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CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES

FOUR STUDIES IN THEORETICAL
SPATIAL ECONOMICS

Jean H. P. Paelinck

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FOUR STUDIES IN THEORETICAL SPATIAL ECONOMICS

Abstract

In what follows, four research topics in theoretical spatial economics are presented, topics which have been worked on recently.

They start with two so-called "Tinbergen-Bos Systems" (TBS) analyses. The first is a check on the empirical presence of "Tinbergen hierarchies" in Dutch microregional data; the hypothesis is not rejected. The second develops two theoretical aspects: the computation of non-allowable TBS (supply of some goods and/or services being absent) and the solution via continuous linear programming (CLP) of Tinbergen-Bos metricised systems.

This CLP approach can be found back in an essay, the third one, on the maximal flow capturing problem, for which a solution in those terms is presented.

Coming back to TBS, it should be mentioned that spatial interdependence via transportation costs is a central idea in the analysis; this idea is applied again in an optimal control set-up with potentialised partial differential equations (PPDEs), for which a - once more potentialised - framework and an explicit solution are proposed.

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1. Empirical Evidence on Tinbergen-Bos Systems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction.
2. Theoretical foundations.
3. Statistical evidence.
4. Case study.
5. Conclusions.
6. References.

1. Introduction.

Tinbergen-Bos Systems (TBS) go back to the sixties; since their emergence we have studied them closely (see references 6.1).

Attempts at observing TBS-structures are scarce (see Chin, 1964 and Meulemeester, 1969); the problem has been taken up again recently¹⁾.

In what follows we will first expose the theoretical foundations of TBS, then study the linking problems with empirical evidence, introducing to a case study for the Netherlands.

2. Theoretical foundations.

The starting point is the notion of an economic activity exercised by a certain number of plants of equal ("optimal") size. The set of basic activities can be ranked according to that number; the activity comprising the minimal number of plants is said to have the highest rank (say 1).

Activities concentrate in centers; with I activities $c_1 = 2^{I-1}$ types of centers can obviously be composed.

A reference area is covered with certain types of centers, and a realisation thereof is called a system; for I activities the number of possible systems is equal to $s_1 = 2^{c_1-1} - e_1$, where e_1 is the number of excluded systems, i.e. of systems not delivering all I goods and services²⁾.

Special cases of centers and systems can be pointed at. Two such cases are the weak Tinbergen hierarchy (WTH, applying to centers) and the strong Tinbergen hierarchy (STH, applying to systems)³⁾. WTH implies that every center possesses all the activities of lower rank than the activity of highest rank present; STH implies that a system is built up of a complete set of centers with WTH. Postulating a STH solves of course the problem of selecting one of the s_1 possible systems.

1) Within the framework of an essay on Theoretical Spatial Economics at the Rotterdam School of Economics; we like to thank the two authors, Duncan Beeckman and Emiel Maasland, for having made available the original statistical material they collected, and Reinaud van Gastel for having performed the computations.

2) No analytical expression for e_1 is known to us; but we were able to derive an upper bound.

3) The terminology is ours.

3. Statistical evidence.

Let us start with the assumption that a system is built up from elementary activities and shows STH; table 1 then summarises the evidence.

TABLE 1

Activities	1	2	3	I
Number of centers					
$n^1 = n_1$	1	n_{21}	n_{31}	n_{I1}
$n^2 = n_2 - n^1 n_{21}$	0	1	n_{32}	n_{I2}
$n^3 = n_3 - n^1 n_{31} - n^2 n_{32}$	0	0	1	n_{I3}
.....
$n^I = n_I - n^1 n_{I1} - \dots - n^{I-1} n_{I,I-1}$	0	0	0	1
Number of activities	n_1	$< n_2$	$< n_3$	$< n_I$

In practice, however, sectors and centers are aggregate entities, so aggregation over activities and elementary centers has to be considered. It is not difficult to prove that, for sector aggregates, if the aggregation is over $i < i'$ activities, zeros are kept down i' , and up i' for $i > i'$; the reverse holds for center aggregation.

Let us now make two assumptions :

A_1 : sector aggregation is over neighbouring activities of table 1; this is not unreasonable in terms of homogeneous activity classification;

A_2 : center aggregation is over neighbouring centers; this again is not unreasonable in terms of common locational factors.

In the pure A_1 -case zeros continue to appear below the still present ones, in the pure A_2 -case also but the ones have disappeared. A special case is that of joint A_1 - A_2 aggregation leading to a square matrix : the latter is then upper-triangular. The reason is obvious : table 1, being rectangular, is pseudo-triangular, and any "square" aggregation will keep zeros below the main diagonal. However one supposes implicitly that aggregate sector-ranking follows elementary activity ranking; exceptions to this assumption cannot be excluded.

4. Case study.

A square 43x43 matrix was produced for the Netherlands (1993), the regions being so-called "COROP-regions"; table 2 summarises the information (source : CBS, Statistiek van het Ondernemingenbestand 1993, table A.6). It should be mentioned that the sectors have been defined over enterprises and not over plants, which adds an additional perturbing element to the analysis to follow.

