CESifo Working Papers

Game of Zones:
The Political Economy of Conservation Areas

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Abstract

Provided there are positive external benefits attached to the historic character of buildings, owners of properties in designated conservation areas benefit from a reduction in uncertainty regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the restrictions put in place to ensure the preservation of the historic character limit the degree to which properties can be altered and thus impose a cost to their owners. We test a simple theory of the designation process in which we postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. The implication of the model is that a) an increase in preferences for historic character should increase the likelihood of a designation, and b) new designations at the margin should not be associated with significant house price capitalization effects. Our empirical results are in line with these predictions.

JEL-Code: H230, H310, R400, R580.

Keywords: designation, difference-in-difference, RDD-DD, England, gentrification, heritage, property value.

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1 Introduction

One of the key motivations for a variety of spatial planning policies is how to solve coordination problems inherent to free markets. Among such policies historic preservation occupies a leading position in terms of the rigidity of the related regulations as well as the complexity of related social and private costs and benefits. These policies restrict individual property rights in order to protect buildings with a particular aesthetic, cultural or historic value. In doing so the policy may overcome a coordination problem by ensuring that owners can no longer "freeride" on the character of nearby buildings while making inappropriate changes to their own properties. In other words it may help to solve a so-called prisoner's dilemma (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012). A welfare maximizing preservation policy must take into account social costs and benefits of preservation incurred by the wider society and even future generations. It is therefore unlikely that designation decisions that are considered socially optimal are also in the interest of local homeowners. In this paper we ask the question whether owners are able to 'game the system' to their advantage i.e. whether the designation status of each zone in a neighborhood is determined by the preferences of the homeowners residing there. We answer this question by deriving a model of the designation process in which a planner acts as an agent of local homeowners and then empirically testing its predictions.

Our theory distinguishes between a *heritage effect*, which can be internal or external, i.e., the effect of the appearance of a historic building on the perceived value of the house itself (internal) or nearby houses (external), and a *policy effect*, which results from the legal treatment of the designation policy. We argue that with positive heritage effects, the policy benefits the owners by removing uncertainty regarding the future of the neighborhood, i.e., the presence of the heritage effect. These benefits are opposed by the costs of regulation (in the form of development restrictions and maintenance obligations) so that the net effect of the policy effect is ambiguous. Our theoretical framework predicts positive, but diminishing returns to designation. Taking on the assumption that the planner acts in the interests of local homeowners we can derive a condition for the (political) equilibrium level of designation. This condition generates two empirically testable hypotheses. Firstly, new designations will result from increases in the local preferences for heritage. Secondly, in equilibrium, the marginal costs and benefits of designation will offset each other, resulting in a zero impact of new designations on house prices. At all other locations in a neighborhood the effect will be positive.

We test these implications using two different empirical approaches. Firstly, we estimate the effect of changes in neighborhood composition, what we define as gentrification, on the likelihood of designations using a tobit IV approach. Secondly, we use a hybrid difference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) identification strategy to estimate the effect of new designations on the market value of properties. Our analysis is based on the whole of England, making use of 1 million property transactions from 1995 to 2010 and of about 8,000 designated conservation areas, of which 915 have been designated in the same observation period. We also make use of ward level education data from the UK census for 1991, 2001, and 2011 in order to analyze the effect of changing neighborhood characteristics on the designation status. Previewing our results we find that an increase in the local share of residents holding a university or college degree leads to an expansion of the designated area. The property price effect inside newly designated conservation areas turns out not to be statistically distinguishable from zero. We find evidence that the effect just outside the conservation area boundary is positive and significant. These results are in line with the political equilibrium policy level suggesting that the planner adheres to local homeowner interests.

Our analysis of the conservation area designation process adds to a growing body of literature on the political economy of housing markets, which implicitly or explicitly assumes that property owners are able to influence political outcomes in their own interest (e.g. Boes & Nüesch, 2011; Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner, Sonstelie, & Thayer, 2001; Cellini, Ferreira, & Rothstein, 2010; Dehring, Depken, & Ward, 2008; Fischel, 2001a, 2001b; Hilber & Mayer, 2009; Oates, 1969). We also contribute to a literature that investigates policies related to spatial externalities (Hansen & Libecap, 2004; Libecap & Lueck, 2011; Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, & Owens, 2010), and a literature that investigates the costs and benefits of restrictive planning regimes (e.g. Cheshire & Hilber, 2008; Cheshire, Hilber, & Kaplanis, 2011; Hilber & Vermeulen, 2010). Our results are also relevant to research that has looked into the value amenities add to neighborhoods and cities more generally (e.g. Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, & Wolf, 2012; Bayer, Ferreira, & McMillan, 2007; Brueckner, Thisse, & Zenou, 1999; Chay & Greenstone, 2005; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Edward L. Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2001). Notably, there is also a growing body of literature that is investigating the property price effects of designation policies, mostly focused on the U.S. (e.g. Asabere, Hachey, & Grubaugh, 1989; Asabere & Huffman, 1994; Asabere, Huffman, & Mehdian, 1994; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & Leichenko, 2001; Edward L

Glaeser, 2011; Leichenko, Coulson, & Listokin, 2001; Noonan, 2007; Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & Millerick, 1991).

The key contribution of this study is to provide insights into the political economy of conservation area designation and to examine whether the outcome follows local homeowners interests. We also make a number of more specific, though still important contributions. Firstly, the theoretical framework we develop lends a structure to the designation process that helps to interpret the existing evidence that has typically been derived from ad-hoc empirical models. Secondly, our analysis of conservation area effects on property prices is one of the few rigorous analysis of this kind available for Europe (e.g. Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Koster, Van Ommeren, & Rietveld, 2012; Lazrak, Nijkamp, Rietveld, & Rouwendal, 2013) and the first to analyze England. It is unique in terms of the size and spatial detail of the data set and special in its focus on the spatial modeling of heritage externalities. Thirdly, our difference-in-differences analysis of the designation effects on property prices is one of the few studies that uses a quasi-experimental research design to separate the policy effect of designation from correlated location effects (Koster, et al., 2012; Noonan & Krupka, 2011). Fourthly, we make use of a novel combination of RDD and DD approaches to identify the policy effects on outcome trends and discontinuities from quasi-experimental variation, which could be applied more generally to program evaluations. Fifthly, we provide one of the few empirical analysis of the determinants of heritage designation (Maskey, Brown, & Lin, 2009; Noonan & Krupka, 2010, 2011). More generally, we establish a novel connection between the spatial outcome of a political bargaining process and one of the most striking contemporary urban phenomena: gentrification.

The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces our theoretical model of heritage designations and the institutional setting. Section three presents our empirical strategy. A presentation and discussion of our empirical results is in section 4. The last section concludes.

2 Theory and context

2.1 Theoretical Framework

We assume that a linear neighborhood exists along a spatial dimension x on the interval $[0,1]$. At each point along x there exists a small zone of housing which may be designated as a conservation area as a whole or not.[1] Housing in each zone is endowed with units of internal heritage according to the function $h(x)$, described below. The aggregate of the distribution of internal heritage across all zones gives the heritage character (external heritage) H of the whole neighborhood at any point in time.

Owners in each zone care about their *initial endowment* of internal heritage $h(x)$, which is under their full control, and the *long run* external heritage, which may be damaged by their neighbors' (in all zones) property (re)developments. Such redevelopments occur in the long run with a probability of $(1 - \pi)$ where $0 \leq \pi < 1$ is the 'preservation probability' in the absence of conservation policies. The effect of designating a particular zone is to increase the preservation probability to 1 within that zone.[2] Therefore, the long-run external heritage depends on both the internal heritage distribution and the level of designation.

Within the neighborhood, the initial internal heritage monotonically decreases in x. The theoretical argument does not depend on the functional form. For simplicity we assume *h(x)* to be a linear function of the heritage endowment of the zone at the neighborhood's center (h_0):

$$h(x) = h_0(1 - x) \tag{1}$$

One way to rationalize this distribution is to assume a neighborhood that grew outwards from its historical center (at $x = 0$) until the neighborhood limit (at $x = 1$) and an internal heritage that strictly increases in the age of the housing unit.[3]

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[1] The planner can either designate the whole zone or none of the zone, consistent with the idea of conservation areas as ensembles of buildings that work together to produce a desirable local character. Protection of single buildings is covered by listed building status. Designating a zone is assumed to approximate a marginal increase in the level of designation for the whole neighbourhood. Essentially the zone represents an infinitely small part of the whole neighbourhood.

[2] Our argument does not depend on the assumption of full preservation probability, only that preservation is *more likely* inside conservation areas.

[3] Alternatively, x can simply be interpreted as the rank of a zone in the heritage distribution.

To protect the neighborhood heritage, a planner can choose to designate all zones from the historical center up to where $x = D$ and hence, a share $0 \leq D \leq 1$ of the neighborhood. Since heritage is monotonically decreasing in x it is always rational to start designating at $x = 0$. By affecting the preservation probability, the designation share D determines the external heritage amount to be expected in the long run. The expected long-run external heritage derived from undesignated zones ($x > D$) corresponds to the integral of the distribution of internal heritage multiplied by the preservation probability, $\int_D^1 \pi h(x)\, dx$. This is added to the amount derived from designated zones ($x \leq D$), which is simply the integral of the internal heritage as the preservation probability is equal to one, $\int_0^D h(x)\, dx$.

$$E[H|D] = \int_0^D h(x)\, dx + \int_D^1 \pi h(x)\, dx \tag{2}$$

$$E[H|D] = h_0 \left(1 - \frac{D}{2}\right) D + \frac{\pi}{2} h_0 (1 - D)^2 \tag{3}$$

The expected external heritage integral $E[H|D]$ is indicated by the whole grey-shaded area in Fig. 1. below. The expected amount of external heritage saved by the preservation policy is illustrated as the black-dotted area $\breve{H}$ which denotes the difference in (expected) external heritage between a scenario with no designation and a scenario with a designation share D. This amount is:

$$\breve{H} = h_0 (1 - \pi) \left(1 - \frac{D}{2}\right) D \tag{4}$$

As evident from the partial derivatives, the amount of external heritage saved by the policy increases with the designation share but at a decreasing rate:

$$\frac{\partial \breve{H}}{\partial D} = \frac{\partial E[H|D]}{\partial D} = h_0 (1 - D)(1 - \pi) > 0 \tag{5}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \breve{H}}{\partial D^2} = \frac{\partial^2 E[H|D]}{\partial D^2} = -h_0 (1 - \pi) < 1 \tag{6}$$

The partial derivatives of $\breve{H}$ (which are the same as of H) with respect to D establish a central stylized fact of our theory: There are diminishing returns to designation.

Fig. 1.   Expected heritage distribution with partial designation

Notes: The function $h(x)$ gives the internal heritage at each zone in the neighborhood. The expected external heritage is equal to the grey-shaded area and is the integral of $h(x)$ up to the designation share plus the integral of π times this $h(x)$ from the designation share until the neighborhood limit at $x = 1$. The stippled area marked $\breve{H}$ is the amount of expected external heritage preserved by the policy.

To link the distribution of heritage in the neighborhood to the utility U of a representative individual residing in a zone at x we define a utility function:

$$U(x) = A(x)X^{\delta}L^{1-\delta} \tag{7}$$

where X is a composite consumption good and L is housing space. The Cobb-Douglas form is motivated by the empirical observation that housing expenditure shares tend to be relatively constant across geographies and population groups (Davis & Ortalo-Magné, 2011). $A(x)$ is a composite amenities term:

$$A(x) = a(x)e^{\varphi h(x)}e^{\gamma E[H|D]}e^{-c\widetilde{D}(x)} \tag{8}$$

where a is a further composite indicator of m non-heritage amenities,[4] $h(x)$ is the internal heritage endowment (i.e., heritage character of the specific housing unit), φ is the internal heritage preference parameter, $E[H|D]$ is the external heritage (i.e., expected heritage of surrounding units, which depends on the designation policy) and is conditional on the designation share as defined above, γ is the external heritage preference parameter, and c represents the costs of designation policies, which arise from the development restrictions imposed inside conservation areas. The cost to a representative individual is $e^{-c\widetilde{D}(x)}$ and depends on their zone's designation status $\widetilde{D}(x)$, a binary function of x, which takes the value of one if $x \leq D$ and zero otherwise.

We assume that the designation of a single zone approximates a marginal change to the designation share of the neighborhood as a whole. The positive utility effect of designating a single zone is therefore given by:

$$\frac{dU(x)}{dD} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial E[H|D]}\frac{\partial E[H|D]}{\partial D} = \gamma U(x) h_0 (1-D)(1-\pi) \tag{9}$$

The negative utility effect is incurred only by owners within the zone that changes designation status and is given by:

$$\frac{dU(x)}{d\widetilde{D}(x)} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial \widetilde{D}(x)} = -cU(x) \tag{10}$$

By setting these two equal we find D^*, which is the particular zone for which the net effect of designation will be zero:

$$D^* = 1 - \frac{c}{(1-\pi)\gamma h_0} \tag{11}$$

The relevance of D^* to the planner can be explained in a context where the planner wishes to satisfy as many homeowners in the neighborhood as possible. Simply put, the representative individual in all zones at $x<D^*$ will want their zone to be designated because the benefits to them will outweigh the costs to them. However, in zones at $x>D^*$ the cost of being designated outweighs the benefit for the representative individual. This makes D^* the equilibrium designa-

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[4] Non-heritage amenities are given by: $a = b\prod_m a_m{}^{\rho_m}$ where the different amenity levels are denoted a_m and are given a collective scaling factor b and individual parameters ρ_m.

tion share for a planner that wishes to ensure that the representative homeowner in each zone is happy with their zones designation status.[5]

Based on this condition we can derive some useful comparative statics (see also Figure A1 in the Appendix). The equilibrium designation share is greater when people have a greater taste for external heritage γ or where there is altogether more heritage (determined by the heritage endowment at the neighborhood center h_0, and implicitly the age of the neighborhood):

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \tag{12}$$

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial h_0} > 0 \tag{13}$$

The equilibrium level of designation decreases with the preservation probability π and the cost of designation c:

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \pi} < 0 \tag{14}$$

$$\frac{\partial D^*}{\partial c} < 0 \tag{15}$$

These theoretical implications are in line with intuition and can in principle be transformed into empirically testable hypotheses. However, the heritage at the neighborhood center h_0, the preservation probability π and the costs to owners of conservation policies c are all difficult to observe in reality. For that reason we will concentrate on testing the first comparative statics implication about taste for heritage (proxied by the education level of the local population) in the empirical section.

