

Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

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Abstract

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, *Journal of Public Economics*, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions. However, the distribution of contributions is not as predicted: late contributors are sometimes willing to punish early low contributors by contributing less than their best response. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. A consequence of this is that we fail to observe a predicted first mover advantage.

JEL Code: C92, D03, H41.

Keywords: public goods, voluntary contributions, sequential moves, experiment.

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1. Introduction

In an important theoretical contribution to the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods Varian (1994) shows that, under appropriate assumptions, a sequential contribution mechanism elicits lower contributions than a simultaneous contribution mechanism. One of the implications is that if a fundraiser for a public good wanted to maximize contributions and could choose between solicitation mechanisms he or she should avoid the sequential mechanism. Key to this result is the crowding-out of contributions: under sequential moves a first-mover enjoys a first-mover advantage by contributing zero, relying on other contributors to provide the public good on their own. Thus, if forced to use a sequential mechanism, the fundraiser should ensure that those who are willing to contribute the most on their own refrain from contributing first. In this paper we report a laboratory experiment designed to investigate Varian's model.

It is difficult to test Varian's model using field data, but some natural and field experiments suggest that sequential mechanisms can be very effective, and, in contrast to the theoretical result, may be more effective than simultaneous mechanisms. For example, several studies have demonstrated the advantage to fundraisers of announcing past contributions. Silverman, et al. (1984) examine data from a 20-hour national telethon in which three different funding schemes were employed. Their results show that announcing the names of individuals pledging money and the amount of money pledged resulted in greater contributions than when they were not announced. In other words, information about what other people have contributed in the past is in itself sufficient to increase contributions. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) conduct a field experiment in which they manipulate the initial contributions to a fundraising campaign. They find that increasing the initial contribution from 10% to 67% of the campaign goal produced a nearly six-fold increase in subsequent contributions. Frey and Meier (2004) show that contributions to two charitable funds at the University of Zurich are affected by the information about how many others donated in the past. In a similar vein, Croson and Shang (2008) conduct a field experiment in conjunction with the fundraising campaign of a public radio station and find that announcing contributions made by other donors in the past significantly affected contribution behavior. Martin and Randal (2008) find that manipulating the contents of an art gallery's donation box (empty versus filled with money) affected patrons' donation behavior. These studies suggest that initial contributions may crowd-in, rather than crowd-out, subsequent

contributions. Closest to a comparison of sequential and simultaneous mechanisms is the field experiment of Soetevent (2005), who compares ‘closed bag’ and ‘open basket’ methods for Baptist church collections in the Netherlands. With traditional closed bag collections members of the congregation are contributing simultaneously in the sense that they do not know the decisions of other contributors at the time they make donations, whereas with open baskets they contribute sequentially in the sense that they do have information about earlier contributions when they make donations. Soetevent finds that offerings for charitable purposes external to the parish were significantly higher when open collection baskets were used.

One possible explanation for divergent theoretical and empirical results is that the theory of voluntary contributions does not fully capture motives for giving.¹ A large body of evidence, much of it gathered in carefully controlled laboratory experiments, shows that many people are concerned with fairness and reciprocity (e.g. see Fehr and Gächter (2000)). In particular, in experiments on the private provision of public goods many people are found to be ‘conditionally cooperative’ in that they are willing to contribute if others do so, but not willing to contribute if others free-ride.² These concerns may cause people to have a stronger, not weaker, disposition to contribute in response to contributions by others. Indeed, recent theoretical papers have analyzed behavior when individuals exhibit social preferences, and show that contributions by a leader may crowd-in subsequent contributions. Romano and Yildirim (2001) demonstrate that if players get a ‘warm-glow’ from contributing it is possible that crowding-in may result, reversing Varian’s results. Huck and Rey-Biel (2006) study contributions to team output and show that when agents dislike effort differentials followers reciprocate high efforts by leaders, and sequential contributions may be more effective than simultaneous contributions. These empirical

¹ Another possibility is that these results reflect asymmetric information about the value of the public good. In this case early contributions by informed contributors signal that the public good has a high value and this induces higher contributions from uninformed contributors. Thus high quality charities may prefer sequential to simultaneous mechanisms (see Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006)). For experimental evidence on contributions in asymmetric information settings see Potters, et al. (2005) and Potters, et al. (2007). Sequential contribution mechanisms may also be effective when there is a provision point that must be met for the public good to be consumed (see Andreoni (1998)).

² See, e.g., Guttman (1986); Andreoni (1995); Keser and van Winden (2000); Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Croson, et al. (2005); Croson (2007); Gächter (2007); Ashley, et al. (2008); Muller, et al. (2008); Fischbacher and Gächter (forthcoming).

and theoretical results make it unclear whether Varian's results will hold among agents exhibiting social preferences.

Our experiment focuses on the simplest version of Varian's model with two players, quasi-linear returns from public/private good consumption, and complete information about returns from public/private good consumption. This differs from previous experimental work on voluntary contributions in three important respects. First, we use a setup more aligned with the theoretical literature, where conventional theory (i.e. ignoring social preferences) predicts crowding out, rather than the usual setup where predicted contributions are independent of others' contributions. Second, we use a set up where the returns from the public good varies across players, whereas the usual setup studies symmetric games. Third, whereas the usual setup has participants make simultaneous contributions, we also study sequential contribution mechanisms.

Most previous public goods experiments that have studied sequential contributions do so in a linear environment where players have dominant strategies to contribute nothing. Thus, neither crowding out nor crowding in are predicted, and predicted contributions are invariant to move structure. In fact there is substantial evidence of conditional cooperation in these experiments: players are willing to contribute if others do so as well. This suggests a degree of crowding in, but at the same time, there is, at best, weak evidence that sequential moves lead to higher contributions. Gächter and Renner (2003), using a standard public goods experimental framework, find high degrees of reciprocity but no significant differences between aggregate contributions when all players contribute simultaneously and when one player makes a leader contribution before the other players respond. Güth, et al. (2007) find that aggregate contributions are only marginally higher with a simple sequential contribution mechanism than with a simultaneous one, and Levati, et al. (2007) show that this small positive effect of sequential moves vanishes in a setting where players have heterogeneous endowments and incomplete information about the distribution of endowments. Potters, et al. (2007) also find a substantial degree of reciprocity in a leader-follower game with a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, but they also find that total contributions do not differ significantly from those observed in a simultaneous move version of the game. Previous experiments that have used non-linear returns from private and/or public goods have not compared alternative move structures (e.g. Keser