A way indeed to study the properties of the table is to compare it to the triangular structure which would have resulted from the A_1 - A_2 aggregation on a pure STH. To that end an index t was constructed as :

$$t = (u - 1) n^{-1} \tag{1}$$

where u is the number of plants on and above the main diagonal, l the remaining number of plants, and n the total number of plants. t can be rewritten as :

$$t = 1 - 2 l n^{-1} \tag{2}$$

It is easily seen that $t = 1$ for the pure triangular case; an extreme opposite case would be the equal spatial dispersion (ESD) of all aggregated sectors, in which case :

$$l = \sum_i n_i (I - i) I^{-1} \tag{3}$$

A statistical test can be constructed supposing that all possible configurations between ESD and an aggregated STH are homogeneously distributed; in that case the probability of obtaining by chance a configuration between the observed one and a square matrix resulting from the aggregation of a pure STH is :

$$p = (1 - t^t) (1 - t_{ESD}^t)^{-1} \tag{4}$$

t^t being the empirical value of t ; for table 2, t_{ESD} has been computed as .698094. As however, given the structure of table 2, relatively high values of t^t are to be expected a priori (the case of t_{ESD} illustrates this), a triangular distribution would be more in order; given the constraint on the probability integral and $p(1)=0$, one gets :

$$p = .045^{-1} - .045^{-1} t \tag{5}$$

Another possible reference point - substitute for t_{ESD} - is that of the biproportional adjustment of table 2, which respects row and column totals, followed by an adjustment along the lines of point (c) below; still another one is - still along that point (c) - a maximum-1 objective. Results will also be reported.

TABLE 2

COROP	28	33	90	75	26	24	29,30	73	31	38	22	32	97	77
1 Rijnmond	32	9	12	23	10	17	83	614	62	124	85	82	157	118
2 Amsterdam	11	1	10	33	14	23	38	84	40	90	71	50	284	149
3 W-N Brabant	33	10	9	12	11	28	52	22	86	49	66	74	59	107
4 Aggl Grav.	10	4	12	6	8	11	39	21	16	81	56	37	301	160
5 Alkmaar e.o.	7	5	4	1	6	4	20	4	39	35	17	22	19	36
6 Utrecht	17	6	11	15	23	19	130	14	85	141	92	125	336	166
7 Twente	6	7	11	8	18	14	46	4	95	57	136	88	60	76
8 Z-O-N Brabant	5	16	6	12	14	43	45	4	80	74	126	115	61	83
9 Veluwe	5	3	1	10	4	3	19	40	31	33	47	25	31	78
10 Kop N-Holland	4	12	4	0	36	30	28	3	53	31	66	45	25	56
11 Achterhoek	4	4	1	11	9	4	27	16	46	41	32	46	32	49
12 Z-O-Z Holland	4	6	13	11	18	20	79	2	47	53	68	103	121	122
13 Z-Limburg	4	4	5	0	1	3	22	14	50	27	88	44	30	43
14 N-Overijssel	4	5	0	1	3	2	22	10	17	20	20	9	7	24
15 Zaanstreek	4	1	2	2	2	23	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
16 Aggl Arnhem	3	10	10	5	20	33	35	8	59	74	63	104	103	123
17 N-Limburg	3	6	1	17	6	13	17	1	22	19	28	102	32	38
18 M-Limburg	3	6	4	1	3	13	17	1	22	19	28	102	32	38
19 Ov-Groningen	3	3	2	6	2	6	7	17	72	28	38	16	43	78
20 O-Groningen	3	2	0	0	14	2	19	1	12	9	9	24	7	15
21 Z-Vlaanderen	2	0	2	0	2	5	13	46	3	10	29	11	9	39
22 Limond	2	8	3	1	9	5	15	71	16	16	9	18	7	13
23 Ov-Zeeland	2	4	8	7	2	8	13	37	17	15	30	35	32	80
24 's-Hertogenbosch	2	4	7	3	1	16	31	1	34	21	24	40	35	31
25 Z-W-Gelderland	2	4	1	1	5	11	23	4	32	21	27	56	17	49
26 Gr-Adam	2	2	8	57	17	10	33	7	27	52	41	41	50	76
27 N-Friesland	4	2	0	4	3	14	33	26	18	23	37	37	32	76
28 Gooi-Vechtstreek	2	2	2	11	7	5	31	2	21	33	27	25	29	39
29 N-Drenthe	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	6	13	17	7	22	32	25
30 O-Z-Holland	2	1	5	1	12	5	30	1	26	27	29	125	35	33
31 Z-O-Drenthe	2	0	2	1	1	1	9	0	21	20	21	14	7	26
32 Z-O-Friesland	2	0	2	0	0	3	5	13	17	20	17	20	13	28
33 N-O-N Brabant	1	6	5	0	6	27	35	3	30	17	42	44	19	36
34 Delfzijl e.o.	1	2	0	0	0	0	12	107	3	2	1	5	6	10
35 Flevoland	1	1	2	13	11	5	21	7	28	21	21	19	35	25
36 Aggl Haarlem	1	0	5	3	5	3	5	2	10	12	32	27	21	30
37 Z-W-Friesland	1	1	0	1	0	2	2	14	12	7	23	30	10	21
38 M-N-Brabant	0	8	7	4	15	328	27	9	85	39	71	75	59	34
39 Delft-Westland	0	3	2	3	9	4	24	2	19	26	13	37	41	20
40 Aggl Leiden	0	1	4	7	8	4	35	3	32	38	21	44	60	39
41 Z-W-Overijssel	0	1	3	3	5	6	16	0	12	5	11	12	21	10
42 Z-W-Drenthe	0	1	3	3	3	5	12	0	14	9	8	17	14	23
43 Gr-Rijnmond	0	0	0	1	2	7	13	8	15	17	17	17	10	44
	162	181	242	272	426	786	1255	1331	1508	1541	1744	2023	2469	2473