To develop a testable hypothesis on whether the equilibrium condition is fulfilled, i.e., the planner sets $D = D^*$, we incorporate capitalization effects in the next step. We first assume that individuals maximize their utility defined above subject to a budget constraint: $W = X + \theta(x)L$, where $\theta(x)$ is a housing bid rent. Furthermore we assume spatial equilibrium such that all zones offer the same level of utility $\bar{U}$ which we set equal to one:

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[5] It should be noted again here that this is not the optimal designation share in the sense of social welfare. The level D^* may be below the optimal level because the externality benefit is incident on all other zones in the neighbourhood. Further, it may be above the optimal level because designation reduces housing supply.

$$U(x) = A(x)[\delta W]^{\delta}[(1-\delta)\frac{W}{\theta}]^{1-\delta} = \overline{U} = 1 \tag{16}$$

This can be rearranged to give the spatial equilibrium bid rents for a representative homeowner:

$$\theta(x) = (1-\delta)\big[\delta^{\delta} W a(x) e^{\varphi h(x)} e^{\gamma E[H|D]} e^{-c\widetilde{D}(x)}\big]^{\frac{1}{1-\delta}} \tag{17}$$

In keeping with intuition, the bid rent increases in the expected external heritage, which depends on the designation share D and the internal heritage endowment $h(x)$ and decreases in the designation cost, which is locally constrained to $x \leq D$ as defined above.

The spatial equilibrium condition can be used to derive the marginal effect of an increase in designation share on prices in the neighborhood. In all zones in the neighbourhood a marginal increase in designation share D triggers a positive effect on prices through an increase in the expected external heritage. In the marginal zone, in addition, the change in designation status $\widetilde{D}$ also creates a cost.

$$\frac{d\theta(x)}{dD} = \begin{cases} \dfrac{\partial\theta(x)}{\partial E[H|D]}\dfrac{\partial E[H|D]}{\partial D} + \dfrac{\partial\theta(x)}{\partial\widetilde{D}(x)}d\widetilde{D}(x) \; if \; x = D \\[4mm] \dfrac{\partial\theta(x)}{\partial E[H|D]}\dfrac{\partial E[H|D]}{\partial D} \; if \; x \neq D \end{cases} \tag{18}$$

Substituting in the equilibrium designation share $D = D^{*}$ derived above we get:

$$\frac{d\theta(x)}{dD} = \begin{cases} \dfrac{\theta(x)}{1-\delta}\Big[\gamma h_0\Big(1-1+\dfrac{c}{(1-\pi)\gamma h_0}\Big)(1-\pi)-c\Big] = 0 \; if \; x = D \\[4mm] \dfrac{\theta(x)}{1-\delta}\Big[\gamma h_0\Big(1-1+\dfrac{c}{(1-\pi)\gamma h_0}\Big)(1-\pi)-c\Big] = \dfrac{\theta(x)}{1-\delta} \; if \; x \neq D \end{cases} \tag{19}$$

The two conditions directly translate into two testable hypotheses. If the designation process is in equilibrium, we expect the marginal effect of designation on house prices to be zero in newly designated zones and to be positive at all other zones in the neighborhood. Likewise, an excessive or restrictive designation policy will be associated with negative or positive marginal designation effects.

Assuming that the preservation probability (if undesignated) and the preservation costs are held constant our theory predicts that, in equilibrium designations occur as a result of an increase in the benefits associated with (external) heritage. Such increases in benefits will occur

mechanically over time if the internal (and thus the external) heritage depends on housing age. The effective benefits will also increase as a result of neighborhood turnover, if the in-migrating residents have larger heritage preferences than the incumbents. Designation then becomes a collateral effect of 'gentrification'. The older the conservation area, the greater the accrued benefits of designation may be.

Contrary to the assumption in our theory there is evidence suggesting that heritage externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2012) or housing externalities more generally (Rossi-Hansberg, et al., 2010) decline quite steeply in distance. This means that there may not be a strong positive policy effect outside a newly designated conservation or it may at least be very spatially confined. Further, since our 'zones' are supposed to be infinitely small it may be that some new conservation areas represent the designation of several zones all in one go. For example in the case of a less than marginal change in the taste for heritage. In this case it would be the last zone, or the outer edge of the newly designated conservation area where we would expect a zero effect. There may be positive effects towards the center of a conservation area (under the existence of spatial decay) where the internal heritage density is greater. Whilst we justify our simplified theory on the grounds that most conservation areas are small in reality even compared to the narrow scope of housing externalities, in the empirical section we allow for more flexibility to test these caveats.

2.2 Institutional context

In England, the designation of conservation areas started in 1967 and continues today under the provisions 69 and 70 of the Planning Act 1990 (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas).[6] Conservation areas are those that have been identified as having "special architectural or historic interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or to enhance" (Section 69). The Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 (PPG15) states that a conservation area "may form groups of buildings, open spaces, trees, historic street patterns, village greens or features of historic or archaeological interest. It is the character of the areas rather than individual build-

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6 However, the first legislation to protect the historic environment was enacted in 1882 when the Ancient Monuments Protection Act was passed to protect a small number of designated ancient monuments. More statutory measures came into force in the ensuing years, but it was the passage of the Ancient Monuments Consolidation and Amendment Act in 1913 that set out a more comprehensive legislative framework for the protection of ancient monuments.

ings that conservation areas seek to enhance." Conservation areas are designated on the grounds of local and regional criteria. After the designation, the Local Authority has more control over minor developments and the demolition of buildings (Botrill, 2005). However, the protection an area receives when it is designated a conservation area is determined at the national level to reflect the wider interests of society.

In 2011 there were around 9,800 conservation areas in England. Conservation areas vary in character and size. Many have strong historical links, for example an architectural style associated with a certain period. Besides these characteristics, designation is made based on softer benefits said to have emanated from conservation area designation including: the creation of a unique sense of place-based identity, encouraging community cohesion, and promoting regeneration (HM Government, 2010).[7] This 'instrumentalization' of conservation policy, which seeks to encompass heritage values, economic values, and public policy outcomes, has been identified as a key shift in the English policy context (Pendlebury, 2009; Strange, 2003). This is reflective of the notion of heritage not as a single definable entity, but as a political, social, cultural, and economic "bundle of processes" (Avrami, 2000cited in Pendlebury, 2009: 7).

In combination with bottom-up schemes leading to designation (e.g., community-led designation), the complex heritage preservation agenda which pursues a multitude of objectives and the institutional setting with responsibilities shared across several institutional layers creates significant scope for organized interest groups like property owners to influence the outcome of a political bargaining process.

3 Empirical Strategy

3.1 Designation process

The first potentially testable implications of our theoretical model are the partial derivatives (12) to (15). As mentioned in the theory section it is difficult to find feasible proxies for the variables π, c and h_0. We therefore concentrate on testing the first of these conditions, i.e., the 'taste' for heritage γ has a positive effect on optimal designation share D^* in a neighborhood. We adopt the common assertion that the demand for urban consumption amenities increases in

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[7] See for details HM Government (2010): *The Government's Statement on the Historic Environment for England*. London: DCMS.

education and income (Brueckner, et al., 1999; Carlino & Saiz, 2008; Edward L. Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; van Duijn & Rouwendal, 2013). In particular, we assume that the preference for heritage γ_n in a neighborhood n is related to the share of people in the neighborhood who hold a higher education certificate (DEG_i)[8] with the following functional form:

$$\gamma_{nt} = DEG_{nt}{}^{\vartheta} e^{-\varepsilon_{nt}} \tag{20}$$

where $\vartheta > 0$ such that the relationship is positive. The selection of DEG as educational proxy is driven by data availability. It is perhaps notable that assuming 12 [16] years of education for non-degree [degree] holders a 100% increase in degree share is synonymous to an additional average year of education in a ward with an initial degree share of 25%. Since the purpose of our empirical exercise is to evaluate the causal impact of changes in heritage preferences on designation status – and not the causal impact of education on heritage preference – it is sufficient to assume that ϑ captures a correlation between education and heritage preferences. ε_{nt} is a random disturbance term capturing determinants of heritage preferences that are not correlated with education. Rearranging the equilibrium designation share equation (11), substituting the education degree proxy relationship and taking logs we arrive at the following empirical specification:

$$\log(1 - D_{nt}) = \alpha - \vartheta \log(DEG_{nt}) - \omega_n + \varepsilon_{nt} \tag{21}$$

$$\text{where } \alpha = \log(1 - \pi) - \log(c) \text{ and } \omega_n = \log(h_{0n}) + l_n. \tag{22}$$

The n subscripts correspond to the individual 'neighborhoods' of our theoretical model and we choose to represent these empirically as UK Census wards. Wards are the smallest geographical areas that are comparable between 1991 and 2011 Censuses. Subscript t stands for time periods for which we use the Census years of 1991 and 2011. All idiosyncratic time-invariant location components l_n (location-specific determinants of designation not modeled in our theory) and the unobserved heritage endowment h_{0n} of a neighborhood n as captured by ω_n as well as the preservation probability π and the costs to owners of conservation policies are removed by taking first-differences:

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[8]   We also use income as a proxy for a subsample of our data set – results are reported in the appendix.

$$\Delta \log(1 - D_n) = \Delta \alpha - \vartheta \, \Delta \log(DEG_n) + \Delta \varepsilon_n \qquad (23)$$

Our estimation equation now depicts that a neighborhood change reflected in a positive change in (log) educational degree share causes the (logged) share of non-designated land on the left-hand side to decrease. This is just another way of saying that a positive change in educational degree leads to a higher designation share, although the transformation is non-linear. Note that we implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium in the sense that all areas that should be designated at t are in fact designated. To support the case, we estimate our model using a long difference between 1991 and 2011, which is more than two decades after the start of the policy and the initial wave of designations. Results for the smaller differences between 1991–2001, and 2001–2011 respectively, are reported in the appendix.

Equation (23) evidently follows from a stylized model world. In the empirical implementation we add a number of covariates to control for alternative determinants of designation. The ongoing designation is then only determined by the local changes in preferences and the steady aging of buildings and the effects on heritage, which are differentiated out. To control for the contagion effects in designation we add the initial (1991) designation share which we instrument with the share in 1981 to avoid a mechanical relationship with the dependent variable. A number of variables are added to account for heterogeneity in the net benefits of designation and abilities to express (collective) opinions in a political bargaining that may influence the designation decision. These include the initial (1991) degree share, the homeownership rate, the household size, the average population age, and the share of foreigners (both in initial shares and changes). We alter the baseline model in a number of robustness checks to account for institutional heterogeneity at the TTWA level, neighborhood appreciation trends and, to the extent possible, the historic and physical quality of the housing stock.

In practice, however, it is difficult to control for all determinants of designation that are external to our model. One particular concern is that areas can be designated if the heritage is threatened by poor maintenance in a declining neighborhood. Such derelict is likely to be negatively correlated with our explanatory variable and is unlikely to be fully captured by the control variables we have at hand. At the same time, the policy itself could make it more likely that educated people are attracted to designated areas due to a different valuation of uncertainty (reverse causality). Since an OLS estimation of equation (23) can result in a significant bias in either direction we make use of instrumental variables z_n, which predict changes in education,

$\rho(z_n, \Delta \log DEG_n) \neq 0$, but must be conditionally uncorrelated with the differenced error term, $\rho(z_n, \Delta \varepsilon_{nt}) = 0$. We argue that rail station (in London additionally Tube station) density as well as effective employment accessibility (both time-invariant in levels) are good predictors of neighborhood gentrification (Florida, 2002; Edward L. Glaeser, et al., 2001).[9] We also argue that it is unlikely that these level variables directly impact on the likelihood of designation conditional on the unobserved heritage endowment in the fixed effects ω_n.

Another empirical concern is that, theoretically, a decrease in preferences for heritage must provoke a reduction of the designated area. The abolishment of conservation areas, however, is extremely rare in England so our data is left-censored (we do not observe increases in the share of non-designated land). Since we are interested in testing whether the mechanisms emphasized by the model are at work, and not simply the causal effect of changes in degree share on designation share, we take the model to the data using a tobit approach:

$$Y_n^* = \Delta \alpha - \vartheta \, \Delta \log(DEG_n) + \Delta \varepsilon_n, \quad \Delta \varepsilon_n \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \tag{24}$$

, where $Y_n^* = \Delta \log(1 - D_n)$ is a latent variable and the observed variable is defined as follows

$$Y_n = \begin{cases} Y_n^*, & if \ Y_n^* = \Delta \log(1 - D_n) \ < 0 \\ 0, & if \ Y_n^* \qquad\qquad\qquad\quad \geq 0 \end{cases} \tag{25}$$

3.2 Equilibrium designation

To test whether the designation share in practice is set at the equilibrium level (D^*) we employ hedonic regression (Rosen, 1974) to estimate the effect of the event of designation on property prices within and surrounding conservation areas. In its essence our quasi-experimental methods are a derivative of the established difference-in-differences (DD) methodology (e.g. Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). We draw elements of the increasingly popular regression discontinuity designs (RDD) (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008), however, to relax the DD assumptions of homogeneous trends and a singular treatment date to separate smooth variation (e.g.,

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[9] Our measure of effective employment accessibility aggregates employment in surrounding regions weighted by distance. We use exponential distance weights that are popular in the theoretical (Fujita & Ogawa, 1982; Rossi-Hansberg, et al., 2010) and the decay parameter estimate provided by Ahlfeldt (2013). Transport infrastructure is captured by a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2 km which is considered to be the maximum distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005).

externalities) and discontinuities (e.g., conservation area boundaries) in treatment effects from correlated unobservables.

Difference-in-differences

We define a group of 912 'treated' conservation areas as those that were designated between the years 1996 and 2010 to ensure we observe property transactions both before and after the designation date. Our counterfactuals are established via various control groups of housing units that are similar to the treated units but are themselves not treated. These control groups are discussed in more detail in the results section and in the appendix (Section A2.2).