(1996); Sefton and Steinberg (1996); Isaac and Walker (1998); Falkinger, et al. (2000); Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (2001); for a review, see Laury and Holt (2008)).³

Our experiment studies two cases, corresponding to different degrees of asymmetry in preferences. In one parameterization the returns from the public good do not vary much across players, and under sequential moves the first-mover is predicted to contribute zero, leaving the second-mover to provide the public good. Aggregate contributions are predicted to be lowest (and lower than under the simultaneous mechanism) in the sequential mechanism when the person with highest returns moves first. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that aggregate contributions are indeed lowest when the person with highest returns moves first. However, the extreme prediction that the first-mover free-rides completely off the second-mover is not supported. We find that second-movers are sometimes willing to punish first-movers who contribute low amounts by contributing less than their best response, and this induces first-movers to contribute higher amounts. A consequence of this is that we do not observe a predicted first mover advantage.

We also study a second parameterization where one player gets much lower returns from the public good than the other. In this case the model yields a move-order invariance prediction: regardless of the order of moves the person with lowest returns contributes nothing, and all contributions are made by the person with highest returns. We find, again consistent with equilibrium predictions, that aggregate contributions are invariant to move structure. Again, however, individual contributions are not as predicted and we find evidence of punishment of low first-mover contributions. In this parameterization we observe an unpredicted first mover *disadvantage*.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we briefly review Varian's model and the main hypotheses our experiment is designed to test. In Section 3 we describe our experiment and in Section 4 report on the results. Section 5 concludes.

³ Another strand of the literature studies step-level public good settings where, in general, there are multiple equilibria and sequential moves can assist coordination on more efficient equilibria. Experiments have shown that sequential contribution mechanisms outperform simultaneous mechanisms in these settings. For example, Erev and Rapoport (1990) and Coats, et al. (2009) find that under a sequential contribution mechanism the rate of success in the provision of the public good is higher than under simultaneous moves.

2. Varian's (1994) model of sequential contributions to a public good

The simplest version of Varian's model is based on a simple quasi-linear setting with two players, and this is the setting used in our experiment.⁴ Varian allows preferences over the public good ('tastes') to differ between the two players and distinguishes between 'the player who likes the public good most' and 'the player who likes the public good least'. In our experiment the player who likes the public good most in this sense is also the player who enjoys a higher return from the public good for any level of provision. We will therefore refer to her as the 'HIGH' player. We refer to the player who likes the public good least as the 'LOW' player.

Player i , $i \in \{\text{HIGH}, \text{LOW}\}$, is endowed with wealth w_i and contributes an amount $0 \leq g_i \leq w_i$ to a public good. The remainder is allocated to private good consumption. The total amount of the public good provided is $G = g_{\text{HIGH}} + g_{\text{LOW}}$. Player i 's payoff is given by:

$$\pi_i = w_i - g_i + f_i(G)$$

where individual i 's return from the public good, $f_i(G)$, is increasing and strictly concave.

If the other agent contributes zero, player i 's best response is her 'stand-alone contribution' \hat{g}_i . Varian assumes $w_i > \hat{g}_i$ so that the first order condition for an interior optimum is satisfied:

$$f'_i(\hat{g}_i) = 1.$$

If player j contributes $g_j > \hat{g}_i$ then i 's marginal return from contributing g_i is $f'_i(g_j + g_i) - 1 < 0$. Thus i 's best response is $g_i = 0$. If player j contributes $g_j \leq \hat{g}_i$, then i 's best response satisfies:

$$f'_i(g_i + g_j) = 1.$$

Comparing this with the first-order condition for an interior optimum we have:

$$f'_i(g_i + g_j) = f'_i(\hat{g}_i)$$

or

$$g_i = \hat{g}_i - g_j.$$


Thus, i 's best response function is:

$$g_i = \max\{\hat{g}_i - g_j, 0\}.$$

⁴ Varian (1994) also shows that his results are more general than this. For example, contributions are weakly higher under simultaneous contributions if the public and private goods are normal and the utilities are common knowledge.

Figure 1 shows the best response functions. Note that the best response functions feature one-for-one crowding out: if a player increases her contribution by one unit, the other player's best response decreases by one unit (as long as her contribution is non-zero).

Figure 1. Best-response functions



With simultaneous moves, the unique Nash Equilibrium is $g_{\text{HIGH}} = \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$, $g_{\text{LOW}} = 0$. Thus the LOW player contributes zero and the HIGH player makes her stand-alone contribution.


Next, suppose the LOW player moves first. In a subgame perfect equilibrium the second-mover's strategy is given by her best response function: $g_{\text{HIGH}} = \max\{\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}} - g_{\text{LOW}}, 0\}$. The LOW player's subgame perfect equilibrium strategy results in her most preferred point on the HIGH player's best response function. Suppose $g_{\text{LOW}} > \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$ so that the HIGH player then contributes zero. The LOW player can reduce g_{LOW} so that the HIGH player still contributes zero, but the LOW player moves closer to her stand-alone contribution (which is her optimal contribution given that $g_{\text{HIGH}} = 0$). Thus, the LOW player's payoff increases as she moves down the vertical part of the HIGH player's best response function. Now suppose that $0 < g_{\text{LOW}} \leq \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$ so that the HIGH player responds by ensuring that $G = \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$. The LOW player can reduce her first-mover contribution and the HIGH player will compensate by increasing her second-mover contribution so that overall provision remains at $G = \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$. Thus the LOW player's payoff continues to increase as she moves down the HIGH player's best response function. Clearly, her most preferred point is where $g_{\text{LOW}} = 0$ and the HIGH player responds by choosing $g_{\text{HIGH}} = \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$. Thus, when the LOW player moves first she contributes

zero, free-riding off the second mover's stand-alone contribution. This outcome is the same as with simultaneous moves.