TABLE 2 continued

39	37	36	23	35	85	76	74	92	25	63,64	34	27	20,21	94	52	82	71,72	93
165	286	175	153	313	350	1552	1522	498	372	584	765	530	589	640	750	1159	1393	989
265	110	178	553	100	284	668	296	295	372	785	217	1009	395	484	437	743	1410	817
92	103	131	106	180	167	222	253	229	260	381	428	291	448	357	412	471	626	566
176	33	129	103	105	133	240	25	350	256	393	196	492	338	579	540	903	884	776
47	43	60	64	42	68	64	20	105	130	153	117	208	147	134	169	211	149	241
212	141	277	182	250	287	301	166	451	490	698	550	746	603	815	740	1101	922	1294
83	46	118	219	258	121	164	16	251	303	281	358	252	368	329	346	403	412	649
175	241	190	229	214	132	210	132	202	501	458	556	387	440	360	446	471	533	675
99	115	100	65	182	150	110	32	240	263	348	347	291	436	346	395	451	512	635
46	107	77	60	106	106	72	63	163	171	150	178	173	205	229	293	268	321	355
54	53	48	56	155	109	102	12	131	257	163	296	212	319	245	279	280	310	399
40	40	34	43	70	76	54	361	83	140	87	195	128	171	149	159	220	259	237
60	70	47	44	64	85	98	156	142	189	108	132	241	179	318	243	292	268	403
23	17	19	9	32	30	26	16	55	60	33	65	48	98	100	85	115	167	139
10	27	13	6	15	30	68	231	44	40	38	66	34	93	72	101	98	137	132
15	34	25	30	53	52	61	35	74	71	87	112	71	94	79	135	113	142	186
40	83	34	43	67	74	93	157	120	67	99	136	91	185	230	196	165	301	354
26	52	50	78	106	56	56	39	119	174	174	168	150	174	165	204	290	215	339
64	26	66	44	27	66	45	122	91	311	153	192	137	141	103	147	138	360	211
66	88	82	86	106	142	389	73	196	194	358	186	282	218	231	337	512	528	430
34	38	144	34	25	70	117	44	158	155	138	96	130	164	242	241	213	248	329
66	35	72	58	69	83	62	32	128	119	352	110	286	126	197	227	269	193	317
29	16	19	12	31	31	40	26	6	53	64	59	48	75	67	148	98	112	114
80	62	55	34	87	85	74	58	105	172	196	151	156	204	180	261	269	352	319
26	14	21	15	33	48	28	12	62	42	36	109	61	81	94	89	102	165	151
34	57	22	20	31	49	23	42	70	110	63	99	100	114	125	102	147	192	193
54	40	57	102	123	56	26	132	231	231	123	211	140	244	160	240	288	328	342
7	12	5	1	16	14	14	46	12	18	10	16	16	23	35	34	26	56	62
38	58	48	63	75	60	67	45	128	86	116	102	129	170	105	99	124	161	189
68	25	14	50	39	57	71	19	79	98	198	79	214	113	200	205	223	132	324
26	26	138	14	8	51	20	15	128	44	56	44	75	56	86	61	72	96	115
92	84	122	173	117	97	97	216	228	291	414	316	207	323	284	372	447	473	209
34	30	76	20	46	63	66	19	88	61	69	294	101	113	137	269	151	280	209
68	71	65	37	84	89	104	40	159	132	188	116	212	226	248	302	254	373	335
14	10	12	14	31	28	33	16	49	41	67	47	80	83	87	95	101	88	135
16	24	11	16	32	26	18	51	57	59	64	74	91	92	107	84	100	143	146
18	63	38	21	78	53	91	173	72	72	96	103	151	74	139	98	179	192	359
2840	2867	3088	3187	4197	4353	6114	6173	6657	7548	8721	8836	9137	9547	10121	10797	13344	15740	16806