Our baseline DD model takes the following form:

$$p_{it} = \beta^I I_i + \beta^E E_i + \beta^{IPost}(I_i \times Post_{it}) + \beta^{EPost}(E_i \times Post_{it}) + X_i'\mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (26)$$

where p_{it} is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property i in time period t, I_i is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation area, E_i indicates observations external to the treated CA. While our standard models use a buffer area of 500m we also experiment with various alternative spatial specifications. $Post_{it}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether the transaction year t is equal to or greater than the designation year, X_i is a vector of controls for property, neighborhood and environmental characteristics, f_n is a set of n location fixed effects and Y_t are year effects. The β^{IPost} and β^{EPost} parameters give the difference-in-differences estimates of the designation effect on the properties within and just outside a conservation area. We show in Appendix 2.2 that β^{IPost} is equal to the net marginal policy (designation costs and benefits) effect while β^{EPost} reflects the pure (albeit spatially discounted) policy benefit.

Temporal regression discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD)

The standard DD specification (26) identifies the policy treatment effect under some arguably restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the treatment and control groups follow the same trend before and after the treatment. Secondly, the treatment occurs at a singular and *a priori* known date and affects the level (and not the trend) of the outcome variable. These assumptions are evidently violated if the outcome variable does not respond immediately to the treatment, e.g., because of costly arbitrage, or in anticipation of the treatment, for example because of an invest-

ment motive by buyers (Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013). In our case, a positive pre-trend can also be associated with the gentrification that causes designation according to our theoretical model, a reverse causality problem.

To address these limitations of the standard DD we refine the model to accommodate differences in trends across the treatment and the control group. We borrow the functional form from the RDD literature where a (temporal) treatment effect is identified as an instant adjustment – a discontinuity – conditional on higher order polynomial (pre- and post-) trends, which are assumed to be unrelated to the treatment (Bento, Kaffine, & Roth, 2010). In our regression discontinuity design of differences (RDD-DD) we combine an RDD-type polynomial specification of trends with the control group-based counterfactual from the DD. It is therefore possible to attribute pre- and post-trends to the treatment as long as it is credible to assume that treatment and control groups would have followed the same trend in the absence of the treatment. It is notable that even if this assumption is violated the RDD-DD (unlike the standard RDD) will at least remove macro-economic shocks from the treatment effect by taking differences from the control group. This improves identification so long as the control group remains unaffected by the treatment. Our RDD-DD with linear trends takes the following form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_{it} = {} & \beta^I I_i + \beta^{IYD}(I_i \times YD_{it}) + \beta^E E_i + \beta^{EYD}(E_i \times YD_{it}) + \beta^{IPost}(I_i \times Post_{it}) \qquad (27) \\
& + \beta^{IPostYD}(I_i \times Post_{it} \times YD_{it}) + \beta^{EPost}(E_i \times Post_{it}) \\
& + \beta^{EPostYD}(E_i \times Post_{it} \times YD_{it}) + X_i' \mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it}
\end{aligned}
$$

where YD_{it} is the number of years since the designation date, with the pre-designation years having negative values. As in the RDD, the polynomial degree of the trend can be increased subject to sufficient degrees of freedom. We make use of a quadratic trend specification and evaluate the fit of the parametric polynomial function using a semi-parametric version of (27) that replaces the YD_{it} variables with full sets of years-since-designation effects (details in the appendix).

A significant 'dis-in-diff' parameter (β^{IPost} or β^{EPost}) can be entirely attributed to the treatment even under the existence of complex relative trends that are unrelated to the treatment or may even have caused the treatment as the comparison is made just before and just after the treatment date. Under the assumption of homogeneous counterfactual trends the significant pre-trend parameters (β^{IYD} or β^{EYD}) describe the anticipation effects. Significant post-trend param-

eters ($\beta^{IPostYD}$ or $\beta^{EPostYD}$) then indicate changes in relative trends after the treatment. In conjunction, the 'dis-in-diff' and the pre- and post-trend parameters describe the full temporal structure of the treatment effect. As a program evaluation tool that is applicable to a variety of event studies, the RDD-DD thus naturally comes with a stronger test (dis-in-diff) and a weaker test (trends) of whether there exists an effect of the treatment.

Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD)

In contrast to our theory, in reality there most likely exists a spatial decay to the heritage externalities. This decay implies that the external heritage effect should be stronger at the center of the conservation area than at the boundaries. The policy benefit, which is a transformation of the external heritage effect, should also be greater at the center of the newly designated conservation area. Likewise, the predicted positive policy effects just outside the boundary should be decaying in distance to the conservation area (CA) boundary. At the CA boundary there may be a discontinuity as the cost of the policy ends abruptly at the boundary, whereas potential externalities decay smoothly across it. The combination of trends and discontinuities potentially caused by the treatment resembles the temporal identification problem just described and will be addressed by a similar combination of RDD and DD tools. Essentially, we use the RDD tools to capture how the difference (before and after) in the differences (treatment vs. control) of property prices varies along the (internal and external) distances from the CA boundary. Unlike in the standard (spatial) RDD, unobserved time-invariant spatial effects can be held constant due to the availability of spatiotemporal variation.[10] In our spatial RDD-DD model it is therefore possible to attribute spatial trends (with respect to distance to the CA boundary) as well as a discontinuity (at the CA boundary) to the treatment provided that the spatial trends are uncorrelated with unobserved temporal trends. The spatial RDD-DD we estimate takes the following form:[11]

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[10] Dachis, Duranton, & Turner (2012) also make use of spatiotemporal variation in their RDD. Our specification additionally takes differences from a control group.

[11] In models with historical CAs as control groups the following terms are also included $\beta^{CD}(C_i \times D_i) + \beta^{EC}EC_i + \beta^{ECD}(EC_i \times D_i)$, where C_i indicates internal to control CA and EC_i external to control CA. This ensures that spatial effects are estimated conditional on the spatial trends in control CA.

$$p_{it} = \beta^I T_i + \beta^{ID}(T_i \times D_i) + \beta^{IPost}(T_i \times Post_{it}) + \beta^{IDPost}(T_i \times D_i \times Post_{it}) + \beta^E O_i \qquad (28)$$
$$+ \beta^{OD}(O_i \times D_i) + \beta^{OPost}(O_i \times Post_{it}) + \beta^{ODPost}(O_i \times D_i \times Post_{it}) + X_i' \mu$$
$$+ f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

where D_i is the distance from the property to the conservation area boundary (internal distances are negative values), O_i indicates properties outside a treated conservation area and T_i indicates the conservation area that is nearest to a property that is treated at any point of the study period. In order to fully explore the extent of spatial externalities O_i indicates a larger area outside CAs[12] rather than just within 500m as indicated by E_i in previous models. As with the temporal RDD-DD specification we also estimate an expanded model specification in which we allow for quadratic distance trends and semi-nonparametric specifications replacing the distance variable with some distance bin effects.

The coefficient β^{IPost} gives the intercept of the internal effect (i.e., the internal effect at the boundary) and β^{IDPost} estimates how this changes with respect to internal distance. Jointly, these terms capture the net policy costs and benefits of designation for internal treated areas. A zero β^{IPost} coefficient would be reflective of a zero effect at the boundary and would be in line with the optimality condition derived in the theory section. A negative β^{IDPost} would be in line with the existence of policy benefits (due to increased preservation probability) that spillover with decay. The parameters β^{EPost} and β^{EDPost} allow for a spatial discontinuity treatment effect at the boundary and heterogeneity in spatial trends inside and outside the treated areas. As with β^{IDPost}, a jointly negative $\beta^{IDPost} + \beta^{EDPost}$ would be in line with the decaying policy benefits external to the conservation area. The discontinuity at the border is measured by the external intercept term β^{EPost}. A statistically positive estimate would indicate a cost to the policy. A jointly positive effect of $\beta^{IPost} + \beta^{EPost}$ would in turn indicate the existence of policy benefits.

4 Data

We have compiled two distinct data sets for the two stages of the empirical analysis. Both data sets make use of data provided by English Heritage. These include a precise GIS map of 8,167 conservation areas in England, the Conservation Areas Survey containing information on com-

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[12] Specifically, the empirical analysis uses properties within 1,400m of the treated conservation area.

munity support and risk status (average condition, vulnerability and trajectory of a conservation) and a complete register of listed buildings.

For the analysis of the determinants of designation we use UK census wards as a unit of analysis. Shares of designated land within each Census ward are computed in a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) environment. Various ward level data on educational level, age, ethnical background, average household size and homeownership status and vacancy rate were obtained from the UK Census. Any changes in ward boundaries between the years were corrected for using the online conversion tool GeoConvert.[13] For robustness tests we also collected a measure of the ward's average income (Experian). The instrumental variables station density and employment potential are regenerated data that stem from nomis (workplace employment) and the Ordinance Survey (rail stations). The average turnover in housing is approximated as the number of properties transacted per year in a ward as recorded in the Nationwide Building Society data set (see below).

For the analysis of the capitalization effects of designation we use transactions data related to mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer. Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates.

With this information it is possible within GIS to calculate distances to conservation area borders and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside of these borders. Furthermore, it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g., densities) for the amenities and environmental characteristics such as National Parks, as well as natural features like lakes, rivers and coastline. The postcode reference also allows a merger of transactions and various household characteristics (median income and ethnic composition) from the UK census,

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[13] http://geoconvert.mimas.ac.uk/

natural land cover and land use, various amenities such as access to employment opportunities, cultural and entertainment establishments and school quality. A more detailed description of all the data used is in the appendix.

5 Empirical Results

5.1 Designation process

Table 1 reports the results of our tobit model of the designation process defined in equation (24). The non-instrumented baseline model is in column (1). As predicted by our theory, increases in educational levels that are presumably correlated with heritage preferences are associated with reductions in the share of non-designated land. More precisely, an increase in the degree share by 1% is associated with a 0.12% reduction in the share of non-designated land. This decrease corresponds to an $0.12\% \times (1 - \overline{D}_{t-1})/\overline{D}_{t-1} = 2.61\%$ increase in the share of designated land for a ward with the mean of the positive initial designation shares $\overline{D}_{t-1} = 4.4\%$. The effect substantially increases once we instrument the change in degree share using rail station density and employment potential (column 2). This increase is in line with unobserved (positive) deterioration trends that a) increase the likelihood of designation and b) are negatively correlated with changes in degree share. Introducing the instruments, the effect of a 1% increase in degree share on the share of non-designated land increases to 0.88%, which for a ward with the mean initial designation share $\overline{D}_{t-1}$ corresponds to an increase in the designated land share of about 19%. While we have argued that our estimates are supposed to reflect a causal estimate of gentrification (proxied by degree shares) on designation probabilities and not necessarily a causal effect of degree share on designation share, a parameter estimate of $\hat{\vartheta} = 0.88$ is at least indicative of heritage preferences increasing relatively steeply in education. It is notable that increases in the share of designated land are also positively correlated with high initial levels of degree shares.

The remaining columns in Tab. 1 provide variations of the benchmark model (2). We add TTWA effects to control for unobserved institutional heterogeneity in column (3). Column (4) adds several conservation area characteristics that capture historic quality (e.g. number of listed buildings), risk (e.g. various measures capturing vulnerability and trajectory) and development pressure (e.g. vacancy rate). The latter includes a measure of property price appreciation, which we obtain from ward-level regressions of log property prices on a time trend (and property

controls, see the appendix for details). With this variable we control for a potentially positive correlation between owners' risk aversion and the value of their properties – typically their largest assets. This is a potentially important control since a larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighborhood and, thus, potentially increases the optimal designation share. It is a demanding control since positive price trends are potentially endogenous to changes in neighborhood composition and may thus absorb some of the gentrification effect on designation. Specification (5) replicates the benchmark model on a reduced sample of predominantly residential to ensure that the results are not driven by commercial agents, which we don't model in our theory.[14] None of these model alterations changes the education effect substantially. Model (6) tests for an interaction effect between homeownership rate and degree share. We find that the (positive) impact of neighborhood change on designations shares (interaction term) is particularly large in high homeownership areas (see column 6). This is in line with a political economy literature that suggests that homeowners tend to form well-organized interest groups (e.g. Brunner & Sonstelie, 2003; Dehring, et al., 2008; Fischel, 2001a).

The results in Table 1 offer some further interesting insights on potential determinants of designation. We do not find evidence in support of contagion effects in designation, i.e., designated land shares do not tend to increase where shares were initially high. The likelihood of designation rises with ward population age, which could be related to a higher appreciation of heritage by the elderly. The likelihood declines in the share of foreigners, which, likewise, could reflect a lower appreciation among people with different cultural backgrounds. An alternative and potentially complementary explanation may be a lack of familiarity with the institutional context and, thus, a difficulty to `game the system'.

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[14] In the results reported we drop wards with more workers than inhabitants, which amount to about 7.4% of the total sample. The results do not change qualitatively even if we drop the top quintile according to the same metric.

Tab. 1.   Designation process

	(1) Tobit	(2) IV Tobit	(3) IV Tobit	(4) IV Tobit	(5) IV Tobit	(6) IV Tobit
	Δ log share non designated land (t)					
Δ log degree share (t) (ϑ)	-0.112***	-0.875***	-0.754***	-0.794***	-0.874***	-0.871***
	(0.022)	(0.105)	(0.136)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.103)
log degree share (t-1)	-0.116***	-0.426***	-0.401***	-0.394***	-0.438***	-0.403***
	(0.012)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)
log designation share (t-1)	-0.005***	0.003*	0.005**	0.004**	0.004**	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Δ log homeownership (t)	0.207***	0.618***	0.563***	0.582***	0.658***	0.530***
	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.061)
log homeownership (t-1)	0.134***	0.195***	0.208***	0.220***	0.238***	0.588***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.065)
Δ log average house-hold size (t)	0.037	-0.336***	-0.205**	-0.346***	-0.454***	-0.121
	(0.050)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.074)
log average household size (t-1)	-0.027	-0.304***	-0.289***	-0.376***	-0.229***	-0.353***
	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Δ log pop age (t)	-0.014	-0.277***	-0.214**	-0.332***	-0.477***	-0.078
	(0.068)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.100)	(0.084)
log pop age (t-1)	-0.109***	-0.252***	-0.275***	-0.288***	-0.232***	-0.263***
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Δ log share of foreign-ers (t)	0.004	0.075***	0.066***	0.074***	0.071***	0.051***
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)
log of share of fore (t-1)	-0.003	0.079***	0.051***	0.079***	0.083***	0.071***
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
log price trend				0.017		
				(0.022)		
Δ log vacancy rate (t)				-0.003		
				(0.010)		
log vacancy rate (t-1)				-0.009		
				(0.015)		
log turnover in hous-ing				-0.007		
				(0.006)		
log listed buildings density				-0.003		
				(0.004)		
log of share of building from pre1945				-0.021***		
				(0.006)		
average condition score (1 best, 4 worst)				-0.069***		
				(0.020)		
average vulnerability score (1 low, 8 high)				-0.052***		
				(0.019)		
average trajectory score (-2 improving, +2 deteriorating)				0.037		
				(0.038)		
Δ log degree share (t) x homeownership (t-1)						-0.953***
						(0.138)
Constant	0.490**	1.470***	1.565***	1.801***	1.351***	1.724***
	(0.235)	(0.286)	(0.323)	(0.360)	(0.300)	(0.299)
TTWA Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Residential wards only	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
CHI2		328.334	617.186	491.909	312.116	332.841
EXOG_P		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OVERID		0.001	.	0.435	5.805	0.242
OVERIDP		0.981	.	0.509	0.016	0.623
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7965	7379	7965

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, employment potential and the degree share in 1981 in all models except model (1). Model (4) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions. Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001.

