission of financial behaviors across generations and the influence of education on participation in financial markets. His research has been featured in leading journals in economics and finance.