TABLE 2 continued

	68	51	83	86	81	67	61.62	84	65.66	Som	Heofdiagram	Bevolking
95.96												
924	953	2246	2782	2709	4528	3080	6539	6619	8976	53609	53609	1109755
1389	722	1061	1435	2581	5308	3998	5465	6481	8245	49652	49652	722598
532	678	1394	1046	1494	1127	1744	3333	3415	4609	25741	25741	574377
707	721	1460	2197	2011	2127	2425	3104	5878	6403	34236	34236	7073231
234	268	769	482	564	443	670	1031	1393	1893	10108	10108	220918
327	1134	2475	2845	2737	4002	2375	5907	9513	8613	52344	52344	1053083
545	662	1240	1382	1223	1436	2612	2578	4832	5164	30575	30575	589077
657	912	1543	1876	1644	1931	1966	3230	4571	4834	23485	23485	1053083
678	743	1377	1998	1248	1679	2765	2805	4658	24675	24675	24675	689931
433	436	1299	472	809	531	1195	1248	1616	2668	14200	14200	609318
295	457	1106	1402	824	636	717	2246	2893	2872	15131	15131	365129
732	627	1233	884	1559	972	2846	1978	2660	5477	17393	17393	397068
354	388	763	483	616	467	853	1354	1153	2711	12405	12405	64756
144	151	439	218	367	448	269	583	777	1118	6265	6265	329037
834	675	1230	1564	1470	1105	1765	2561	3140	4838	24890	24890	148556
306	303	612	366	605	734	962	1182	917	2027	11032	11032	665674
239	241	502	339	491	366	818	999	976	1911	9700	9700	265591
390	402	626	629	708	471	986	1128	1721	2592	13214	13214	219595
140	187	252	138	269	114	374	388	307	1165	4990	4990	350335
94	112	274	176	244	207	530	472	350	1104	4990	4990	151204
161	194	468	288	442	327	453	716	824	1811	4990	4717	107096
303	308	574	416	624	787	1242	963	1025	2218	7328	7328	165725
261	313	836	545	611	748	766	1500	1591	2369	12443	12443	255810
203	275	684	427	536	384	515	1333	1276	1773	10099	10099	258442
381	505	1134	1051	1123	1239	780	3026	3076	3252	20504	20504	402180
358	358	745	326	583	424	1000	1030	916	2388	12397	12397	317998
489	329	721	867	942	983	650	1748	2810	2428	15022	15022	235159
186	188	306	430	295	172	476	533	631	1066	5599	4907	160964
242	375	1033	734	753	997	588	1763	2313	2417	14427	14427	313637
180	163	333	377	299	142	363	429	452	1166	5218	5218	150235
208	269	456	212	396	248	467	774	592	1486	6851	6851	191181
280	429	810	347	648	573	759	1569	1121	2391	12192	12192	300443
45	54	89	33	114	51	129	108	113	330	1639	1639	300443
234	223	435	244	515	503	407	1174	1393	1379	8580	8580	54526
280	268	565	501	760	667	811	1091	1950	2148	11510	11510	248976
157	116	273	122	198	141	354	318	297	782	4059	4059	219575
479	542	1045	957	908	929	1172	2728	2149	3701	20041	20041	96719
175	239	655	538	509	481	486	1120	1566	1434	9512	9512	453852
377	386	991	711	825	1125	1023	2425	2320	3021	16476	16476	219155
151	130	215	274	240	178	332	468	623	973	4722	4722	373664
186	200	340	363	294	162	412	569	502	1079	5458	5458	130729
142	262	590	608	414	478	409	1343	998	1489	9059	9059	139116
16886	17409	36172	36669	36980	40128	45297	76559	88971	126049	687387	623909	15309131

It should be made clear how the aggregated centers ("COROP"-regions) should be ranked in order to compute t , the (aggregated) sectors having of course a fixed ranking (according to the number of units observed in each sector; see table 2, last row). Three possible criteria could be proposed (amongst others, for sure) :

- (a) a ranking according to the maximal number of units in the ranked sector (specialisation);
- (b) the average rank of the aggregated centers in terms of sector ranks;
- (c) minimal l ; as the sector ranking is fixed, this leads to a linear assignment problem (LAP), of which the solution can be computed by means of linear programming⁴⁾.

Table 3 shows the obtained rankings of the COROP-regions, the corresponding t -values and the probabilities p . The correspondence between (a) and (b) on the one hand, (c) on the other, is not perfect, but the (b)-rule comes closer to (c) than (a), according to the t -values which play the role of e.g. a Kendall- τ rank correlation coefficient. If one opts for a triangular distribution, a chance factor of 15% is present in the (c)-ranking, but given the nature of the aggregate data described above, they do not contradict a fundamental STH-tendency.

4) Garfinkel and Nemhauser, 1972, p. 73-74; the problem can be written indeed as :

$$\max \sum_{i=1-4j} \sum_{j=1-4j} x_{ij} \sum_{k_2} m_{ik} \quad (5)$$

s.t.

$$Jx = i \quad (6)$$

$$xx = x \quad (7)$$

(6) being the so-called assignment-conditions and (7) the 0-1 constraints, which can be replaced by :

$$0 \leq x \leq i \quad (8)$$

x_{ij} assigns a spatial unit i to rank j , the m_{ik} 's summed being the (shrinking) sum of row elements of table 2 as i occupies a lower rank.

J is the well-known assignment matrix, x the vector of the x_{ij} 's, i the unit column vector.

TABLE 3 : results for criteria (a), (b) and (c)

Criteria	(a)	(b)	(c)
Ranked regions	29a	17	29a
	36	29a	17
	17	23a	33
	23	36	23a
	14	33	34
	34	15	36
	39	39	39
	2	13	15
	12	26	12
	23a	12	26
	10	34	13
	28	23	3
	26	30	23
	15	14	18
	13	18	25
	4	25	30
	33	3	35
	35	28	14
	37	35	10
	30	24	4
	25	10	38
	38	35a	16
	18	37	35a
	16	4	28
	24	32	24
	27	16	37
	3	19	19
	32	21	32
	21	38	21
	35a	27	27
	19	40	29
	29	29	6
	40	22	40
	6	20	9
	9	6	20
	20	9	8
	11	7	7
	22	8	22
	31	1	31
	7	31	1
	8	11	11
	1	5	5
	5	2	2
t	.8661	.8762	.8814
p rectangular	.4455	.4101	.3912
p triangular	.1989	.1711	.1544

The biproportional adjustment, followed by the (c)-programme, resulted in a t-value of .8814, very near to the (c)-value itself (.8819). The minimising LAP however lead to a t-value of .3848; recomputing the rectangular and triangular probabilities for the (c)-case gave values of .1920 and .0365 respectively. which only reinforced the statement made above.

5. Conclusions.

Another type of data base, starting from elementary technical units, would be a much better entry to WTH and STH checking; some census data provide them, and they could be exploited along the lines exposed and implemented above.