Further robustness

While our IVs comfortably pass the typical statistical tests, we have experimented with four alternative sets of IVs. We have also split up the 1991–2011 long difference into two shorter differences (1991–2001 and 2001–2011), used the change in income as a proxy for heritage preferences (for 2001–2011) and run the baseline model in OLS keeping only observations with positive changes in shares of designated land. The results are presented in the technical appendix and support those discussed here.

5.2 Equilibrium designation

Difference-in-differences

Tab. 2. shows the results from an estimation of the standard DD equation (26) for different selections of control groups and fixed effects. Each model includes controls for property, location, and neighborhood characteristics, year effects and location fixed effects to hold unobserved time-invariant effects constant. Column (1) is a naive DD using the mean price trend of all properties located beyond 500m of a treated conservation area as a counterfactual. Columns (2) to (7) provide more credible counterfactuals by restricting the control group to properties that are presumably similar to the treated properties. Column (2), with ward fixed effects, and (3), with nearest CA fixed effects, provide a spatial matching by restricting the sample to properties within 2km of a treated CA, where many unobserved *location* characteristics are likely to be similar. In column (4) we impose the additional restriction that properties in the control group must fall within 500m of the boundaries of a historically designated conservation area (before 1996), which increases the likelihood of unobserved *property* characteristics being similar. While areas that are designated at any point in time are likely to share many similarities, the diminishing returns to designation in our theoretical framework also imply that heritage-richer areas should generally be designated first. To evaluate whether the designation date of the treated conservation areas, relative to those on the control group, influences the DD estimate, we define CA designated 1996–2002 as a treatment group and form control groups based on CAs designated just before (1987–1994) or right after (2003–2010) in columns (5) and (6). In column (7), finally, we use environmental, property and neighborhood characteristics to estimate the propensity of being in a treated (1996–2010) CA over a historical (<1996) CA. Then the treated CAs are matched to their 'nearest-neighbor', i.e., the most similar non-treated CA, based on the estimated propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). A fixed effect is defined for each treated CA

and its nearest-neighbor control CA such that the treatment effect is estimated by the direct comparison between the treated CA and its nearest-neighbor.

We anticipate that the strength of the counterfactual increases as we match the treatment and control group based on proximity (2 & 3), proximity and qualifying for designation (4, 5, & 6) and qualifying for designation and a combination of various observable characteristics (7). As the credibility of the counterfactual increases, the statistical significance of the treatment effect tends to decrease. Benchmarked against the nationwide property price trend both the internal effect (Inside × Post) and the external effect (Within 500m × Post) are significant at the 5% level. The magnitudes of these effects are of similar size, implying a 2.8% premium for houses inside newly designated conservation areas and a 2.3% premium outside. The spatial matching (2 & 3) renders the internal treatment effect insignificant (2 & 3). With further refinements in the matching procedure the external effect also becomes insignificant. Tab. 2. results, thus, suggest that designation does not lead to significant property price adjustments. Evidence is weak for positive (policy) spillovers to nearby areas.

Tab. 2. Conservation area premium – designation effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	log property transaction price						
Inside treated CA × Post designation	0.028***	0.014	0.014	0.003	-0.024	-0.077	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.013)
Within 500m buffer of treated CA × Post des.	0.023***	0.013***	0.012***	0.004	0.012	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.010)
Inside treated CA	-0.043***	-0.038***	-0.048***	-0.037***	-0.062	0.029	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.057)	(0.108)	(0.021)
Within 500m buffer of treated CA	-0.010**	-0.004	-0.011**	0.005	0.003	0.006	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Hedonic controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Location controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Neighborhood cont.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ward effects	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Nearest treat. CA effects	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Matched CA effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Treatment group: CAs designated	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2002	1996-2002	1996-2010
Control group	Full England sample	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 500m of CA designated before 1996 & within 2km of treated CA	Within 500m of CA designated 1987-1995 & within 4km of treated CA	Within 500m of CA designated 2003-2010 & within 4km of treated CA	Within 500m of pre-1996 CA matched on propensity score
R^2	0.921	0.922	0.915	0.915	0.861	0.864	0.909
AIC	-587,375	-156,426	-130,469	-67,046	-5,408	-8,475	-41,184
Observation	1,088k	302k	302k	178k	21k	32k	133k

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Temporal RDD-DD

Tab. 3. illustrates the results of the estimation of the (temporal) RDD-DD outlined in equation (27). We present the results of a variety of models that feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control groups utilized in Tab. 2. One important finding across these specifications is that the external (Within 500m × Post) 'dis-in-diff' parameter estimate is significant in four of 10 specifications at the 5% level and in one half of the specifications at the 10% level, whereas, the internal (Inside × Post) parameter is only significant in one specification at the 10% level (column 8). This suggests primarily that there exists a significant treatment effect exactly at the treatment date only for the external area. This interpretation is in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. Another finding illustrated by Tab. 3. is the positive change in the internal price trend after a CA has been designated (Inside treated CA × Post

designation × Years designated). The change in trend, which is significant at the 5% level in seven of the 10 models, may be regarded as evidence for a cumulative internal effect of the designation policy. There is also a faster appreciation in the external area post-designation that is significant in four of the 10 models. In short, the temporal RDD-DD has confirmed that designation policy causes no immediate effect inside the conservation area but shows instead that it increases the speed of price appreciation over time. The RDD-DD has also uncovered that areas external to the conservation area receive an immediate shift in prices at the designation date in line with our theoretical hypothesis.

Fig. 2 provides a graphical illustration of the predicted effect of being in the treatment group over the control group against years-since-designation. A horizontal red line is drawn at the mean of the pre-treatment effects in order to illustrate the differences between the RDD-DD results and those of the standard DD. The positive impact of designation on (relative) price trends suggested by the RDD-DD (black lines) is supported by the functionally more flexible semi-parametric estimates for the 'years-since-designation bins' (grey dots).[15] However, the post-treatment effects are never statistically distinguished from the pre-period mean, which is in line with the DD estimates.

Fig. 2. provides an analogical illustration for the external treatment effect, i.e., the spillovers onto areas adjacent to the designated CAs. Again, the post-period estimates do not deviate significantly from the pre-period mean. However, the top-left panel illustrates a large discontinuity at the treatment date that is statistically significant in Tab. 3. As with the internal effects, there is a positive trend shift post-designation.

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[15] Confidence bands for the semi-parametric 'bins' model are presented in the appendix.

Tab. 3. Regression discontinuity design of differences between treatment and control (RDD-DD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
					log property transaction price					
Inside treated CA × Post designation	0.015	0.022	0.024	0.027	-0.006	0.023	0.033	0.038*	0.036	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Within 500m buffer of treated CA × Post designation	0.006	0.013*	0.015**	0.020**	-0.007	0.013	0.017**	0.022**	0.017	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Inside treated CA × Years designated	0.000	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007**	-0.002	-0.010	-0.016*	-0.019*	-0.019*	-0.020*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Inside treated CA × Years designated^2						-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002*
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Inside treated CA × Post designation × Years designated	0.003	0.007**	0.008**	0.009**	0.008*	0.020	0.026**	0.032**	0.031**	0.031**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Inside treated CA × Post Designation × Years designated^2						0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001
						(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Within 500m of treated CA × Years designated	0.002	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.004***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.007*	-0.004	-0.009
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Within 500m of treated CA × Years designated^2						-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Within 500m of treated CA × Post designation ×Years des.	0.001	0.004***	0.004***	0.005***	0.003	0.003	0.007	0.011**	0.008	0.009
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Within 500m of treated CA × Post designation × Years des.^{2}						0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001
						(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Hedonic controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Location controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Neighborhood controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ward effects	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
Nearest treated CA effects	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
Matched CA effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Control group as in Tab. 2, column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(7)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(7)
R^2	0.920	0.921	0.912	0.914	0.907	0.920	0.921	0.912	0.914	0.907
AIC	-547,688	-147,818	-120,160	-64,425	-39,321	-548,078	-147,839	-120,191	-64,467	-39,329
Observations	995k	277k	277k	164k	123k	995k	277k	277k	164k	123k

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. Observations dropped if years designated falls outside of range -10 years:+10 years. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fig. 2. RDD-DD internal estimates

Nearest treated CA (linear trends)
Tab.3, column (4)

Matched CA (linear trends)
Tab. 3, column (5)

Nearest treated CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 3, column (9)

Matched CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 3, column (10)

Note: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and estimated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991). The grey dots plot the point estimates of 'years-since-designation bins' effects obtained from separate regression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.

Fig. 3. RDD-DD external estimates

Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)
Tab. 3, column (4)

Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)
Tab. 3, column (5)

Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends)
Tab. 3, column (9)

Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 3, column (10)

Notes: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and es-
timated using equation (27). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented Aiken and West (1991). The grey
dots plot the point estimates of 'years-since-designation bins' effects obtained from separate re-
gression described and presented in more detail in the appendix. The horizontal red line illustrates
the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.

Spatial RDD-DD

Tab. 4 shows the results of the estimation of the (spatial) RDD-DD model outlined in equa-

tion (28). As with the temporal RDD-DD, we present the results of a variety of models that

feature linear (1–5) and quadratic (6–10) trends and several of the control groups utilized

in Tab. 2. One interesting and consistent feature of Tab. 4 is that the positive discontinuity

coefficient (Outside × Post) matches the expected (positive) sign under the existence of a

policy cost inside. However, the parameter is statistically insignificant in all models.

We have argued that the model predictions for capitalization effects under equilibrium designation policy and a spatial decay in heritage externalities hold at the conservation area boundary, i.e., we expect a zero effect just inside and a positive effect just outside the boundary. Fig. 4 illustrates the joint effect of the parametric estimates reported in Tab. 4 at varying (internal and external) distances from the CA boundary. With the control group of historical CAs within 2km of the treatment CA (left panels) we find a positive capitalization effect just inside and outside the boundary, which is in line with the baseline DD result in Tab. 2, column (4). Moreover, the treatment effect increases toward the center for the CA and decreases in external distance to the boundary until it becomes zero at around 700m. This distance is in line with existing evidence on a relatively steep decay in heritage and housing externalities (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Lazrak, et al., 2013; Rossi-Hansberg, et al., 2010). However, the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero at almost all distances. The single exception is a significant (at 5% level) 1.6% effect just outside the CA in the quadratic model. While the effect is only significant within 100m of the CA, this is precisely where we expect a positive effect in a world with spatial decay in heritage (housing) externalities. In the context of the model the lower and not statistically significant effect just inside the CA indicates the presence of a cost that compensates for some of the benefits associated with designation.

With the control group of matched CAs (right panels) the treatment effect just inside the CA boundary is remarkably close to zero. The joint effect just outside the boundary is positive, although not statistically significant. Briefly summarized, the spatial RDD-DD model suggests that across the treated CAs owners – at least on average – are not harmed by designation. There is some evidence that owners just outside a conservation area receive some benefit.

Tab. 4. Spatial regression discontinuity design of difference-in-differences (RDD-DD)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	log property transaction price									
Within 1400m of treated CA × Post designation	0.027***	0.014	0.012	0.008	-0.003	0.026**	0.014	0.012	0.008	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Within 1400m of treated CA × Distance to boundary x Post des.	-0.057	-0.032	-0.030	-0.029	-0.070	-0.096	-0.046	-0.040	-0.040	-0.118
	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.156)	(0.154)	(0.162)	(0.157)	(0.143)
Within 1400m of treated CA × Distance to boundary^2 × Post des.						-0.059	-0.017	-0.018	-0.017	-0.099
						(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.130)
Outside treated CA × Post designation	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.009	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Outside treated CA × Distance to boundary × Post des.	0.039	0.016	0.013	0.011	0.046	0.064	0.014	0.013	0.004	0.080
	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.159)	(0.145)
Outside treated CA × Distance to boundary^2 × Post des.						0.070	0.028	0.025	0.029	0.109
						(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.130)
Hedonic controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Location controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Neighborhood controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ward effects	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
Nearest treated CA effects	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO
Matched CA effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Control group	Full England sample	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 1.4km of CA designated before 1996 & within 2km of treated CA	Within 1.4km of pre-1996 CA matched on propensity score	Full England sample	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 1.4km of CA designated before 1996 & within 2km of treated CA	Within 1.4km of pre-1996 CA matched on propensity score
R^2	0.921	0.922	0.915	0.914	0.905	0.921	0.922	0.915	0.914	0.921
AIC	-587,538	-156,448	-130,478	-118,076	-101,076	-587,533	-156,444	-130,478	-118,074	-587,538
Observation	1088k	302k	302k	281k	327k	1088k	302k	302k	281k	327k

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the location fixed effects. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fig. 4. RDD-DD spatial treatment effects

Pre-1996 CA within 2km (linear trends)
Tab. 4. , column (4)

Matched pre-1996 CA (linear trends)
Tab. 4. , column (5)

Pre-1996 CA within 2km (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4. , column (9)

Matched pre-1996 CA (quadratic trends)
Tab. 4. , column (10)

Notes: The solid lines are graphical illustrations of the parametric estimates presented in Tab. 3. and es-
timated using equation (28). The dashed lines indicate the 95% CI which are calculated using
standard errors of multiplicative interaction terms presented by Aiken and West (1991).

6 Conclusion

Historic preservation policies are among the most restrictive planning policies used to
overcome coordination problems in the housing market internationally. These policies
aim at increasing social welfare at the cost of constraining individual property rights.
From the perspective of owners of properties in conservation areas, the policy may help to
solve a collective action problem, preventing owners from freeriding on the heritage char-
acter of nearby buildings while inappropriately altering their own property. If property
owners value the heritage character of nearby buildings and can influence the designation
process they will seek out a (local) level of designation where the marginal costs of desig-
nation equate the marginal benefits. An increase in the marginal benefit of designation will
lead to an increase in designation activity. If the planner acts on behalf of the local owners,

additional designations in a neighborhood will not lead to an adverse impact on those being designated.