If the HIGH player moves first she could also commit to contributing zero and rely on the LOW player to contribute \hat{g}_{LOW} , giving her a payoff of $w_{\text{HIGH}} + f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}})$. Also, just as before, if she were to contribute a small amount the LOW player would reduce her contribution to the public good so that total provision remains at \hat{g}_{LOW} . Thus the HIGH player's payoff would decrease, as she would enjoy a lower level of private good consumption and the same level of public good consumption. If the HIGH player contributes more than \hat{g}_{LOW} the LOW player will contribute zero and the HIGH player's payoff will be $w_{\text{HIGH}} - g_{\text{HIGH}} + f_{\text{HIGH}}(g_{\text{HIGH}})$. In this range her payoff is maximized by her stand-alone contribution, \hat{g}_{HIGH} , leading to a payoff of $w_{\text{HIGH}} - \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}} + f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}})$. The HIGH player's optimal first-mover contribution depends on the comparison between her payoff when she contributes zero, $w_{\text{HIGH}} + f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}})$, and her payoff when she makes her stand-alone contribution, $w_{\text{HIGH}} - \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}} + f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}})$.

Figure 2 displays the HIGH player's payoff as a function of her contribution for each of the two following cases. In case (a), with $f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}) - f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}}) > \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for the HIGH player to choose $g_{\text{HIGH}} = \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$ and the LOW player responds with $g_{\text{LOW}} = 0$. Again, the outcome is the same as with simultaneous moves. However, in case (b) where $f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}) - f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}}) < \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$, the subgame perfect equilibrium is for the HIGH player to choose $g_{\text{HIGH}} = 0$ and the LOW player responds with $g_{\text{LOW}} = \hat{g}_{\text{LOW}}$. Here, since $\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}} < \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$ public good provision is lower than with simultaneous moves. Note that if the players have similar tastes for the public good, \hat{g}_{HIGH} will be similar to \hat{g}_{LOW} and so $f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}) - f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}})$ will be close to zero, and condition (b) will be met. Thus when tastes are not too different and the HIGH player moves first, contributions are lower than with simultaneous moves.

Figure 2. The HIGH player's payoff as a function of her first-mover contribution



(a) $f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}) - f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}}) > \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$



(b) $f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}) - f_{\text{HIGH}}(\hat{g}_{\text{LOW}}) < \hat{g}_{\text{HIGH}}$

In summary, Varian's model provides a number of testable predictions. Most generally, *HYPOTHESIS 1. Aggregate contributions are (weakly) higher under a simultaneous contribution mechanism compared to a sequential contribution mechanism.*

More specifically,

HYPOTHESIS 1a. If tastes are sufficiently different aggregate contributions are invariant to the move structure.

HYPOTHESIS 1b. If tastes are not too different aggregate contributions under a simultaneous contribution mechanism are i) the same as when the LOW player moves first, and ii) higher than when the HIGH player contributes first.

The model provides parallel predictions for individual contributions:

HYPOTHESIS 2a. If tastes are sufficiently different individual contributions are invariant to the move structure.

HYPOTHESIS 2b. If tastes are not too different individual contributions under a simultaneous contribution mechanism are the same as when the LOW player moves first. When the HIGH player contributes first she reduces her contribution and the LOW player increases her contribution.

The invariance result in *HYPOTHESIS 2a* implies that payoffs are also invariant to move structure. Thus:

HYPOTHESIS 3a. If tastes are sufficiently different individual payoffs are invariant to move structure.

However, when tastes are not too different payoffs do depend on move structure. *HYPOTHESIS 2b* stems from the first-mover's ability to commit to a contribution and the one-for-one crowding out of contributions. If the HIGH player moves first, rather than make her stand-alone contribution she may prefer to contribute nothing because she knows the LOW player (who likes the public good least, but not too much less) will replace most of her contributions toward the public good. Although less of the public good is provided than under other move orderings, this way the HIGH player avoids the cost of contributing. Thus, in the case where tastes are not too different the first-mover enjoys a first-mover advantage and at the same time the second-mover suffers a second-mover disadvantage:

HYPOTHESIS 3b. If tastes are not too different each player prefers being first- to second-mover.

In our experiment subjects are paid according to their contributions, where earnings functions are based on the payoff functions of Varian's model. Thus, these predictions also apply to our experimental environment, under the assumption that it is common knowledge that

subjects maximize own-earnings. Given the evidence on the importance of social preferences, and in particular of conditional cooperation in public goods experiments, it is not so clear that experimental evidence will support the hypotheses outlined above. Will first-mover contributions really crowd out second-mover contributions? Is it perhaps more likely that, as in previous linear public good experiments, second-movers will contribute *more* after the first mover contributes? And, if the first-mover attempts to exploit her theoretical first-mover advantage by committing to contributing zero, will second-movers really contribute their private optimum, irrespective of the fact that by doing so they are helping the free-rider? Is it perhaps more likely that, as in ultimatum game experiments when responders are confronted with a low offer, second-movers will eschew their private interests in order to resist unfair outcomes?

3. Experimental design and methods

3.1 The experimental game

Our experiment is based on the following two-player game. Each player is endowed with 17 tokens, and must decide how many to place in a Private Account and how many to place in a Shared Account. For each token a player places in the Private Account that player receives 50 points. For each token placed in the Shared Account both players receive an additional amount of points, which differ across players and across treatments as explained further below. The total earnings from the game are the sum of the earnings from the Private Account and the Shared Account. As already discussed in the previous section, the earnings functions imply that the HIGH player enjoys a higher return from the public good than the LOW player.⁵ The earnings are derived from a quadratic utility function of the form:

$$\pi_i = 50 \cdot (17 - g_i) + t_i (68 \cdot (g_i + g_j) - (g_i + g_j)^2)$$

where $g_i, g_j \in \{0, 1, \dots, 17\}$ represent the contribution decisions of player i and j , for $i, j \in \{HIGH, LOW\}$ and $i \neq j$, and where $t_{HIGH} = 1.32$ and $t_{HIGH} > t_{LOW} > 0$.

⁵ During the experiment we never used the labels ‘HIGH’ and ‘LOW’ when referring to the two types of player, but instead used the labels ‘RED’ and ‘BLUE’. See the experimental instructions, reproduced in Appendix A, for further details.