Other lines of investigation would be to check on the size of the plants concerned (employment, production) to analyse the nature of joint plant location; again more refined data would be necessary.

6. References.

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2. On Two Problems in the Analysis of Tinbergen-Bos Systems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction.
2. Inadmissible systems.
3. Computing metricised TBS-equilibria.
4. References.

1. Introduction.

Tinbergen-Bos Systems (TBS) continue to pose interesting problems; we recently encountered two of them, on the solution of which we report hereafter.

The first problem concerns inadmissible systems, i.e. systems not delivering all goods and services demanded by the market.

The second derives from the computation of metricised TBS, a problem in mixed integer-continuous linear programming.

2. Inadmissible systems.

In Paelinck, 1995, an overview was given of TBS theory; briefly it considers systems - i.e. sets - of centers, the latter being defined as (spatial) clusters of plants belonging to different activity sectors. The number of possible systems for I activity sectors was given as :

$$s_i = 2^{c_i} - 1 - e_i \quad (1)$$

with :

$$c_i = 2^i - 1 \quad (2)$$

e_i being the number of excluded or inadmissible systems. No analytical expression of it is known to us, but hereafter we derive an upper bound.

Consider the following example for $I = 4$; we first construct matrix **A**, linking the number of centers ($c_i = 15$) to the total number of possible systems ($2^{c_i} - 1 = 32,767$) :

TABLE 1 : Center-System Matrix

$S_i \backslash C_i$	1	2	3	.	.	.	15
1	1	0	0	.	.	.	0
2	0	1	0	.	.	.	0
3	0	0	1	.	.	.	0
.							
.							
.							
15	0	0	0	.	.	.	1
16	1	1	0	.	.	.	0
.							
.							
.							
s_i	1	1	1	.	.	.	1

We then construct matrix **B**, linking the number of centers to the number of activities :

TABLE 2 : Center-Activity Matrix

$C_i \backslash I_i$	1	2	3	4
1	1	0	0	0
2	0	1	0	0
3	0	0	1	0
4	0	0	0	1
5	1	1	0	0
6	1	0	1	0
7	1	0	0	1
8	0	1	1	0
9	0	1	0	1
10	0	0	1	1
11	1	1	1	0
12	1	1	0	1
13	1	0	1	1
14	0	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	1
Number of zeros	7	7	7	7

The number of zeros in each column is equal to 7, i.e. $2^3 - 1 = c^{l-1}$; this result is derived from the fact that zeros and ones are distributed in an anti-symmetrical way inside the distribution of center types, there being one more one due to the absence of empty centers.

Consider now $C = A \cdot B$, an $s_i \times I$ matrix, which shows the activities present in each type of system. The rows of the the first (identity) submatrix of A hit 7 times the zeros of a column of B ; the rows of the second submatrix hit them $\left\{ \begin{matrix} 7 \\ 2 \end{matrix} \right\}$ times. It is obvious that once a row of A has 8 or more ones, $\left\{ \begin{matrix} 7 \\ 2 \end{matrix} \right\}$ a one in B will always be hit.

This allows of drawing the following table of upper bounds for inadmissible systems, as double counting is present between columns of B ; the number in the parenthesis of $e(.)$ relates to the number of ones in the rows of the submatrices of A .

TABLE 3 : Inadmissible Systems, Upper Bounds

e	Formula	I = 4	Exact Number
e(1)	$I_{\left\{ \begin{matrix} c_{1-1} \\ 1 \end{matrix} \right\}}$	28	14
e(2)	$I_{\left\{ \begin{matrix} c_{1-1} \\ 2 \end{matrix} \right\}}$	84	66
e(3)	$I_{\left\{ \begin{matrix} c_{1-1} \\ 3 \end{matrix} \right\}}$	135	?
.....			
e_1	$I(2^{c_{1-1}} - 1)$	508	?

One has in general :

$$e_1 < I \cdot s_{1-1} \tag{3}$$

hence the following proposition :

Proposition 1 : e_1/s_1 tends towards zero for I large.

Proof : for large I, e_1/s_1 tends towards $I/2^{c_1 - c_{1-1}} = I/2^{2^{I-1}}$, from which convergence to zero is obvious.*.

3. Computing metricised TBS-equilibria.

Kuiper, Kuiper and Paelinck, 1993, presented the equations for solving a TBS metricised system; in condensed form, they can be presented as follows :

$$\min f = w'x \tag{4}$$

$$x, d$$

s.t.

$$Jx^\# = c \tag{5}$$

where :

$$x^\# = [x' ; d']' \tag{6}$$

and:

$$i'd_k = n_k, \forall k \tag{7}$$

Here x is a column vector of intra- and intercenter flows, d a vector of possible locations for the producers of each product k (numbering n_k) and c a vector of constants; the elements of d are integers.

Now from (5) a number of variables can be substituted via :

$$x_2^\# \in J_1^{-1}(-J_2 x_1^\# + c) \tag{8}$$

Let $x_2^\#$ contain d and the vector of x_{ijk} s, the deliveries inside an elementary area, at transport cost zero; substituting (8) into (4) one obtains :

$$\min f = \alpha'd + \alpha_1'x_{ii} + \alpha_2'x_{ij} \tag{9}$$

$$d, x_{ij}, x_{ij}$$

subject to the constraints mentioned above. Consider now :

$$\alpha_2'x_{ij} = (w_2 - w_1 J^{-1} J_2)x_2 \tag{10}$$

and in (4) the total differential, for a fixed value of f :

$$dw'x = w_1 dx_{ij1} + w_2 dx_{ij2} = 0 \tag{11}$$

From (10) and (8) follows immediately that :

$$\alpha_2'dx_{ij} = 0 \tag{12}$$

which holds for $\alpha_2'x_{ij}$, given linearity.