We provide evidence that is supportive of this scenario using two empirical approaches that follow from a simple model of equilibrium conservation area designation. First, we present a neighborhood level IV tobit analysis that reveals a positive impact of an increase in degree share, which is presumably (positively) correlated with heritage preferences, on the share of designated land. Gentrification, by increasing the value of neighborhood stability to local owners, can cause designation. Second, we combine the strengths of difference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity designs (RDD) to estimate the capitalization effect of designation on newly designated areas as well as spillovers to adjacent areas. This RDD-DD methodology qualifies more generally as a useful tool for program evaluations where a treatment is suspected to lead to an impact on (spatial or temporal) trends and discontinuities. Within newly designated conservation areas we find no significant short-run effects of designation and some evidence for positive capitalization effects in the long run. There is some evidence for positive spillovers onto properties just outside.

These results suggest that the policy is either deliberately adhering to the interests of local owners or, as suggested in the literature on the political economy of housing markets, homeowners are able to successfully influence the outcome of local policies in their interest. It is therefore unlikely that the policy is welfare enhancing on a wider geographic scale. Depending on the general restrictiveness of the planning system, historic preservation may constrain housing supply and generate welfare losses. The net-welfare effect to a wider housing market area is an interesting and important question that we leave to future research.

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Technical appendix to Game of zones: The political economy of conservation areas

1 Introduction

This appendix complements the main paper and is not designed to stand alone or as a replacement. Section 2 provides an illustration of how a planner determines the designation share and adds to the theory section of the main paper. Section 3 complements the empirical strategy section of the main paper by providing a more detailed discussion of the control variables in tobit designation process models. The section also links the reduced form difference-in-differences parameters to the marginal policy effect in the theoretical model. Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the data we use, its sources, and how they are processed. Finally, section 5 complements the empirical results section of the main paper by showing the results of a variety of robustness tests and model alterations not reported in the main paper for brevity.

2 Theory and context

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This section briefly illustrates how a planner determines the designation share. The political equilibrium between the social marginal benefits (MB) of designation (equation 9 in the main paper) and the marginal costs (MC) (equation 10) is depicted by Figure A1. At point A the designation share D adheres to local homeowner interests. The representative homeowner in each zone along x is happy with the designation status of their zone. However this is not a welfare maximizing equilibrium since a further extension would benefit all owners in zones to the left of A and to the right of B as they would profit from increasing the expected heritage in the neigh-

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borhood without experiencing a change in marginal cost. In zones between A and B, however, the social marginal benefit would also increase, but the increase would not compensate for the private marginal costs associated with a change in the designation status from undesignated to designated.

If there is, for instance, a change in preferences and residents develop a greater taste for external heritage γ their marginal benefits curve shifts to the right. The planner adapts to this situation and raises the designation share to set marginal benefits equal to marginal costs again. This new equilibrium is illustrated by point B where the designation share increases to D'.

Fig A1. Designation equilibrium

3 Empirical strategy

3.1 Designation process – control variables

This section provides a detailed description and motivation of the control variables we use to account for the determinants of conservation area designation that are unrelated to the mechanisms modeled in our theory. In particular we try to control for composition effects, neighbor-

hood sorting, heterogeneity in terms of homeownership, and whether the heritage in a neighborhood is at particular risk.

We add the initial period (1991) degree share for two reasons. First, we assume that the highly educated derive higher (net-)benefits from neighborhood heritage. To the extent that this group is capable of more efficiently articulating their will in a political bargaining a higher degree share will make the designation more likely. It is important to control for the initial degree share since levels and changes may be correlated in either direction. On the one hand there may be catch-up growth in the degree share of less educated regions, i.e., mean reversion. On the other hand, people with degrees may be more likely to move to areas with an already high share of people with degrees, which would imply a self-reinforcing process leading to spatial segregation.

We also include a control for the extent of designation in the initial period (1991). The share of designated land area in the total ward area would be (positively) correlated with the change in the designation share if designations spark further designations as in a contagion model. Initial designation also helps to control for the possibility that the skilled may be attracted to areas with a lot of designated land. To avoid a mechanic relationship between the dependent variable and the lagged designation share we instrument designation in the initial period (1991) by its lagged value, i.e. the designation share in 1981.

Another set of controls is driven by the interest in homeowners within the designation process. Homeowners experience extra benefits/costs from designation since, unlike renters, they are not compensated for changes in neighborhood quality by increases in degrees or rents. Homeowners, thus have additional incentives to engage in political bargaining. Similar to the other controls, homeownership status enters in lagged levels and differences. In a final specification we also add an interaction of the logged change in degree with homeownership (rescaled to a zero mean to make coefficients comparable). We use average household size (both in differences and lagged levels) to control for the presumption that larger households are more likely to lobby against designation and the resulting constraint on available floor space. We control for further neighborhood characteristics by including average population age and the share of foreigners inside a ward (also both in differences and lagged levels). We expect older residents to appreciate heritage stronger making it more likely that they lobby for designation. Conversely, a high share of foreigners is expected to be negatively correlated with designation. Foreigners, on average, might not know the planning system that well and perhaps find it more difficult to form

interest groups. Moreover, they might value English heritage differently due to their cultural background.

A larger risk aversion increases the benefit from a policy that increases certainty regarding the future of the neighborhood and, thus, potentially increases the optimal designation share. To control for a potentially positive correlation between owners' risk aversion and the value of their properties – typically their largest assets – we add a measure of neighborhood appreciation. We generate ward-level property price trends in n separate auxiliary regressions of the following type:

$$\log(P_{itn}) = \alpha_n + X_{ni}b_n + \beta_n T_t + \varepsilon_{itn} \tag{A1}$$

where X is a vector of property and neighborhood characteristics and T is a linear time trend. To avoid a reverse effect of designation on the property price trend we only consider transactions that occur outside conservation areas.

A second set of controls deals with potential development risk. Areas that experience development pressure or are in poor and/or declining condition may be more likely to be designated in order to protect against the threats to the heritage character of the neighborhood. We use the vacancy rate, a density measure of listed buildings, housing turnover, the share of pre1945 buildings as well as score measures for a conservation area's condition, vulnerability and trajectory provided by English Heritage to capture development pressure. We expect that neighborhoods with few vacancies will be put under higher development pressure. Vacancies enter the specification both in differences and lagged levels. The reason for the differenced term is that a change in development pressure is likely to lead to a change in designation status as a result. We argue that the lagged level may also capture changes (not just levels) in development pressure. This is because of external factors and conditions (i.e., population growth) that effect areas unevenly depending on their level in certain attributes (e.g., vacant housing). It seems likely that general population growth would put greater development pressure on neighborhoods with lower vacancy rates. By using the total number of houses sold between 1995 and 2010 we introduce an alternative measure of development pressure. The share of houses built before 1945 serves as an indicator of potential heritage. If we are not in a steady state, building age could affect the change in designation share. The score measures reflect the development risk inside a conservation area and come from a survey provided by English Heritage. The higher the condi-

tion score, the worse the heritage conditions. A higher vulnerability as well as a higher trajectory are also indicated by higher scores. Except for the score variables, all control variables enter our empirical specification in logs.

While taking first-differences of the empirical specification will remove all time-invariant ward-specific effects that might impact on the level of designation (including the heritage itself), it will not help if there are location-specific effects that impact on the *changes* in designation status. For example, if there is heterogeneity across Local Authorities (LAs) about how difficult or easy it is to designate arising from different bureaucratic practices then this would affect changes in designation for all wards within a particular LA. We therefore estimate a fixed effects specification for the 166 English Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). The TTWAs are designed to approximate city regions which can be described as somehow self-contained economic areas from a job market perspective. By applying a TTWA fixed effect model we are therefore able to control for socio-economic heterogeneity across TTWAs.

3.2 Difference-in-differences

This section motivates the difference-in-differences approach for the estimation of the marginal policy effect. Firstly, we illustrate how the policy and heritage effects are difficult to disentangle in a simple cross-sectional hedonic estimation. Secondly, we lay out how the difference-in-differences treatment effect is used to estimate the marginal policy effect laid out in terms of the structural parameters of our model.

Cross-sectional hedonics

Taking logs of the spatial equilibrium price equation (17) from the main paper gives:[1]

$$\ln \theta(x) = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a(x) + \frac{\varphi h(x)}{1-\delta} + \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1-\delta} - \frac{c\widetilde{D}(x)}{1-\delta} \qquad (A2)$$

The following heritage and policy effects determine the bid rent:

$$Policy\ cost = \frac{c\widetilde{D}(x)}{1-\delta} \qquad (A3)$$

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[1] Where τ is a constant and equal to: $\ln(1-\delta) + \frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\ln \delta + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln W$.

$$External\ heritage\ effect\ (conditional\ on\ designation) = \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1 - \delta} \tag{A4}$$

$$Internal\ heritage\ effect = \frac{\varphi h(x)}{1 - \delta} \tag{A5}$$

Consider the cross-sectional reduced form equation:

$$p_{it} = \aleph I_i + X'_i \mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{A6}$$

where p_{it} is the natural logarithm of the transaction price for property i in time period t, I_i is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is internal to a treated conservation area, X_i is a vector of controls for property, neighborhood, and environmental characteristics, f_n is a set of n location fixed effects and Y_t are year effects. The coefficient $\aleph$ on the CA_i dummy identifies the policy cost associated with the location of a property inside a conservation area $\widetilde{D}(x) = 1$. The policy cost should have a negative effect on logged house prices. The coefficient also partly identifies the internal heritage effect. Specifically, it identifies the value of the difference between the mean internal heritage inside conservation areas and the mean internal heritage outside conservation areas (i.e. $\varphi/(1 - \delta)(\overline{h_{CA_t=1}} - \overline{h_{CA_t=0}})$). This should be positive because the policymaker would normally designate areas that have the most heritage. Finally, under the existence of some spatial decay in externalities, it will also identify the value of the difference inside and outside conservation areas in the external heritage effect (i.e., $\gamma(1 - \delta)(\overline{E[H|D]_{CA_t=1}} - \overline{E[H|D]_{CA_t=0}})$). This is a function of internal heritage and will therefore also be positive.

The coefficient $\aleph$ thus reflects a composite effect of policy costs, policy benefits, and correlated internal heritage effect. Furthermore, in reality the actual distribution of internal heritage is unknown and there is likely a spatial decay to externalities, further complicating the estimate.[2] In practice, $\aleph$ will also be affected by unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are correlated with the distance to the conservation area. A positive $\aleph$ parameter, at best, tells us only that the overall higher levels of heritage (internal and external) combined with the policy benefits of conservation outweigh the policy costs. This does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the

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[2] In a general case the estimate would be equal to:

$$\aleph = \frac{\varphi}{1 - \delta}(\overline{h_{CA_t=1}} - \overline{h_{CA_t=0}}) + \frac{\gamma}{1 - \delta}(\overline{E[H|D]_{CA_t=1}} - \overline{E[H|D]_{CA_t=0}})$$

policy effect itself. To try and disentangle these effects we implement a different empirical approach.

Difference-in-differences

Using the difference-in-differences (DD) approach to estimate the marginal effect of a change in designation status offers an improved identification.

Our empirical difference-in-differences specification is equation (26) from the main paper:

$$p_{it} = \beta^I I_i + \beta^E E_i + \beta^{IPost}(I_i \times Post_{it}) + \beta^{EPost}(E_i \times Post_{it}) + X'_i \mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (A7)$$

Tab. A1. illustrates the conditional mean prices (after controlling for time effects) for the treatment and control group in the pre- and post-treatment periods. It is important to note that the year fixed effects Y_t capture the general development of price over time. Without this feature it would be necessary to control for the overall growth in price between the pre- and post-treatment periods via the inclusion of a non-interacted version of $Post_{it}$.

Tab. A1.

Conditional mean of prices	Pre	Post
Treated (Internal)	$\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat} = \beta^I$	$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} = \beta^I + \beta^{IPost}$
Control	$\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Con} = 0$	$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Con} = 0$
$Treatment\ Effect = (\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} - \bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat}) - (\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Con} - \bar{p}_{Pre}^{Con})$		
$Treatment\ Effect = ([\beta^I + \beta^{IPost}] - [\beta^I]) - ([0] - [0])$		
$Treatment\ Effect = \beta^{Post}$		

Notes: The conditional mean of prices in the treatment group in the pre-period is denoted $\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat}$. This represents the log of prices conditional on fixed and year effects $(f_n + Y_t)$ and controls X_i. The same notation is used for the other groups.

Our treatment coefficient β^{IPost} essentially differentiates across the treatment and control groups before and after designation and is, thus defined as follows:

$$\beta^{IPost} = (\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} - \bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat}) - (\bar{p}_{Post}^{Con} - \bar{p}_{Pre}^{Con}) \qquad (A8)$$

Let's assume that the relationship between the observed conditional mean and the theoretical bid rent is given by:

$$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} = \theta_{Post}^{Treat} + u_{Post}^{Treat} \qquad (A9)$$

where u_{Pre}^{Treat} are partially unobservable factors specific to properties in the Treated-Post cell. The same relationship applies for the other cells (Treated-Pre, Control-Post and Control-Pre). At the heart of our identification strategy we assume that the price trends unrelated to the policy are the same within the treatment and the control group. The typical identifying assumption on which the difference-in-differences identification strategy relies can be expressed as follows:

$$(u_{Post}^{Treat} - u_{Pre}^{Treat}) = (u_{Post}^{Con} - u_{Pre}^{Con}) \tag{A10}$$

The credibility of the counterfactual rests on the likelihood that the treatment group, in the absence of the intervention, would have followed a trend that is similar to that of the control group. An appropriate definition of the control group is therefore a critical element of the identification strategy. We therefore consider a number of different control groups in which we try to reduce the potential heterogeneity between properties in the treatment and control group.

The first treatment group is a spatial match where we choose the observations that fall within a 2km buffer surrounding conservation areas that changed designation status during the observation period (1995–2010). As an alternative, we consider a number of matching procedures that rest on the idea that properties inside conservation areas generally share similarities. Properties in conservation areas that did not change designation status therefore potentially qualify as a control group. To make the areas in the treatment and control group more similar, we select conservation areas based on similarities with those in our treatment group (Rosenbaum & Ruben, 1983). For the matching procedure we only make use of variables that turn out to have significant impact in the auxiliary propensity score matching regression.[3] We use a nearest neighbor matching procedure, which produces a broader and a narrower group.