Our treatment variables are the parameter t_{LOW} and the order in which players make their decisions. In our three ‘T78’ treatments we have $t_{LOW} = 0.78$ and the public good generates low returns for the LOW player, while in three ‘T89’ treatments we set $t_{LOW} = 0.89$ and the returns for the LOW player are higher.⁶ For each parameterization we examine treatments where the players play the game simultaneously (‘SIM’), where the HIGH player moves first (‘HIGH’), and where the LOW player moves first (‘LOW’). Our six experimental treatments are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Overview of treatments

Treatment	Order of Moves	t_{LOW}	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium	
			Contributions {HIGH, LOW}	Payoffs {HIGH, LOW}
SIM-T78	Simultaneous	0.78	{15, 0}	{1150, 1470}
LOW-T78	LOW moves first	0.78	{15, 0}	{1150, 1470}
HIGH-T78	HIGH moves first	0.78	{15, 0}	{1150, 1470}
SIM-T89	Simultaneous	0.89	{15, 0}	{1150, 1555}
LOW-T89	LOW moves first	0.89	{15, 0}	{1150, 1555}
HIGH-T89	HIGH moves first	0.89	{0, 6}	{1340, 890}

With these parameters we study both cases discussed in the previous section. In the three T78 treatments the equilibrium involves HIGH contributing 15 tokens and LOW contributing 0 tokens, regardless of move ordering. LOW’s stand-alone contribution is so low that HIGH prefers to supply her own stand-alone contribution even if she is the first-mover. Thus, total contributions, the distribution of contributions and earnings are predicted to be invariant to the move order. In the T89 treatments predictions about contributions and earnings depend on the move order. In SIM-T89 and in LOW-T89 the equilibrium involves HIGH contributing 15 tokens and LOW contributing 0 tokens. However, if HIGH moves first she enjoys a first-mover

⁶ In our experiment earnings were rounded to a multiple of 5 points and then presented to subjects in an Earnings Table, reproduced in Appendices B and C. The rounding preserves the one-for-one crowding out feature of the game as well as the key predictions outlined in the previous section.

advantage by contributing 0 tokens and letting LOW contribute 6 tokens. This final treatment, HIGH-T89, involves a different equilibrium outcome from the other five and illustrates a case where sequential moves yield lower overall contributions than simultaneous moves.

3.2 Procedures

The experiment was conducted at the University of Nottingham using subjects recruited from a university-wide pool of students who had previously indicated their willingness to be paid volunteers in decision-making experiments.⁷ Twelve sessions were conducted (two sessions for each treatment) with 16 participants per session. No subject took part in more than one session and so 192 subjects participated in total. The average age was 20.2 years and 52% were female. All sessions used an identical protocol. Upon arrival, subjects were welcomed and randomly seated at visually separated computer terminals. Subjects were then given a written set of instructions that the experimenter read aloud. The instructions included a set of control questions about how choices translated into earnings. Subjects had to answer all the questions correctly before the experiment could continue.

The decision-making phase of the session consisted of 15 rounds of the game described above, where in each round subjects were randomly matched with another participant. Neither during nor after the experiment were subjects informed about the identity of the other people in the room they were matched with. The matching procedure worked as follows. At the beginning of each session the participants were randomly allocated to one of two eight-person matching groups. The computer then randomly allocated the role of HIGH to four subjects and the role of LOW to the other four subjects in each matching group. Subjects were informed of their role at the beginning of the first round and kept this role throughout the 15 rounds. At the beginning of each round the computer randomly formed pairs consisting of one HIGH and one LOW participant within each matching group. To ensure comparability among sessions and treatments, we randomly formed pairings within each matching group prior to the first session and used the same pairings for all sessions.⁸ Because no information passed across the two matching groups,

⁷ Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).

⁸ Subjects were informed that they would be randomly matched with another person in the room in each round (see Appendix A), although the details of the matching procedure were not specified.

we treat data from each matching group as independent. Thus our design generates two independent observations for each session, or four independent observations per treatment. Repetition of the task was used because we expected that subjects might learn from experience. However, our desire to test predictions based on a one-shot model led us to use the random re-matching design in order to reduce repeated game effects.

Subjects were paid based on their choices in one randomly-determined round. At the end of round fifteen a poker chip was drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The number on the chip determined the round that was used for determining all participants' cash earnings. At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire asking for basic demographic information and were then privately paid according to their point earnings in the round which had been randomly selected at the end of round fifteen. Point earnings were converted into British Pounds at a rate of £0.01 per point. Subject earnings ranged from £8.50 to £17.50, averaging £12.69 (at the time of the experiment £1 \approx \$1.61), and sessions lasted about 75 minutes on average.

4. Experimental results

4.1 Aggregate contributions

We start our analysis by looking at aggregate contributions to the public good made by pairs of subjects across treatments. Table 2 shows aggregate contribution averages and standard deviations in our six treatments. In line with theoretical predictions, aggregate contributions are lowest in HIGH-T89 – averaging 10.2 across the whole 15 rounds, somewhat higher than the predicted 6 tokens – while contributions are about 14 tokens in the other treatments (except in LOW-T89 where contributions seem somewhat lower than predicted).

In all treatments contributions are higher in the first five rounds and then stabilize to a lower level from round 6 onwards. This pattern is clear in Figure 3, which shows the development of average aggregate contributions across the 15 rounds of the experiment. Equilibrium aggregate contributions are shown by dashed lines. In the T78 treatments equilibrium aggregate contributions are invariant to move structure, and the three treatments are in fact difficult to distinguish and appear to track quite well the prediction (dark dash line at 15 tokens). In the T89 treatments equilibrium aggregate contributions are predicted to vary with the


move order, contributions being lower in HIGH-T89 (light dash line at 6 tokens) than in the other two treatments (dark dash line at 15 tokens). Here, consistent with the comparative static predictions, contributions are lower in HIGH-T89 than in the other two treatments, though the magnitude of the difference is smaller than predicted.

Table 2. Aggregate contributions*

Treatment	Predicted	Overall	Round		
			1 to 5	6 to 10	11 to 15
SIM-T78	15	14.55 (5.74)	15.94 (6.55)	13.82 (5.64)	13.87 (4.71)
LOW-T78	15	14.39 (5.28)	16.51 (5.65)	13.61 (4.98)	13.04 (4.55)
HIGH-T78	15	14.10 (4.97)	14.76 (6.68)	13.47 (4.38)	14.07 (3.17)
SIM-T89	15	14.30 (5.98)	16.52 (5.45)	13.77 (5.59)	12.59 (6.24)
LOW-T89	15	13.32 (6.04)	16.21 (6.90)	12.27 (5.19)	11.46 (4.78)
HIGH-T89	6	10.20 (5.39)	12.70 (5.58)	9.45 (4.68)	8.45 (4.99)

*The table shows aggregate contribution per game, with standard deviations in parentheses.