This leads to the following proposition :

Proposition 2 : problem (4) through (7) can be solved by solving only a linear problem in d and x_{ii} under the constraints (7), integrality for the elements of d , and binarity for the elements of x_{ii} ; moreover $d_{ik} > 0 \Rightarrow x_{ii} = 1$ (Kuiper, Mares and Paelinck, 1995).

The new system, comprising only the above-mentioned constraints (the last one being substituted by $d_{ik} \geq x_{iik}$), can be solved by linear programming, which increases the possibilities of computing solutions to metricised TBS for large k and a large number of possible locations.

The following example illustrates the foregoing; take three possible locations equally spaced on a line, with unit transport costs equal to the line-lengths to be bridged (1 and 2), in which case :

$$f = x_{21} + 2x_{31} + x_{12} + x_{32} + 2x_{13} + x_{23} \quad (13)$$

together with the demand and supply constraints (5).

Substituting along the lines exposed above gives :

$$f = -1.5d_2 - 2x_{11} - 2x_{33} + 5 \quad (14)$$

which for $n_i = 2$ has a minimum equal to 1 for $x_{11} = x_{33} = 1$ (1/2 being transported from locations 1 and 3 to location 2). If we put the 1-3 unit transport costs equal to 3 instead of 2, the objective function becomes

$$f = -3d_2 + x_{22} - 3x_{11} - 3x_{33} + 7 \quad (15)$$

with the same optimal solutions as above.

4. References.

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**3. On Solving the Maximal Flow Capturing Problem by Means of
Continuous Linear Programming**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction.
2. Specifications.
3. Applications.
4. Conclusions.
5. References.

1. Introduction.

The maximal flow capturing problem (MFCP) is known to be a binary linear program (see e.g. Hodgson, 1990; Hodgson et al. 1995 and forthcoming; Berman et al., 1992).

In what follows a respecification will be presented, which should allow of using continuous linear programming for its solution.

2. Specifications.

The main structure of the MFCP can be presented as follows (Table 1) :

Table 1 : Fundamental Matrix for the MFCP

f^*	f/n'	1	2	3	j^*	m^*
f_1^*	1										m_1^*
f_2^*	2										m_2^*
f_3^*	3										m_3^*
.	.						s^*				.
.	.										.
.	.										.
$f_{i^*}^*$	i^*										$m_{i^*}^*$
		n^*	n_1^*	n_2^*	n_3^*					$n_{j^*}^*$	$i'n^* = i'm^*$

Each row shows in a binary way whether a flow passes through certain nodes (n_j), each column showing the flows (f_i) which pass through a given node. The respective row and column totals are m_i^* and n_j^* . A column vector f^* shows the flow intensities.

The problem can be stated in the following way :

$$\max_y g = f^* y \quad (1)$$

s.t.

$$y \leq S^* x \quad (2)$$

$$i^* x = p^* \quad (3)$$

$$y, x \in \{ 0, 1 \} \quad (4)$$

One wants to maximise the number of flows meeting fixed objects located in a given number p^* of nodes, those flows being dependent on the fact that they pass through the (optimally) selected nodes, x .

It is known that continuous linear programming (CLP), $\{ 0, 1 \}$ being replaced by $[0, 1]$, can produce fractional solutions in x ; a simple 5x5 example will show this.

Consider the following 5x5 S^* -matrix (Table 2) :

Table 2 : An S^* -matrix

f^*	$f \setminus n'$	1	2	3	4	5	m^*
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2
2	2	0	1	1	0	0	2
3	3	0	0	1	1	0	2
4	4	0	0	0	1	1	2
5	5	0	0	1	0	1	2
	n^*	1	2	3	2	2	8

For $p^* = 2$, an optimal binary solution is the x' -vector $[0 0 1 1 0]$ giving an objective function value of $g = 14$. However the vector $x' = 1/2 [0 1 1 1 1]$ satisfies the constraints and allows of obtaining $g = 14.5$.

Consider now the matrix :

$$y = S^* \hat{x} \quad (5)$$

It could lead to the following specification of the problem :

$$\max_y g = f^* y \quad (6)$$

s.t.

$$y \leq Y_i \quad (7)$$

$$i^* Y n^* i = p^* \quad (8)$$

$$y, Y, \epsilon \in \{ 0, 1 \} \quad (9)$$

Instead of producing weighted solutions as specification (1) through (4) does, CLP now "samples" flows from various nodes, as the following example shows (Table 3) :

Table 3 : A Y -matrix

f^*	$f \setminus n$	1	2	3
1	1	Y_{11}	Y_{12}	
2	2	Y_{21}		Y_{23}
3	3	Y_{31}	Y_{32}	Y_{33}
4	4	Y_{41}	Y_{42}	
5	5		Y_{52}	Y_{53}
6	6	Y_{61}	Y_{62}	Y_{63}
7	7	Y_{71}		Y_{73}
8	8		Y_{82}	Y_{83}
9	9	Y_{91}	Y_{92}	Y_{93}

For $p^* = 1$, the optimal one-node solution is 1 for node 3, with $g = 40$; CLP, however, drops flow y_{23} and replaces it by y_{42} , producing $g = 42$, all active y_{ij} s being equal to one.