Under the assumptions made it is straightforward to demonstrate that the DD treatment coefficient gives the pure policy effect we are interested in. Combining the theoretical bid rent of equation (17) from the main paper with the definition of $\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat}$ in equation (A9) gives the conditional mean price of (treated) properties inside newly designated conservation areas before (pre) and after (post) designation can be expressed as follows[4]:

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[3] A list of significant controls in propensity score matching regressions is included in the next subsection.

[4] Where the theoretical locations x have been replaced by observed housing transactions i.

$$\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\varphi h_i}{1-\delta} + \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1-\delta} + u_{Pre}^{Treat} \tag{A11}$$

$$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\varphi h_i}{1-\delta} + \frac{\gamma}{1-\delta}\left(E[H|D] + \frac{dE[H|D]}{dD}\right) - \frac{c\widetilde{D}_i}{1-\delta} + u_{Post}^{Treat} \tag{A12}$$

where a new designation is represented as an increase in designation share D. For a control group sufficiently far away to not be exposed to the heritage externality we similarly get:

$$\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Con} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1-\delta} + u_{Pre}^{Con} \tag{A13}$$

$$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Con} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1-\delta} + u_{Post}^{Con} \tag{A14}$$

where there is (by definition) no new designation. Given the common trend assumption of equation (A10), β^{IPost} identifies the pure net policy effect of designation:

$$\beta^{IPost} = \frac{\gamma}{1-\delta}\frac{dE[H|D]}{dD} - \frac{c\widetilde{D}(x)}{1-\delta} \tag{A15}$$

In the empirical implementation of the DD strategy we also consider alternative treatment groups that consist of properties just outside conservation areas, which are potentially exposed to spillovers, but not to the cost of designation. The interpretation of the external treatment coefficient can be derived analogically where designation leads to benefits but without the associated costs:

$$\bar{p}_{Pre}^{Treat} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\gamma E[H|D]}{1-\delta} + u_{Pre}^{Treat} \tag{A16}$$

$$\bar{p}_{Post}^{Treat} = \tau + \frac{1}{1-\delta}\ln a_i + \frac{\gamma}{1-\delta}\left(E[H|D] + \frac{dE[H|D]}{dD}\right) + u_{Post}^{Treat} \tag{A17}$$

Under the common trends assumption the treatment coefficient reflects the pure policy benefit associated with the reduction in uncertainty as predicted by the stylized theory:

$$\beta^{EPost} = \frac{\gamma}{1-\delta}\frac{dE[H|D]}{dD} \tag{A18}$$

Propensity score matching regression

In order to determine the control group for the difference-in-differences specification a propensity score matching approach was employed. We used a stepwise elimination approach in order

to determine which variables have a significant impact on propensity score. With a significance level criterion of 10% the following variables remained in the final CA propensity score estimation:

CA characteristics: Urban, Commercial, Residential, Industrial, World Heritage Site, At Risk and Article 4 Status.

Environmental characteristics: Land Cover Type 9 (Inland bare ground), Land Cover Type 3 (Mountains, moors and heathland), distance to nearest National Nature Reserve, distance to nearest National Park, National Park (kernel density) and Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (kernel density).

Neighbourhood characteristics: Median Income and Ethnicity Herfindahl index

Amenities: Distance to nearest Bar, distance to nearest Underground Station, distance to nearest Hospital, distance to nearest Motorway and distance to nearest TTWA centroid.

Semi-parametric temporal and spatial estimations of treatment effects

We estimate a semi-parametric version of (27) that replaces the YD_{it} variables with a full set of years-since-designation bins. We group transactions into bins depending on the number of years that have passed since the conservation area they fall into or are near to had been designated. Negative values indicate years prior to designation. These bins (b) are captured by a set of dummy variables PT_b:

$$p_{it} = \sum_b \beta_b^I\big(PT_i^b \times I_i\big) + \sum_b \beta_b^E\big(PT_i^b \times E_i\big) + \sum_b \beta_b PT_i^b + X_i'\mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it} \qquad \text{(A19)}$$

The parameters β_b^I and β_b^E give the difference in prices between treatment and control groups in each years-since-designation bin b. The results of this semi-parametric estimation are plotted in Fig A2. in Appendix 5.2. In order to allow for a casual inspection of the fit of the parametric models the semi-parametric point-estimates are also plotted in Fig. 2 (internal) and Fig. 3 (external) of the main paper.

As with the temporal models, we relax the parametric constraints of the spatial estimations by replacing the distance variable in equation (28) with distance bins:

$$p_{it} = \sum_d \beta_d \left(DB_i^d \times T_i \right) + \sum_d \beta_d^{Post} \left(DB_i^d \times T_i \times Post_{it} \right) + X_i'\mu + f_n + Y_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{A20}$$

where DB_i^d are positive (external) and negative (internal) distance bins from the designation area boundary and β_d^{Post} are d treatment effect parameters at different distances inside and outside the conservation area. If the planner designates according to local homeowner interests then the bin that corresponds to the locations just inside the treated conservation area should indicate a zero treatment effect. This may or may not be associated with a positive effect for the bins deepest inside the conservation area. Furthermore, if there are significant externalities associated with the designation (and heritage in general) then the bins just outside the boundary should indicate a positive effect. A lower effect for further out bins would indicate a spatial decay to this externality. The results from this specification are presented Fig A3. in Appendix 5.2 and in Fig. 4 of the main paper.

4 Data

4.1 Data sources

Housing transactions

The transactions data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. The data for England comprise 1,088,446 observations and include the price paid for individual housing units along with detailed property characteristics. These characteristics include floor space (m²), the type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold) and whether they are a first-time buyer.

Importantly, the transaction data includes the full UK postcode of the property sold allowing it to be assigned to grid-reference coordinates. With this information it is possible within a Geographical Information Systems (GIS) environment to calculate distances to conservation area borders and to determine whether the property lies inside or outside these borders. Furthermore it is possible to calculate distances and other spatial measures (e.g., densities) for the amenities and environmental characteristics that will be used as control variables. Since the data set refers to postcodes rather than individual properties, it is not possible, however, to analyze

repeated sales of the same property. This is a limitation shared with most property transaction data sets available in England, including the land registry data.

Neighborhood characteristics

The main variables used for estimating capitalization effects of neighborhood characteristics are median income and ethnic composition. The income data is a model-based estimate of median household income produced by Experian for Super Output Areas of the lower level (LSOA). This is assigned to the transaction data based on postcode. The data on ethnicity was made available by the 2001 UK Census at the level of Output Area (OA). Shares of each of the 16 ethnic groups and a Herfindahl index[5] were computed to capture the ethnic composition of neighborhoods.

Environmental variables

The environmental variables capture the amenity value of environmental designations, features of the natural environment, different types of land cover and different types of land use.

Geographical data (in the form of ESRI shapefiles) for UK National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty, and National Nature Reserves are available from Natural England. National Parks and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty are protected areas of countryside designated because of their significant landscape value. National Nature Reserves are "established to protect sensitive features and to provide 'outdoor laboratories' for research" (National England website). Straight line distances to these designations were computed for the housing units as geographically located by their postcodes. Furthermore, density measures that take into account both the distance to and the size of the features were created. We apply a kernel density measure (Silverman, 1986) with a radius of 2km which is considered to be the maximum distance people are willing to walk (Gibbons & Machin, 2005).

The location of lakes, rivers and coastline are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. The distance to these features is also computed for the housing units from the transaction data. The UK Land Cover Map produced by the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology describes land coverage by 26 categories as identified by satellite images. We follow Mourato et al. (2010) who construct nine broad land cover types from the 26 categories. Shares of each of these nine categories in

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[5] The Herfindahl index (HI) is calculated according to the following relation: $HI = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2$, where s_i is the share of ethnicity i in the LSOA, and N *is* the total number of ethnicities.

1km grid squares are calculated and the housing units take on the value of the grid square in which they reside.

The generalized Land Use Database (GLUD) available from the Department for Communities and Local Government gives area shares of nine different types of land use within Super Output Areas, lower level (LSOA). These nine land use types are domestic buildings, non-domestic buildings, roads, paths, rail, domestic gardens, green space, water, and other land use. These shares are assigned to the housing units based on the LSOA in which they are located.

Amenities

The locational amenities variables capture the benefits a location offers in terms of accessibility, employment opportunities, schools quality, and the proximity of cultural and entertainment establishments.

Employment accessibility is captured both by the distance to Travel to Work Area (TTWA) centroid and a measure of employment potentiality. TTWAs are defined such that 75 per cent of employees who work in the area also live within that area. Thus they represent independent employment zones and the distance to the center of these zones is a proxy for accessibility to employment locations. A more complex measure of accessibility is the employment potentiality index (Ahlfeldt, 2011).[6] This is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and represents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs weighted by their distance.

Key Stage 2 (ages 7–11) assessment scores are available from the Department for Education at the Super Output Area, middle layer (MSOA). School quality is thus captured at the housing unit level by computing a distance-weighted average of the KS2 scores of nearby MSOA centroids.[7]

Geographical data on the locations of motorways, roads, airports, rail stations and rail tracks are available from the GB Ordinance Survey. Distances were computed from housing units to motorways, A-roads, B-roads and rail stations to capture accessibility. Buffer zones were created around the motorways and roads along with distance calculations to rail tracks and airports in order to capture the disamenity noise effects of transport infrastructure.

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[6] Further detail on the construction of the employment potentiality measure is provided in section 4.2.

[7] This is calculated as an Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) with a threshold distance of 5km and a power of 2.

Further data on local amenities were taken from the Ordinance Survey (police stations, places of worship, hospitals, leisure/sports centers) and OpenStreetMap (cafés, restaurants/fast food outlets, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, theaters/cinemas, kindergartens and monuments, memorials, monuments, castles, attractions, artwork). The number of listed buildings was provided by English Heritage. Kernel densities for these amenities were computed for housing units using a kernel radius of 2km and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986). The radius of 2km is consistent with amenities having a significant effect on property prices only when they are within walking distance.

Tab. A2. Variable description

Dependent Variable	
Price	Per square meter transaction price in British pounds of the corresponding floor space (expressed as natural logarithm). Transaction data from the Nationwide Building Society (NBS).
Independent Variables	
CA Effects	Dummy variables denoting property transactions taking place within the boundaries of an currently existing conservation area, in a conservation area at the time when designated or where the designation date is unknown as well as various buffer areas surrounding current or treated conservation areas.
Fixed Effect Control	Travel to Work Areas, nearest conservation area catchment areas and interactives with year effects.
Housing information	Set of property variables from the NBS including: Number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, floor size (in square meter), new property (dummy), building age (years), tenure (leasehold/freehold), central heating (full: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel), central heating (partial: gas, electric, oil, solid fuel), garage (single or double), parking space, property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, bungalow, flat-maisonette).
Neighborhood information	Set of neighborhood variables including: media income (2005, LSOA level), share of white population at total population (2001 census, output area level), share of mixed population at total population (2001 census, output area level), share of black population at total population (2001 census, output area level), share of Asian population at total population (2001 census, output area level), share of Chinese population at total population (2001 census, output area level), Herfindahl of ethnic segregation (including population shares of White British, White Irish, White others, Mixed Caribbean, Mixed Asian, Mixed Black, Mixed other, Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian others, Black Caribbean, Black African, Black other, Chinese, Chinese other population, 2001 census output area).
Conservation area Characteristics	Set of characteristic variables for conservation areas from English Heritage including: Conservation area land use (dummy variables for residential, commercial, industrial or mixed land use), conservation area type (dummy variable for urban, suburban or rural type), conservation area size (dummy for areas larger than mean of 128,432.04 square meters), conservation area (square meter), conservation area has an Article 4 Direction implemented (dummy), oldness of conservation area (dummy for areas older than mean of 1981), conservation area at risk (dummy), conservation area with community support (dummy), conservation area is World Heritage Site (dummy).
Environment Characteristics and Amenities	Set of locational variables processed in GIS including: National Parks (distance to, density), Areas of Outstanding Beauty (distance to, density), Natural Nature Reserves (distance to, density), distance to nearest lake, distance to nearest river, distance to nearest coastline, land in 1km square: Marine and coastal margins; freshwater, wetland and flood plains; mountains, moors and heathland; semi-natural grassland; enclosed farmland; coniferous woodland; broad-leaved/mixed woodland; urban; inland bare ground.
Other amenities	Set of locational variables created in GIS including: Average key stage 2 test score (MSOA averages as well as interpolated in GIS), distance to electricity transmission lines, A-Roads (distance to, buffer dummy variables within 170m), B-Roads (distance to, buffer dummy variable within 85m), motorway (distance to, buffer dummy variable within 315m; buffer distances refer to the distance were noise of maximum speed drops drown to 50 decibel), distance to all railway stations, distance to London Underground stations, dis-

	tance to railway tracks, distance to bus stations, distance to airports, densities of cafés, restaurants/fast food places, museums, nightclubs, bars/pubs, theaters/cinemas, kindergartens, monuments (memorial, monument, castles, attraction, artwork), hospitals, sports/leisure centers, police stations and worship locations, distance to Travel to Work Areas, employment potentiality (based on Travel to Work Areas with an time decay parameter of 0.073).
Neighborhood Distance Controls	Set of neighborhood distance dummy variables created in GIS including: Distances outside conservation area border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m, 250m, 300m, 350m, 400m, 1km, 2km and 3km), distances inside conservation area border (up to 50m, 100m, 150m, 200m).

4.2 Further notes on data methods

Employment potentiality

The employment potentiality index is computed at the Super Output Area, lower level (LSOA) and represents an average of employment in neighboring LSOAs weighted by their distances. Employment potentiality is calculated for each Lower Layer Super Output Area i (LSOA) based on employment in all other LSOAs j using the following equation:

$$EP_i = \sum_j E_j e^{-a\,d_{ij}}, with\ i \neq j \tag{A21}$$

where d measures the straight line distance converted into travel time assuming an overall average speed of 25km/h (Department for Transport, 2009) and Employment the absolute number of workers in the respective LSOA. The indicator is weighted by a decay parameter of $a = -0.073$ estimated by Ahlfeldt (in press). Internal distances are calculated as:

$$d_{ii} = \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{\frac{Area_i}{\pi}} \tag{A22}$$

Kernel densities for National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty and National Nature Reserves

The kernel density is a measure that takes into account both the proximity and the size of NPs, AONBs and NNRs. Every 100x100m piece of designated area is assigned a point and the density of these resulting points calculated for 10km kernels and a quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986, p. 76, equation 4.5) around each housing unit using a kernel density method. The result is similar to calculating a share of NP area within a circle, the one difference being that the points are additionally weighted by distance to the housing units according to a normal distribution.