Figure 3. Aggregate contributions across rounds*



*Equilibrium aggregate contributions are shown by dashed lines. HIGH-T89 light dash, all other treatments dark dash.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of aggregate contributions in each treatment. Note that the public good is provided at its equilibrium level more often in the sequential than in the simultaneous treatments. In each of the sequential treatments the modal aggregate contribution level corresponds with the equilibrium contribution level, while this does not occur in either of the simultaneous treatments, where contributions are instead more dispersed. A second noteworthy feature of Figure 4 is that, among the sequential treatments, we observe a larger fraction of aggregate contributions at the equilibrium level in the T78 treatments, where about 45% of the aggregate contributions are at the equilibrium, than in the T89 treatments, where less than 30% of the observed aggregate contributions are at the equilibrium.

Figure 4. Distributions of aggregate contributions by treatment*



* Based on all 240 games in each treatment. Equilibrium aggregate contributions are marked with a star.

As predicted, contributions in HIGH-T89 are significantly different from the other T89 treatments (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: $p = 0.029$; HIGH-T89 vs. SIM-T89: $p = 0.029$).⁹ It is evident from Figures 3 and 4 that this is because contributions are lower in HIGH-T89. The other two T89 treatments do not differ significantly from one another ($p = 0.457$), and nor are there any significant differences in aggregate contributions between the T78 treatments ($p > 0.686$ in all pair-wise comparisons). Thus, our data supports *HYPOTHESES 1a* and *1b*.

RESULT 1 – In line with theoretical predictions, aggregate contributions are (weakly) higher under a simultaneous contribution mechanism compared to a sequential contribution mechanism (*HYPOTHESIS 1*). As predicted, aggregate contributions are invariant to the move structure in the T78 treatments (*HYPOTHESIS 1a*). Also as predicted, aggregate contributions depend on the move structure in the T89 treatments: contributions are significantly lower when the HIGH player is the first contributor than under a simultaneous contribution mechanism or under a contribution mechanism where HIGH is the second contributor (*HYPOTHESIS 1b*).

4.2 Contributions by type of player

We next turn to an analysis of average contribution decisions by type of player, i.e. we look at the distribution of contributions across HIGH and LOW subjects. Table 3 presents HIGH and LOW contribution averages and standard deviations across the six treatments, and Figure 5 shows how these averages develop across rounds.

An evident feature of Table 3 and Figure 5 is that HIGH contributes more than LOW in all treatments. In five of six cases this is consistent with theoretical predictions. The exception is HIGH-T89, where HIGH is predicted to contribute zero and LOW is predicted to contribute six tokens (light dash lines in lower panel of Figure 5), but in fact HIGH contributes an average of 7.71 tokens and LOW contributes 2.49 tokens. In the other treatments HIGH is predicted to contribute 15 tokens and LOW is predicted to contribute 0 tokens (dark dash lines in Figure 5). Although HIGH contributes more than LOW as predicted, contribution levels differ (sometimes

⁹ All p-values are based on two-sided randomization tests applied to 4 independent observations per treatment. Moir (1998) describes the randomization test and discusses its advantages in the analysis of laboratory generated economic data based on small sample sizes.

substantially) from the point predictions made by theory: HIGH contributes less than predicted and LOW contributes more than predicted.

Table 3. Individual contributions by type of player*

Treatment	HIGH		LOW	
	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed
SIM-T78	15	12.00 (4.40)	0	2.55 (3.70)
LOW-T78	15	10.18 (4.76)	0	4.20 (3.80)
HIGH-T78	15	13.10 (3.93)	0	1.00 (2.84)
SIM-T89	15	10.47 (4.96)	0	3.82 (3.32)
LOW-T89	15	9.37 (4.86)	0	3.95 (3.90)
HIGH-T89	0	7.71 (5.42)	6	2.49 (3.16)


*The table shows contribution per game with standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 3 and Figure 5 also suggest that HIGH and LOW contributions tend to differ across the T78 treatments. LOW and HIGH contributions appear closest to theoretical point predictions in the treatment HIGH-T78 and deviate most markedly in LOW-T78. In fact, for both types of player, contributions in HIGH-T78 are significantly different from LOW-T78 (HIGH players: $p = 0.057$; LOW players: $p = 0.029$). This finding is *not* consistent with theoretical predictions because HIGH and LOW contributions should be invariant to the move structure in the T78 treatments (*HYPOTHESIS 2a*).

Our data from the T89 treatments provide mixed evidence concerning *HYPOTHESIS 2b*. Consistent with theoretical predictions, HIGH contributions in HIGH-T89 differ significantly from the other T89 treatments at the 10% level (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: $p = 0.086$; HIGH-T89 vs. SIM-T89: $p = 0.057$). The reason is that HIGH subjects reduce their contributions in HIGH-T89 (although contributions are well above the theoretically predicted level of zero, see Figure 5). On the other hand, contrary to theoretical predictions, LOW contributions in HIGH-

T89 are not significantly different from the other T89 treatments (HIGH-T89 vs. LOW-T89: $p = 0.171$; HIGH-T89 vs. SIM-T89: $p = 0.114$). In fact, while theory predicts that LOW will contribute more in HIGH-T89 than in the other T89 treatments, LOW subjects actually contribute *less*.

Figure 5. HIGH and LOW contributions across rounds*



*Equilibrium contributions are shown by dashed lines. HIGH-T89 light dash, all other treatments dark dash.

Our second result on the distribution of contributions across types of player is therefore somewhat inconsistent with theoretical predictions:

RESULT 2: Inconsistent with *HYPOTHESIS 2a* LOW and HIGH contributions are *not* invariant to the move structure in the T78 treatments. In the T89 treatments *HYPOTHESIS 2b* suggests HIGH will reduce her contribution and LOW will increase her contribution when HIGH moves first. Although HIGH does reduce her contribution when she moves first, LOW *fails* to increase her contribution significantly.

4.3 First-mover advantage

In the T78 treatments players' stand-alone contributions to the public good are so different that, in theory, HIGH provides the public good by herself irrespective of the move structure. Hence, both HIGH and LOW are indifferent between moving first or moving second (*HYPOTHESIS 3a*). By contrast, in theory the move structure matters in the T89 treatments. Both players would prefer to move first, commit to zero initial contributions, and force the second-mover to provide the public good. This results in a first-mover advantage and a second-mover disadvantage in the T89 treatments (*HYPOTHESIS 3b*).