It is known also that a "naive" method, picking successively the nodes ranked downwards according to their total flow intensity, does not necessarily produce an optimum. Consider the following example, given only for illustrative purposes, as some flows are duplicated and others "singletons" (Table 4) :

Table 4 : Again an S^* -matrix

f^*	$f \setminus n$	1	2	3
1	1	1	0	0
2	2	1	0	1
3	3	1	1	0
4	4	1	0	1
5	5	1	1	0
6	6	0	1	0
7	7	0	0	1
Total flows		15	14	13

For $p^* = 2$, the naive method would select nodes 1 and 2, and so would a "semi-naive" method, which would eliminate the flows already encountered; in this case it would start with node 1, eliminate flows 1 through 5, and then pick up node 3. The optimal solution obviously comprises nodes 2 and 3; table 5 compares the values of the objective function.

Table 5 : Values of an Objective Function

Method	Value of g
Naive	21
Semi-naive	22
Optimal	27

What triggers off some thinking about using CLP for the solution of the MFCP is the set of inequalities (2); in fact often their right hand side exceeds the left hand side, which is contrary to the logic of the problem, according to which at least (but also at most) one flow should be captured once by an optimal node choice. This invites to reconsider specification (1) through (4) and replace it by the following one :

$$\max_y g = f^* \cdot y \quad (10)$$

s.t.

$$y \leq \max S^* \hat{x} \quad (11)$$

$$i'x = p^* \quad (12)$$

$$0 \leq x \leq i \quad (13)$$

Given the binary nature of S^* , obviously $0 < y < i$. The logic is that, (10) having to be maximised, y will always tend to hit an upper ceiling, obliging the x_{ij} s to produce 0-1 solutions.

In continuous practice, (11) can be realised by introducing a vector of slack variables, e , and extending the objective function (10) by a penalty term $+\alpha i'e$ ($\alpha > \min f^*$); two additional conditions have to be introduced :

$$0 \leq y \leq i \quad (14)$$

$$0 \leq e \leq (p^* - 1)i \quad (15)$$

and (11) replaced by :

$$y \leq S^*x - e \quad (16)$$

the logic of (15) being that at most p^* redundancies can occur.

3. Applications.

Taking up again Table 2, one gets for $p^* = 2$ the following programme :

$$\max_y g = y_1 + 2y_2 + 3y_3 + 4y_4 + 5y_5 \quad (17)$$

subject to the conditions mentioned above. Recall that if conditions (14) through (16) are ignored, the optimal solution is fractional ($x' = 1/2 [0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1 \ 1]$), producing $g = 14.5$, and that the optimal binary solution is $x' = [0 \ 0 \ 1 \ 1 \ 0]$, generating $g = 14$. Fixing α at 1.1 produces the latter solution with $e_3 = 1$ and $g = 15.1$, splitting up into $14 + 1.1 > 14$.

Table 4 did not need to be ϵ -corrected, as CLP immediately produced the desired binary solution.

4. Conclusions.

More experience is needed with the method, especially in fixing appropriate values for α . It could then be applied to empirical - i.e. large - S^* -matrices.

5. References.

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4. On Optimal Control of Potentialised Partial Differential Equations

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction.
2. Discrete example.
3. Continuous version.
4. Second order PPDE.
5. Conclusions.
6. References.

1. Introduction.

In Kaashoek and Paelinck (references in Section 6) results were presented on (systems of) potentialised partial differential equations (PPDEs). Potentialising (global spatial discounting, say) was used to adapt the use of PDEs (recent references also in Section 6) to (theoretical) spatial economics, where generalised spatial interaction plays an important part.

In this paper we will try to introduce optimal control (see recent references in Section 6) to steer the spatial (one- or more-dimensional) process to a given target (for example the null-solution, possibly but not necessarily supposing mass conservation, that constant mass being zero in certain applications). We first present a discrete example, then generalise it to the continuous case, and finally adapt the solution to a second order PPDE.

Conclusions follow.

2. Discrete example.

Consider the following quadratic programming problem :

$$\min \phi \equiv \frac{1}{2} [u_1^2(0) + u_2^2(0) + u_1^2(1) + u_2^2(1)] \quad (1)$$

the figures between parentheses referring to time periods, the subindices to sites or regions, the u -vector being one of control variables; (1) could be interpreted as cost minimisation, perfect cost symmetry having been introduced for reasons of simplicity.

We now suppose region 1 to be at level 2, region 2 at level -1, and we want to control them to levels 0 in period 3; this leads to :

$$u_1(0) + u_1(1) + \frac{1}{2} [u_2(0) + u_2(1)] = -2 \quad (2a)$$

$$\frac{1}{2} [u_1(0) + u_1(1)] + u_2(0) + u_2(1) = 1 \quad (2b)$$

The special spatial feature here is the fact that control on site i influences the dynamics on site j , and vice versa, be it with a spatial discounting factor (here $\frac{1}{2}$).

Lagrangian optimisation leads to the system :

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{I} & -\mathbf{A} \\ \mathbf{A}' & \mathbf{0} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{u} \\ \lambda \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{a} \end{pmatrix} \quad (3)$$

from which :

$$u^* = A\lambda \quad (4)$$

a linear combination of the lagrangean multipliers, and :

$$\lambda = (A'A)^{-1}a \quad (5)$$

For the above mentioned problem, the outcomes are $\lambda' = [-3.11, 2.89]$ and $u' = [-1.66, 1.34, -1.66, 1.34]$, which in this special case (no time discount) gives a constant vector of the local control variables. Here and further down it can be checked that the second order conditions are satisfied.