Buffers for motorways and roads

The buffer sizes for the different roads are as follows: B-Road (85m), A-Road (170m) and Motorway (315m). These distances are calculated based on how far it is expected that the noise from traffic travelling at the speed limit of the respective roads (Steven, 2005) would decline to an assumed disamenity threshold level of noise of 50db (Nelson, 2008).

Land cover map Broad Categories

Tab. A3. Land Cover Broad categories as defined by Mourato et al. (2010)

1	Marine and coastal margins
2	Freshwater, wetlands, and flood plains
3	Mountains, moors, and heathland
4	Semi-natural grasslands
5	Enclosed farmland
6	Coniferous woodland
7	Broad-leaved/mixed woodland
8	Urban
9	Inland bare ground

5 Estimation results

5.1 Designation process

In order to test our theoretical implication that changes in heritage preferences lead to changes in designation we estimate the regression model as outlined in section 3.1. The prediction of the model is that positive changes in heritage preferences should lead to negative changes in the share of non-designated land in a neighborhood. OLS regression results are reported in Table A4. We drop all zeros and identify the effect based on the sample of observations with observable changes in conservation area shares. The standard OLS estimates without (1) and with a basic set of composition controls (2) are insignificant. Due to the potential sources of bias in OLS discussed in the main paper (section 3.1) we re-estimate the two models using our instrumental variables. The 2SLS estimates (3) and (4) are in line with the tobit results reported in the main paper and support the theory that a positive change in degree share leads to higher designation.

Tab. A4. Designation regressions: OLS/2SLS models

	(1) OLS Δ log designa- tion share (t)	(2) OLS Δ log designa- tion share (t)	(3) 2SLS Δ log designa- tion share (t)	(4) 2SLS Δ log designa- tion share (t)
Δ log degree share (t)	-0.016	0.002	-0.602***	-0.871***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.096)	(0.247)
log degree share (t-1)		-0.015		-0.379***
		(0.013)		(0.105)
log designation share (t-1)		0.001		0.006*
		(0.001)		(0.004)
Δ log homeownership (t)		0.041		0.492***
		(0.032)		(0.140)
log homeownership (t-1)		0.011		0.056
		(0.023)		(0.036)
Δ log average household size (t)		0.140		-0.483**
		(0.107)		(0.193)
log average household size (t-1)		0.209***		-0.107
		(0.032)		(0.125)
log pop age (t-1)		0.126***		-0.025
		(0.041)		(0.103)
Δ pop age (t)		0.183***		-0.222
		(0.047)		(0.164)
log foreigner share (t-1)		-0.019***		0.083***
		(0.007)		(0.031)
Δ foreigner share (t)		0.004		0.068***
		(0.007)		(0.026)
Constant	-0.040***	-0.782***	0.361***	0.299
	(0.011)	(0.169)	(0.066)	(0.497)
IV	NO	NO	YES	YES
Controls	NO	YES	NO	YES
R^2	0.001	0.047	-0.733	-0.445
F	1.516	15.628	38.934	5.724
AIC	-871.268	-925.893	-1.359	-268.685
OVERID	.	.	2.936	2.103
OVERIDP	.	.	0.087	0.147
Observations	1580	1580	1580	1580

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, employment potential and the degree share in 1981. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *$p< 0.05$, **$p< 0.01$, ***$p< 0.001$.

Table A5 reports the first stage results to the second-stage results reported in Table 1 in the main paper. IVs are (conditionally) positively correlated with the change in degree share, and initial designation share respectively.

Tab. A5. Standard IV models – First stage regressions

	(1) Δ log degree share (t)	(2) Δ log degree share (t)	(3) Δ log degree share (t)	(4) Δ log degree share (t)	(5) Δ log degree share(t) x home-ownership (t-1)	(6) log designation share (t)
rail station density	0.098*** (0.026)	0.100*** (0.024)	0.070*** (0.019)	0.102*** (0.020)	0.021*** (0.006)	-0.033 (0.208)
employment potentiality	2.14E-8*** (0.000)	2.08E-8*** (0.000)	2.85E-8*** (0.000)	2.97E-8*** (0.000)	1.46E-9 (0.000)	7.54E-8 (0.000)
predicted Δ log degree share (t) x homeownership (t-1)					0.481*** (0.024)	
log degree share (t-1)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.415*** (0.011)		0.828*** (0.019)
log designation share (t-2)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.020 (0.015)	-0.021*** (0.008)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Δ log homeownership (t)	0.527*** (0.063)	0.540*** (0.062)	0.636*** (0.074)	0.596*** (0.078)	-0.007 (0.030)	-0.707*** (0.181)
log homeownership (t-1)	0.145*** (0.030)	0.174*** (0.033)	0.228*** (0.045)	0.183*** (0.041)	0.213*** (0.019)	-0.536*** (0.131)
Δ log average hh. size (t)	-0.445*** (0.076)	-0.400*** (0.067)	-0.495*** (0.079)	-0.529*** (0.089)	0.162* (0.068)	-0.153 (0.286)
log average hh. size (t-1)	-0.235*** (0.070)	-0.277*** (0.069)	-0.250** (0.086)	-0.091 (0.095)	-0.006 (0.045)	-1.318** (0.442)
log pop age (t-1)	-0.087 (0.052)	-0.040 (0.055)	-0.289*** (0.072)	0.001 (0.059)	0.008 (0.033)	0.584 (0.335)
Δ pop age (t)	-0.321*** (0.086)	-0.256*** (0.068)	-0.490*** (0.095)	-0.552*** (0.079)	0.155*** (0.042)	0.216 (0.356)
log foreigner share (t-1)	0.080*** (0.008)	0.083*** (0.009)	0.079*** (0.009)	0.076*** (0.007)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.053 (0.045)
Δ foreigner share (t)	0.091*** (0.019)	0.087*** (0.016)	0.093*** (0.020)	0.077*** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.009 (0.068)
Log price trend			0.001 (0.028)			
Δ log vacancy rate (t)			0.037** (0.012)			
log vacancy rate (t-1)			0.070*** (0.013)			
Log listed buildings			0.008 (0.004)			
log turnover in housing transactions (t)			-0.016** (0.006)			
log of share of building from pre1945			0.016*** (0.004)			
average condition score (1 best, 4 worst)						
average vulnerability score (1 low, 8 high)						
average trajectory score (-2 improving, +2 deteriorating)						
Constant	0.687** (0.233)	0.537* (0.219)	1.457*** (0.342)	0.242 (0.309)	0.052 (0.171)	-0.739 (1.446)

Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
FE	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Price Trend	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Housing Cond.	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Residential wards	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7379	7965	7965
F	592.006	.	339.162	508.799	.	1852.756
R^2	0.708	0.742	0.719	0.709	0.960	0.717

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. IVs are station density, employment potential and the degree share in t-2 all models. Model (3) includes a dummy variable indicating 60 wards for which no price trend could be computed due to insufficient transactions. We derive the instrument (predicted Δ log degree share (t) x homeownership (t-1)) for the interaction term in model (5) by interacting home-ownership (t-1) with the predicted values of an auxiliary regression where we regress Δ log degree share on the exogenous variables, i.e. on the standard IVs and controls. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. $^*p< 0.05$, $^{**}p< 0.01$, $^{***}p< 0.001$.

We have tried four alternative IV models which are based on the benchmark model, i.e., including the set of controls (Table 1, column 2 in the main paper). The coefficient estimates reported in Table A6 remain qualitatively similar and quantitatively close to the main model. First stage results are reported in Table A7 in the appendix. The alternative instruments, again, pass the validity tests. Only the overidentification test is failed by specification (1) using employment potentiality and museum density as instruments.

Tab. A6. Alternative IV models

	(1) Δ log designation share (t)	(2) Δ log designation share (t)	(3) Δ log designation share (t)	(4) Δ log designation share (t)
Δ log degree share (t)	-0.828***	-0.860***	-0.845***	-0.875***
	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.117)
log degree share (t-1)	-0.408***	-0.421***	-0.415***	-0.427***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.048)
log designation share (t-1)	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Δ log homeownership (t)	0.594***	0.612***	0.604***	0.610***
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.071)
log homeownership (t-1)	0.194***	0.196***	0.194***	0.197***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Δ log average household size (t)	-0.313***	-0.329***	-0.324***	-0.334***
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)
log average household size (t-1)	-0.281***	-0.295***	-0.289***	-0.299***
	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)
log pop age (t-1)	-0.240***	-0.246***	-0.243***	-0.246***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)
Δ pop age (t)	-0.270***	-0.280***	-0.277***	-0.273***
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.082)
log foreigner share (t-1)	0.074***	0.077***	0.075***	0.078***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Δ foreigner share (t)	0.070***	0.073***	0.072***	0.075***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Constant	1.394***	1.436***	1.419***	1.438***
	(0.289)	(0.291)	(0.289)	(0.291)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
IV	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7968
CHI2	319.851	318.289	321.092	316.186
EXOG_P	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
OVERID	2.289	0.084	0.500	0.233
OVERIDP	0.130	0.772	0.479	0.629
Instruments (as densities except employment pot.)	Employment potentiality	Employment potentiality	Employment potentiality	Rail station
	Museum	Coffee place	Bar	Coffee place

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. *$p< 0.05$, **$p< 0.01$, ***$p< 0.001$.

Tab. A7. Alternative IV models – first stage regressions

	(1) Δ log degree share (t)	(2) Δ log degree share (t)	(3) Δ log degree share (t)	(4) Δ log degree share (t)
employment potentiality	3.07E-8*** (0.000)	2.95E-8*** (0.000)	2.85E-8*** (0.000)	
museum density	0.086 (0.053)			
coffee place density		0.004 (0.004)		-0.007 (0.005)
bar density			0.004 (0.003)	
rail station density				0.196*** (0.018)
log degree share (t-1)	-0.409*** (0.010)	-0.410*** (0.010)	-0.411*** (0.010)	-0.409*** (0.009)
log designation share (t-2)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Δ log homeownership (t)	0.521*** (0.064)	0.516*** (0.063)	0.521*** (0.067)	0.534*** (0.061)
log homeownership (t-1)	0.137*** (0.032)	0.135*** (0.034)	0.141*** (0.034)	0.128** (0.039)
Δ log average household size (t)	-0.465*** (0.070)	-0.463*** (0.070)	-0.455*** (0.070)	-0.441*** (0.077)
log average household size (t-1)	-0.272*** (0.067)	-0.276*** (0.066)	-0.257*** (0.061)	-0.240*** (0.064)
log pop age (t-1)	-0.099 (0.051)	-0.099 (0.052)	-0.088 (0.053)	-0.101 (0.052)
Δ pop age (t)	-0.314*** (0.086)	-0.316*** (0.090)	-0.312*** (0.085)	-0.345*** (0.086)
log foreigner share (t-1)	0.081*** (0.009)	0.082*** (0.009)	0.081*** (0.009)	0.087*** (0.010)
Δ foreigner share (t)	0.090*** (0.019)	0.091*** (0.019)	0.091*** (0.019)	0.091*** (0.018)
Constant	0.039 (0.092)	0.051 (0.094)	0.035 (0.091)	-0.015 (0.091)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7968
F	568.539	566.433	573.506	525.781
R²	0.706	0.706	0.707	0.705

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. $^*p< 0.05$, $^{**}p< 0.01$, $^{***}p< 0.001$.

Furthermore, we have split the long difference between 1991 and 2011 into two shorter differences of 1991 to 2001 and 2001 to 2011. For the latter short difference we moreover used the change in income instead of change in degree as a proxy for heritage preferences. The coefficient estimates remain qualitatively similar to the main model and are reported with their first stages in tables A8 and A9. The coefficient of the key variable is slightly smaller in the benchmark specification of the short different between 1991 and 2001 (column 4) and considerably larger for the period between 2001 and 2011 (column 8). In columns (9)–(12) we use income as a proxy of heritage preference. Focusing on the benchmark specification in the final column, doubling income more than quadruples the designation share. The respective instruments are valid and

sufficiently strong. Overall, the results are in line with our theory; increases in heritage preferences, proxied by change in degree or change in income, lead to increases in designation shares.

Tab. A8. Short differences and income model

	(1) 1991-2001 Δ log designation share (t)	(2) 1991-2001 Δ log designation share (t)	(3) 1991-2001 Δ log designation share (t)	(4) 1991-2001 Δ log designation share (t)	(5) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(6) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(7) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(8) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(9) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(10) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(11) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)	(12) 2001-2011 Δ log designation share (t)
Δ log degree share (t)	-0.017** (0.009)	-0.216*** (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.014)	-0.483*** (0.079)	0.477*** (0.052)	1.653*** (0.126)	-0.010 (0.080)	-2.129** (0.919)				
log degree share (t-1)			-0.056*** (0.007)	-0.185*** (0.024)			-0.117*** (0.027)	-0.535*** (0.182)				
log designation share (t-1)			-0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)			-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.009*** (0.003)			-0.014*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.007)
Δ log homeownership (t)			-0.056*** (0.007)	0.386*** (0.056)			-0.117*** (0.027)	0.732* (0.385)			-0.027 (0.116)	1.194*** (0.434)
log homeownership (t-1)			0.129*** (0.028)	0.077*** (0.014)			-0.122 (0.115)	0.340*** (0.127)			0.098** (0.042)	0.777*** (0.237)
Δ log average household size (t)			0.068*** (0.013)	-0.245*** (0.062)			0.057 (0.037)	-0.727 (0.450)			0.190 (0.181)	0.074 (0.272)
log average household size (t-1)			0.004 (0.037)	-0.162*** (0.049)			0.219 (0.185)	-0.099 (0.177)			0.278*** (0.095)	0.129 (0.149)
log pop age (t-1)			-0.027 (0.037)	-0.158*** (0.036)			0.241** (0.095)	0.041 (0.185)			0.285** (0.112)	-1.364** (0.559)
Δ pop age (t)			-0.109*** (0.033)	-0.188*** (0.056)			0.389*** (0.112)	-0.107 (0.362)			0.519** (0.217)	-2.009** (0.899)
log foreigner share (t-1)			-0.044 (0.048)	0.057*** (0.011)			0.557*** (0.211)	-0.004 (0.016)			-0.025* (0.015)	0.101** (0.046)
Δ foreigner share (t)			0.001 (0.004)	0.121*** (0.025)			-0.017 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.038)			-0.026 (0.028)	-0.104** (0.048)
Δ log income									-0.218*** (0.069)	-9.330*** (2.024)	-0.142** (0.070)	-7.305*** (2.364)
log income (t-1)											-0.144*** (0.037)	-0.909*** (0.261)
Constant	0.159*** (0.005)	0.224*** (0.009)	0.489*** (0.143)	0.864*** (0.167)	0.317*** (0.022)	-0.126*** (0.043)	-1.436*** (0.472)	0.367 (0.900)	0.549*** (0.027)	2.881*** (0.524)	0.007 (0.556)	13.647*** (4.552)

IV	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7965	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966
CHI2		103.847		202.519		170.741		203.917		21.242		88.061
EXOG_P		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.012		0.000		0.000
OVERID		7.555		1.413		1.385		19.198		13.526		0.741
OVERIDP		0.006		0.235		0.239		0.000		0.000		0.389

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p< 0.05$, $^{**}p< 0.01$, $^{***}p< 0.001$.