Our data cannot confirm either hypothesis. Table 4 shows average earnings made by HIGH and LOW subjects in the sequential treatments. In the T78 treatments there is a clear first-mover *disadvantage* in our data: HIGH subjects are worse off in HIGH-T78, where they move first, than in LOW-T78, where they move second, and vice versa for LOW subjects. The differences in earnings between the two T78 treatments are significant for both types of player ($p = 0.029$ in both comparisons).¹⁰

Moving to *HYPOTHESIS 3b*, HIGH subjects should be better off in HIGH-T89 (i.e. where they are the first-mover) than in LOW-T89 (i.e. where they are the second-mover), and vice versa for LOW subjects. Our data show that HIGH average earnings are actually *lower* when they move

¹⁰ The result holds for LOW even in the last 5 rounds of the experiment ($p = 0.029$). HIGH earnings are still higher in LOW-T78 than in HIGH-T78 in the last 5 rounds (1232 vs. 1151), but the difference is just insignificant ($p = 0.114$).

first than when they move second, and the difference is significant at the 10% level ($p = 0.086$). LOW earnings do not differ significantly across the sequential T89 treatments ($p = 0.286$).¹¹

Table 4. Earnings by type of player*

Treatment	HIGH		LOW	
	Predicted	Observed	Predicted	Observed
LOW-T78	1150	1321 (189.1)	1470	1219 (194.9)
HIGH-T78	1150	1164 (104.2)	1470	1373 (162.3)
LOW-T89	1150	1293 (202.6)	1555	1269 (202.4)
HIGH-T89	1340	1203 (168.8)	890	1228 (234.2)

* The table shows average earnings, in points, per game, based on all rounds of data. Standard deviations in parentheses.

RESULT 3: Contrary to theoretical predictions, we observe a first-mover *disadvantage* in the T78 treatments (where the distribution of earnings should be invariant to the move structure), and we fail to observe a first-mover advantage in the T89 treatments (where it should be observed). Thus, our data are inconsistent with *HYPOTHESES 3a* and *3b*.

4.4 Individual behavior

While our data generally support Varian’s model predictions for aggregate contributions, we find much less evidence in support of the parallel theoretical predictions for individual contributions and earnings. In this sub-section we examine in more detail the divergences between theoretically predicted and observed behavior, focusing on the sequential treatments. We start our analysis of individual behavior by categorizing second-mover behavior relative to best responses in each of the four sequential treatments (Table 5).

¹¹ We fail to observe a first-mover advantage for HIGH even in the last 5 rounds of the experiment ($p = 0.314$). We do instead have evidence for a first-mover advantage for LOW. LOW earnings are higher in LOW-T89 (1289) than in HIGH-T89 (1172) in the last 5 rounds and the difference is significant ($p = 0.029$).

Table 5. Second-mover contributions relative to best-response

Treatment	% of second-movers' contributions		
	equal to the best-response	lower than the best-response	higher than the best-response
	<i>all rounds (N = 240 per treatment)</i>		
LOW-T78	41	32	27
HIGH-T78	73	-	27
LOW-T89	25	49	26
HIGH-T89	60	9	31
	<i>last 5 rounds only (N = 80 per treatment)</i>		
LOW-T78	51	34	15
HIGH-T78	81	-	19
LOW-T89	25	63	12
HIGH-T89	60	20	20

A large fraction of second-mover's contributions are not a best response to the first-mover's contribution decision. The treatment where second-movers' decisions are most in line with their best-response is HIGH-T78, and this is also the treatment that exhibits by far the greatest degree of conformance with equilibrium point predictions, as discussed above (see, e.g., Table 3).¹² This treatment also differs from the other sequential treatments in that theory predicts only the first-mover will contribute.¹³

¹² Note also that lower-than-best response to first-mover decisions can occur very limitedly in HIGH-T78, as second-movers' best-response function is flat at zero for most of first-mover's contributions.

¹³ Another structural feature of the HIGH-T78 treatment that distinguishes it from the other sequential treatments is that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is also the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, whereas in the other treatments there are (imperfect) Nash equilibria where aggregate contributions are the same as in the subgame perfect equilibrium, but the first mover makes positive contributions. For example, a second-mover might threaten to contribute 0 tokens if the first-mover contributes less than a threshold value \bar{g} and to best-respond if and only if $g \geq \bar{g}$. Given this threat the first-mover may find it optimal to choose \bar{g} .


Pooling across the other three sequential treatments we note that second-movers contributed below their best response in 30% of games and above in 28% of games. However, in all three treatments we observe that contributions lower than the best-response persist and actually *grow* over time, while contributions higher than the best-response appear to be a phenomenon due (at least in part) to subjects' inexperience with the experimental setting and tend to decrease (roughly by 50%) across rounds. Focusing on the last five rounds, deviations from best-responses are just as frequent as in earlier rounds, but they are more likely to be deviations below the best-response function.

When second-movers contribute less than their best-response, this disproportionately occurs in reaction to very low initial contributions. Figure 6 shows optimal and empirical second-mover responses to first-mover contributions in the three treatments where we observe deviations below the best-response function. About 60% of the deviations below the best-response function occur when a first-mover contributes between 0 and 2 tokens, while we cannot distinguish a similar pattern for deviations above the best-response function, as they do not seem to be clustered at any specific interval of the first-mover's contributions.¹⁴

In general, second-mover behavior in these three treatments generates observed response functions that are flatter than predicted by theory. Table 6 reports a Tobit analysis of second movers' contributions on first movers' initial contribution decision and confirms this observation. The observed slope of second-movers' response function, although negative, is much less than the predicted value of -1. Indeed, the coefficient is not significant in the treatments where LOW moves first. The intercept coefficient is also lower than predicted (predicted $\beta_0 = 15$ for the LOW-T78 and LOW-T89 and $\beta_0 = 6$ for the HIGH-T89 treatments).

¹⁴ 26% of the deviations above the best-response occur when the first-mover contributes between 0 and 2 tokens, 22% when the first-mover contributes between 3 and 5 tokens, 19% when the first-mover contributes between 6 and 8 tokens, 17% when the first-mover contributes between 9 and 11 tokens and 16% when the first-mover contributes 12 tokens or more.

Figure 6. Average responses by second-movers to the first-mover's contributions.*
 All rounds (left panels) and last 5 rounds only (right panels).



* Numbers below the horizontal axes report the observed frequency of each contribution decision by first-movers.