3. Continuous version.

Consider now the continuous analog of problem (1)-(2) :

$$\min \phi \triangleq \frac{1}{2} \int_0^T \int_a^b u^2(x,t) dx dt \quad (6)$$

s.t. :

$$\dot{f}(x,t) = \int_a^b w(x,\xi) u(\xi,t) d\xi \quad (7)$$

The Hamiltonian is :

$$H \triangleq \int_a^b \frac{1}{2} u^2(x,t) dx + \int_a^b \lambda(\eta,t) \int_a^b w(x,\xi) u(\xi,t) d\xi d\eta \quad (8)$$

whence, for given x :

$$\delta H / \delta u(x,t) = u(x,t) + \int_a^b w(x,\xi) \lambda(\xi,t) d\xi = 0 \quad (9)$$

and :

$$u^*(x,t) = -\dot{\lambda}(x,t) \quad (10)$$

which shows that, like in the discrete case, the optimal control $u^*(x,t)$ is a linear combination of the costate variables.

Furthermore :

$$-\delta H / \delta f(x,t) = \dot{\lambda}(x,t) = 0 \quad (11)$$

hence $\lambda(x,t)$ is a constant for given x, implying :

$$\dot{\lambda}(x,t) = \dot{\lambda}(x) \quad (12)$$

The transversality conditions finally impose :

$$\lambda(x,T) = 0, \quad \forall x \quad (13)$$

hence all $u^*(x,T) = 0$.

From (10) and (12) one derives that :

$$u^*(x,t) = -\dot{\lambda}(x) \quad (14)$$

so, putting :

$$\int_a^b w(x,\xi) u^*(\xi) d\xi \triangleq \dot{u}^*(x) \quad (15)$$

one obtains, integrating (7) with respect to time :

$$\dot{u}^*(x) = -f(x,0)/T = \dot{f}(x) \quad (16)$$

Equations (10) and (16) should allow of computing the local $\lambda(x)$ and $u^*(x)$ (compare equations (4) and (5)).

4. Second order PPDE.

One can now start from a potentialised partial differential equation, e.g. the one studied in Kaashoek and Paelinck (o.c.) :

$$\ddot{f}(x,t) = \alpha \int_a^b m(x,\xi) f''(\xi,t) d\xi \quad (17)$$

for which explicit solutions were derived (Kaashoek and Paelinck, 1994a) for different specifications of the weighting function $m(x,\xi)$, so, omitting unnecessary details :

$$\ddot{f}(x,t) = \alpha f(x,t) g(x) \quad (18)$$

Substituting $\dot{f} \equiv h$, and adding a potentialised control to (18), gives the system :

$$\dot{h}(x,t) = \alpha f(x,t) g(x) + \beta \int_a^b w(x,\xi) u(\xi,t) d\xi \quad (19a)$$

$$\dot{f}(x,t) = h(x,t) \quad (19b)$$

and adding now a time-discount function to (6) gives the Hamiltonian :

$$H \equiv \frac{1}{2} \int_a^b u^2(x,t) \exp(-\gamma t) + \int_a^b \lambda(\eta,t) [\alpha f(x,t) g(x) + \beta \int_a^b w(\xi,t) u(\xi,t) d\xi] d\eta + \mu(x,t) h(x,t) \quad (20)$$

giving :

$$\delta H / \delta u(x,t) = u(x,t) \exp(-\gamma t) + \beta \int_a^b w(\xi,t) \lambda(\xi,t) d\xi = 0 \quad (21)$$

whence :

$$u^*(x,t) = -\beta \exp(\gamma t) \dot{\lambda}(x,t) \quad (22)$$

in line with (10), but with the addition of a relative efficiency factor β and the (inverse) time-discounting function (as discounted costs decrease with time, controls should logically increase over time).

Furthermore one can derive :

$$-\delta H / \delta h(x,t) = \dot{\lambda}(x,t) = -\mu(x,t) \quad (23)$$

and :

$$-\delta H / \delta f(x,t) = \dot{\mu}(x,t) = -\alpha g(x,t) \lambda(x,t) \quad (24)$$

the transversality conditions giving again for $\forall x$ that :

$$\lambda(x,T) = 0 \quad (25a)$$

$$\mu(x,T) = 0 \quad (25b)$$

so controls are put to zero in T.

Solving (23) and (24) gives :

$$\lambda(x,t) = \pi_1(x) \exp[\epsilon_1(x)t] + \pi_2(x) \exp[\epsilon_2(x)t] \quad (26)$$

and :

$$\mu(x,t) = \rho_1(x) \exp[\epsilon_1(x)t] + \rho_2(x) \exp[\epsilon_2(x)t] \quad (27)$$

where ϵ_1 and ϵ_2 are the eigenvalues of system (23)-(24).

Combining (22) and (26) one sees that this time the controls are combinations, additive and multiplicative, of exponential functions of time.

5. Conclusions.

We have shown that classical optimal control techniques can be applied to PPDEs; generalisations to two spatial dimensions and to systems of PPDEs is immediate, and in this way models in spatial variables (regional models, urban models) can be treated in order to select optimal development and physical planning policies. The important point, we recall, is the spatial interdependence of state and control variables.

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