Tab. A9. Short differences and income model – First stage regressions

	(1) 1991-2001 Δ log degree share (t)	(2) 1991-2001 Δ log degree share (t)	(3) 1991-2001 log designation share (t-1)	(4) 2001-2011 Δ log degree share (t)	(5) 2001-2011 Δ log degree share (t)	(6) 2001-2011 log designation share (t-1)	(7) 2001-2011 Δ log income (t)	(8) 2001-2011 Δ log income (t)	(9) 2001-2011 log designation share (t-1)
rail station density	0.055 (0.049)	0.053* (0.021)	-0.003 (0.208)	-0.062*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.059 (0.151)	-0.012 (0.037)	0.018 (0.029)	0.066 (0.159)
employment potentiality	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
log degree share (t-1)		0.055 (0.049)	0.053* (0.021)	-0.003 (0.208)	-0.062*** (0.010)	0.038*** (0.008)			
log designation share (t-2)		0.007*** (0.001)	0.828*** (0.019)		0.000 (0.000)	0.922*** (0.010)		0.002** (0.001)	0.927*** (0.009)
Δ log homeownership (t)		0.586*** (0.067)	-0.613** (0.232)		0.408*** (0.048)	-1.137*** (0.328)		0.172 (0.101)	-1.232*** (0.343)
log homeownership (t-1)		0.061** (0.022)	-0.431*** (0.118)		0.143*** (0.018)	-0.114 (0.102)		0.110*** (0.028)	-0.141 (0.126)
Δ log average household size (t)		-0.534*** (0.044)	-0.161 (0.325)		-0.424*** (0.093)	0.664 (0.725)		-0.009 (0.089)	0.733 (0.733)
log average household size (t-1)		-0.253*** (0.041)	-1.519*** (0.436)		-0.139* (0.059)	0.273 (0.258)		-0.004 (0.067)	0.227 (0.249)
log pop age (t-1)		0.004 (0.048)	0.555 (0.337)		-0.154*** (0.045)	0.744* (0.350)		-0.217*** (0.058)	0.896* (0.345)
Δ pop age (t)		-0.231*** (0.051)	0.311 (0.370)		-0.325*** (0.077)	0.152 (0.455)		-0.362** (0.118)	0.245 (0.443)
log foreigner share (t-1)		0.110*** (0.009)	0.085* (0.042)		0.004 (0.005)	-0.064 (0.045)		0.015** (0.005)	-0.035 (0.046)
Δ foreigner share (t)		0.267*** (0.017)	0.061 (0.084)		0.026* (0.012)	0.023 (0.065)		-0.010 (0.007)	-0.021 (0.066)
Log income (t-1)								-0.114*** (0.020)	0.191 (0.101)
Constant	0.297*** (0.008)	0.278 (0.209)	-0.336 (1.438)	0.389*** (0.005)	0.790*** (0.221)	-3.160* (1.479)	0.255*** (0.004)	1.880*** (0.239)	-5.076** (1.602)

Controls	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES
Observations	7965	7965	7965	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966	7966
F	134.968	557.956	1891.124	73.689	464.362	3091.590	8.301	17.028	2640.502
R^2	0.124	0.590	0.717	0.095	0.614	0.856	0.004	0.103	0.856

Notes: See the data section for a description of control variables. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered on fixed effects. $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$.

5.2 Equilibrium designation

Tab. A10. below reports the conservation area effects as well as the full set of hedonic controls, housing characteristics in particular, for the difference-in-differences estimation given by equation (26) in the main paper. Column (7) shows that housing units with more bathrooms and bedrooms fetch higher prices, as do detached, semi-detached, and bungalows (over the omitted category flats/maisonettes). The sales price of terraced housing is insignificantly different from flats/maisonettes. Larger floor spaces are associated with higher price but with significant diminishing effects. There is a premium for new properties. Leased properties are of less value than those owned. Properties with parking spaces, single garages and double garages sell for higher prices than those without any parking facilities. There is a house price premium for properties with central heating over other types of heating. In order to control for a potentially non-linear relationship between housing age and house prices we included a series of house age bins. In order to separate the effects of pure building age (which may be associated with deterioration) from the build date (which may strongly determine the architectural style) we allow for age cohort and building data cohort effects. Since the 'New property' variable identifies all properties where the build age is zero years, the omitted category from the age variables is 1–9 years. All of the bins for properties older than this indicate significant negative premiums. The negative premium increases with age, mostly quickly over the first few categories and then more slowly until the penultimate category and finally decreases for buildings over 100 years. The effect of the build date is also non-linear. The general tendency is for buildings built in earlier periods to have higher prices than buildings built in the omitted period 2000–2010. However, this effect becomes insignificant in the 60s and 70s; periods associated with the architectural styles of the post-ward reconstruction phase that are today less appreciated than other styles. The greatest premium is attached to houses built pre-1900, the earliest category.

Tab. A10. Conservation area premium – designation effect

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Inside treated CA × Post designation	0.028***	0.014	0.014	0.003	-0.024	-0.077	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.013)
Within 500m buffer of treated CA × Post des.	0.023***	0.013***	0.012***	0.004	0.012	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.010)
Inside treated CA	-0.043***	-0.038***	-0.048***	-0.037***	-0.062	0.029	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.057)	(0.108)	(0.021)
Within 500m buffer of treated CA	-0.010**	-0.004	-0.011**	0.005	0.003	0.006	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Number of bathrooms	0.007***	0.007***	0.006***	0.013***	0.057***	0.059***	0.014***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Number of bedrooms	0.166***	0.172***	0.169***	0.165***	0.170***	0.179***	0.158***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Number of bedrooms squared	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.018***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Detached house	0.254***	0.222***	0.211***	0.194***	0.235***	0.216***	0.193***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.007)
Semi-detached house	0.119***	0.097***	0.088***	0.070***	0.082***	0.066***	0.073***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Terraced house/Country cottage	0.040***	0.026***	0.015**	0.001	0.002	-0.013	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Bungalow	0.311***	0.285***	0.281***	0.257***	0.292***	0.269***	0.257***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Floorsize (m^2)	0.006***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Floorsize (m^2) × Floorsize (m^2)	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
New property	0.084***	0.087***	0.088***	0.088***	0.047**	0.076***	0.077***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.006)
Leasehold	-0.054***	-0.067***	-0.065***	-0.073***	-0.100***	-0.104***	-0.070***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.006)
Single garage	0.112***	0.097***	0.100***	0.097***	0.096***	0.097***	0.098***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Double garage	0.190***	0.162***	0.161***	0.159***	0.160***	0.156***	0.158***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Parking space	0.076***	0.063***	0.065***	0.061***	0.052***	0.049***	0.063***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Central heating	0.089***	0.094***	0.098***	0.100***	0.085***	0.094***	0.095***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Building age: 10–19 years	-0.047***	-0.063***	-0.062***	-0.075***	-0.071***	-0.068***	-0.069***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.005)
Building age: 20–29 years	-0.079***	-0.106***	-0.104***	-0.125***	-0.133***	-0.126***	-0.113***
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.007)
Building age: 30–39 years	-0.092***	-0.127***	-0.123***	-0.150***	-0.169***	-0.141***	-0.133***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.009)
Building age: 40–49 years	-0.104***	-0.148***	-0.142***	-0.180***	-0.199***	-0.165***	-0.158***
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.011)
Building age: 50–59 years	-0.121***	-0.171***	-0.167***	-0.207***	-0.232***	-0.204***	-0.175***
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.014)
Building age: 60–69 years	-0.135***	-0.198***	-0.194***	-0.238***	-0.320***	-0.265***	-0.215***
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.018)
Building age: 70–79 years	-0.136***	-0.213***	-0.207***	-0.263***	-0.326***	-0.273***	-0.234***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.019)
Building age: 80–89 years	-0.132***	-0.218***	-0.213***	-0.277***	-0.339***	-0.313***	-0.243***
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.021)
Building age: 90–99 years	-0.111***	-0.208***	-0.204***	-0.280***	-0.360***	-0.304***	-0.248***
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.023)

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Building age: Over 100 years	-0.083***	-0.176***	-0.176***	-0.261***	-0.348***	-0.284***	-0.227***
	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.074)	(0.065)	(0.025)
Build date: 1900–1909	0.040***	0.121***	0.128***	0.208***	0.256***	0.222***	0.173***
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.025)
Build date: 1910–1919	0.074***	0.153***	0.158***	0.226***	0.262***	0.256***	0.196***
	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.071)	(0.059)	(0.024)
Build date: 1920–1929	0.093***	0.157***	0.162***	0.215***	0.225***	0.189***	0.190***
	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.021)
Build date: 1930–1939	0.082***	0.128***	0.130***	0.168***	0.187***	0.163***	0.151***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.020)
Build date: 1940–1949	0.040***	0.078***	0.078***	0.111***	0.063	0.053	0.096***
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.018)
Build date: 1950–1959	0.017***	0.033***	0.041***	0.057***	0.017	-0.004	0.046***
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.015)
Build date: 1960–1969	0.001	0.007	0.018	0.023	-0.017	-0.012	0.011
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.013)
Build date: 1970–1979	-0.015***	-0.016**	-0.008	-0.004	-0.059	-0.046	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.011)
Build date: 1980–1989	0.013***	0.017***	0.025***	0.029***	-0.023	-0.010	0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.008)
Build date: 1990–1999	0.022***	0.020***	0.022***	0.029***	-0.020	-0.008	0.017**
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.008)
Build date: pre 1900	0.098***	0.149***	0.162***	0.244***	0.312***	0.259***	0.216***
	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.026)
Location cont.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Neighborhood cont.	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ward effects	YES	YES					
Nearest treated CA effects			YES	YES	YES	YES	
Matched CA effects							YES
Treatment group: CAs designated	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2010	1996-2002	1996-2002	1996-2010
Control group	Full England sample	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 2km of treated CA	Within 500m of pre-1996 CA & within 2km of treated CA	Within 500m of CA designated 1987-1995 & within 4km of treated CA	Within 500m of CA designated 2003-2010 & within 4km of treated CA	Within 500m of pre-1996 CA matched on propensity score
R^2	0.921	0.922	0.915	0.915	0.861	0.864	0.909
AIC	-587375	-156426	-130469	-67044	-5410	-8475	-41206
Observation	1088k	302k	302k	178k	214k	323k	133k

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on location fixed effects. Conservation area control groups in Columns (4)-(7) have separate fixed effects for the areas inside and outside a conservation area. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Semi-parametric temporal and spatial treatment effects

Fig A2. reports the results for the semi-parametric estimation of the temporal effects of designation using equation (A19). Instead of simply presenting our two strongest specifications, as we do in the main paper, here we present a different dimension to the results bin by com-

paring the bin estimates for the naïve DD in the left panels to the matched CA control group in the right panels. The left charts show that the post-period internal and external estimates deviate significantly from the pre-period mean (hence the significant DD estimates) but that this is driven by a general upward trends. This corroborates the results in Tab. 2., column (1) of the main paper where no significant discontinuity nor shift in trend for the naïve control group exists and hence the advantages of the RDD-DD over the standard DD method is highlighted. The charts in the right panels also corroborate the evidence presented using the parametric trends equations in the main paper. Specifically, they show that for the internal effects the post-treatment estimates tend not to deviate significantly from the pre-treatment effects but that there are upward shifts in the trend when compared to the pre-treatment trend. For the external effects there is a general upward trend in the less carefully matched control groups and a downward trend in the stronger control groups but no shift in the trend at the designation date.

Fig A2. Semi-parametric temporal bins estimates

Internal effects: Full dataset
Tab. A10. column (1)

Internal effects: Matched CA
Tab. A10. column (7)

External effects: Full dataset
Tab. A10. column (1)

External effects: Matched CA
Tab. A10. column (7)

Notes: The solid black line plots the estimated differences between treatment group and control group against year since designation date using equation (A19). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used in column (1) of appendix Tab. A10. . The right charts show results for the control group used in column (7) of appendix Tab. A10. . The horizontal red line illustrates the mean of the pre-treatment estimates.

Fig A3. demonstrates the semi-parametric spatial effects using different bin sizes of 100m and 200m using appendix equation (A20). These semi-parametric charts closely resemble their parametric counterparts. Notably, there is no significant and positive effect in the first bin outside the conservation area when using the preferred specification of column (7) from Tab. A10. This is consistent with the parametric findings and baseline DD findings that there is no significant external policy effect and that our second hypothesis cannot be accepted. There is, however, one significant bin inside the conservation area at 200–300m. This provides some support for the idea that heritage externalities are stronger deeper within the

conservation areas such that there may be a positive policy effect. This effect then declines to zero for the deepest bin of greater than 300m.

Fig A3. Semi-parametric spatial bins estimates

Notes: The solid black line plots estimate the difference-in-differences treatment effect at different distances from the conservation area boundary using appendix equation (A20). The dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence intervals. The left charts show results for the control group used Tab. 4., column (1). The right charts show results for the control group used in Tab. 4., column (5). The horizontal red lines illustrate the mean of the pre-treatment estimates, the final pre-period bin and the first post-period bin.

6 Literature

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