Table 6. Empirical response functions: Tobit regressions

<i>Treatment</i>	Estimated equation:		
	$2^{nd} \text{ mover 's contribution} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot 1^{st} \text{ mover 's contribution}$		
	β_0	β_1	<i>N</i>
LOW-T78	11.751 ^{***} (1.319)	-0.336 (0.212)	240
LOW-T89	9.779 ^{***} (0.804)	-0.043 (0.115)	240
HIGH-T89	4.008 ^{***} (0.527)	-0.434 ^{***} (0.116)	240

Robust standard errors in parentheses adjusted for intra-group correlation (matching-groups are used as independent clustering units).

*.05 ≤ *p* ≤ .10; ** .01 ≤ *p* < .05; *** *p* < .01.

Overall, these observations suggest that some second-movers adopt a punishment strategy in these treatments: they punish first-movers for excessively low contributions by systematically lowering their contribution-responses *below* the best-response line.¹⁵ Moreover, this aspect of second-mover behavior persists and is just as clearly observed in the last five rounds. This aspect of our data is reminiscent of Huck, et al. (2001) ‘punishment-for-exploitation’ finding from Stackelberg quantity choice duopoly games. They find that when first-movers attempt to exploit their first-mover advantage by committing to a high quantity, second-movers produce more than their best response. Relative to the best response this is, of course, costly for the second-mover. Relative to the best response it is also detrimental to first movers since it results in a higher aggregate quantity and hence a lower price. More generally, this aspect of our data is reminiscent of punishment of free-riders in linear public goods games (for a survey of results see Gächter and Herrmann (2009)).

It is interesting to consider the implications of second-mover behavior for the T89 treatments. In LOW-T89 this punishment resulted in lower aggregate contributions than

¹⁵ Note that punishment is relatively cheap for second-movers but can be quite costly to first-movers. For example, in the treatment LOW-T89 if HIGH second-movers reacted to a zero-contribution by LOW by contributing nothing rather than the best-response of 15 tokens, they would reduce their own earnings by 300 points but decrease LOW earnings by 705 points.

predicted. However, the effect is not strong enough to result in a very sharp decline in aggregate contributions relative to predictions, particularly since LOW gave, on average, about four tokens, somewhat more than the predicted zero contribution. In HIGH-T89 the punishment has a strong effect on first-mover incentives. In theory HIGH should free ride because if she makes her stand-alone contribution she will earn $100 + 1050 = 1150$, while if she free rides her earnings will be $850 + 490 = 1340$, about 17% higher. However, taking an approximation from Table 6, if LOW only contributes 4 tokens when HIGH free-rides, HIGH earns only $850 + 340 = 1190$ from free riding, only 3% higher. Thus, incentives for the HIGH first-mover to free ride are considerably diluted. This may explain why a significant number of HIGH first-movers contributed 15 tokens, and average HIGH contributions are almost 8 tokens. Thus, while contributions are lower in HIGH-T89 than LOW-T89, the difference is not nearly as large as predicted.

5. Conclusion

Our paper reports an experiment where conventional theory (i.e. ignoring social preferences) predicts that leader contributions crowd out subsequent contributions. In one set of treatments differences in returns from the public good are sufficiently large to dictate that, in theory, the agent with the highest returns from the public good supplies the public good regardless of move ordering. In the other set of treatments returns from the public good are not too different and, theoretically, leaders should cut back on their contributions expecting followers to compensate, and thus contributors should prefer to be early, low, contributors rather than late, high, contributors.

Two important theoretical implications of the model are that when returns from the public good are not too different i) sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than simultaneous contributions, and ii) there is a ‘first-mover advantage’: a contributor will be better off making an early commitment to a low contribution than waiting and responding to the contributions of early contributors.

Our results support the argument that simultaneous mechanisms are better than sequential mechanisms from the point of view of maximizing aggregate contributions, at least in the full information environment studied. Consistent with the model predictions we found that when returns from the public good are sufficiently different aggregate contributions are independent of

move structure, but when returns from the public good are not too different aggregate contributions are lower when the person with the highest returns from the public good moves first.

Although we find that early contributions to a public good *do* crowd-out subsequent contributions, this does not occur to the extent predicted by theory. In particular, late contributors resist being taken advantage of by early low contributors. Rather than fully compensating low initial contributions, they only partially compensate. This induces early contributors to contribute more than they otherwise would. One of the implications is that, relative to theoretical predictions, contributions are less extreme than predicted. Another implication is that there is not much of an advantage to committing to being a free-rider. In fact, we find no first-mover advantage in the parameter set where it is predicted, and a first-mover *dis*advantage in the other parameter set where earnings are predicted to be independent of move ordering.

Our results on the distribution of contributions and move advantage have important implications. First, if a fundraiser is choosing between a sequential and simultaneous solicitation mechanism the optimal choice may depend on the distribution of contributions as well as the level of overall contributions. Although aggregate contributions follow theoretically predicted directions, the distribution of contributions does not. When the person with lowest returns from the public good moves first aggregate contributions are never lower and the distribution of contributions is also more even. Thus, this sequential move ordering may be quite acceptable on many normative criteria, and may even be preferred to a simultaneous move structure. Second, in some settings the move structure is not exogenously imposed, but rather emerges endogenously, and this process typically reflects how alternative move structures reward participants. We find that in the case where theoretically lower aggregate contributions are associated with a theoretical first-mover advantage, no first move advantage is actually attained. Thus, it is unclear whether the detrimental move ordering would emerge in practice.

Appendix A: Experimental Instructions

Instructions

General

Welcome! You are about to take part in an experiment in the economics of decision making. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. The amount you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully. It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until the experiment is over. If you have a question at any time, raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it.

The experiment will consist of fifteen rounds. There are sixteen participants in this room. Before the first round begins the computer will randomly assign the role of “RED” to eight participants and the role of “BLUE” to eight participants. You will be informed of your role, either RED or BLUE, at the beginning of round one and you will keep this role throughout the fifteen rounds. In each round the computer will randomly form eight pairs consisting of one RED and one BLUE participant. Thus, you will be randomly matched with another person in this room in each round, but this may be a different person from round to round. You will not learn who is matched with you in any round, neither during nor after today’s session.

Each round is identical. In each round you and the person you are matched with will make choices and earn points. The point earnings will depend on the choices as we will explain below. At the end of the experiment one of the fifteen rounds will be selected at random. Your earnings from the experiment will depend on your point earnings in this randomly selected round. These point earnings will be converted into cash at a rate of 1p per point.

How You Earn Points

At the beginning of the round you will be given an endowment of 17 tokens. You have to decide how many of these tokens to place in a Private Account and how many to place in a Shared Account.

For each token you place in your Private Account you will earn 50 points, as shown in Table 1.

For each token placed in the Shared Account you will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether the token was placed by you or the person you are matched with. Likewise, for each token placed in the Shared Account the person you are matched with will earn an additional amount, regardless of whether the token was placed by you or them. Earnings from the Shared Account are shown in Table 2.

Your point earnings for the round will be the sum of your earnings from your Private Account and your earnings from the Shared Account.

So that everyone understands how choices translate into point earnings we will give an example and a test. Please note that the allocations of tokens used for the example and test are simply for illustrative purposes. In the experiment the allocations will depend on the actual choices of the participants.

[T78 treatments:

Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the Shared Account, and BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in the Shared Account. In this example there are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 1050 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his Private Account, plus 620 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1120 points.]

[T89 treatments:

Example: Suppose RED places 9 tokens in his Private Account and 8 tokens in the Shared Account, and BLUE places 10 tokens in his Private Account and 7 tokens in the Shared Account. In this example there are a total of 15 tokens in the Shared Account. RED will earn 450 points from his Private Account, plus 1050 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1500 points. BLUE will earn 500 points from his Private Account, plus 705 points from the Shared Account, for a total of 1205 points.]

Test: Before we continue with the instructions we want to make sure that everyone understands how their earnings are determined. Please answer the questions below. Raise your hand if you have a question. After a few minutes a monitor will check your answers. When everyone has answered the questions correctly we will continue with the instructions.

Suppose RED allocates 11 tokens to his Private Account and 6 tokens to the Shared Account, and BLUE allocates 5 tokens to his Private Account and 12 tokens to the Shared Account.

1. What will be RED's point earnings from his private account? _____
2. What will be RED's point earnings from the shared account? _____
3. What will be RED's point earnings for the round? _____
4. What will be BLUE's point earnings from his private account? _____
5. What will be BLUE's point earnings from the shared account? _____
6. What will be BLUE's point earnings for the round? _____

How You Make Decisions

[Sequential treatments:

At the beginning of a round BLUE will make a decision about how to allocate his or her endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. BLUE can enter any whole number between

0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder of BLUE's endowment in BLUE's Private Account.

The computer will then inform RED of BLUE's decision.

After RED has seen how many tokens BLUE has allocated to the Shared Account, RED will decide how to allocate his or her endowment. RED will do this by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. RED can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder of RED's endowment in RED's Private Account.

After RED has made his or her decision the computer will then show an information screen to both RED and BLUE. This screen will display the total number of tokens placed in the Shared Account and the earnings of each person for that round.]

[Simultaneous treatments:

At the beginning of a round you will make a decision about how to allocate your endowment by typing in a number of tokens to place in the Shared Account. You can enter any whole number between 0 and 17 inclusive. The computer will then automatically place the remainder of your endowment in your Private Account.

At the same time, the person with whom you are matched will be deciding how many tokens to place in the Shared Account by entering a number between 0 and 17 inclusive.

After you and the person you are matched with have both made your decisions the computer will then show an information screen to both RED and BLUE. This screen will display the total number of tokens placed in the Shared Account and the earnings of each person for that round.]

After you have read the information screen, you must click on the continue button to go on to the next round.

How Your Cash Earnings Are Determined

At the end of round fifteen there will be a random draw to select the round for which you will be paid. A poker chip will be drawn from a bag containing chips numbered from 1 to 15. The number on the chip will determine the round that is used for determining all participants' cash earnings. Your point earnings in this randomly selected round will be converted into cash at a rate of 1p per point. You will be paid in private and in cash.

Beginning the Experiment

Now, please look at your computer screen and begin making your decisions. If you have a question at any time please raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it.

Appendix B. Earnings Tables for T78 treatments

EARNINGS TABLES

Table 1. Earnings from Your Private Account

TOKENS IN YOUR PRIVATE ACCOUNT	YOUR POINT EARNINGS FROM THE PRIVATE ACCOUNT
0	0
1	50
2	100
3	150
4	200
5	250
6	300
7	350
8	400
9	450
10	500
11	550
12	600
13	650
14	700
15	750
16	800
17	850

Table 2. Earnings from the Shared Account

TOKENS IN THE SHARED ACCOUNT	RED'S POINT EARNINGS FROM THE SHARED ACCOUNT	BLUE'S POINT EARNINGS FROM THE SHARED ACCOUNT
0	0	0
1	90	55
2	180	110
3	260	155
4	340	200
5	415	245
6	490	290
7	565	330
8	635	370
9	700	410
10	765	450
11	825	485
12	885	520
13	940	555
14	995	590
15	1050	620
16	1095	650
17	1140	675
18	1180	700
19	1220	725
20	1260	750
21	1295	770
22	1330	790
23	1360	805
24	1385	820
25	1410	835
26	1435	850
27	1455	860
28	1470	870
29	1485	880
30	1500	890
31	1510	895
32	1515	900
33	1520	905
34	1525	910

Appendix C. Earnings Tables for T89 treatments

EARNINGS TABLES

Table 1. Earnings from Your Private Account

TOKENS IN YOUR PRIVATE ACCOUNT	YOUR POINT EARNINGS FROM THE PRIVATE ACCOUNT
0	0
1	50
2	100
3	150
4	200
5	250
6	300
7	350
8	400
9	450
10	500
11	550
12	600
13	650
14	700
15	750
16	800
17	850

Table 2. Earnings from the Shared Account

TOKENS IN THE SHARED ACCOUNT	RED'S POINT EARNINGS FROM THE SHARED ACCOUNT	BLUE'S POINT EARNINGS FROM THE SHARED ACCOUNT
0	0	0
1	90	60
2	180	120
3	260	175
4	340	230
5	415	285
6	490	340
7	565	385
8	635	430
9	700	475
10	765	520
11	825	560
12	885	600
13	940	635
14	995	670
15	1050	705
16	1095	740
17	1140	770
18	1180	800
19	1220	830
20	1260	855
21	1295	880
22	1330	900
23	1360	920
24	1385	940
25	1410	960
26	1435	975
27	1455	990
28	1470	1000
29	1485	1010
30	1500	1020
31	1510	1025
32	1515	1030
33	1520	1035
34	1525	1040

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