Working Paper

Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma: Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up

Jun-ichi Itaya, Kenichi Kurita
CESifo, Munich, 2020

CESifo Working Paper No. 8621

There are two important problems in welfare benefit programs: the prevalence of welfare fraud, in which ineligible people receive welfare benefits, and incomplete take-up, whereby eligible poor people are reluctant to claim welfare benefits. This study investigates both of these opposing phenomena using simple replicator models of statistical discrimination and the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma suggested by Besley and Coate (1992). We find multiple stable equilibria in the long run, one of which entails low welfare fraud and 100% incomplete take-up and the other of which entails high welfare fraud and complete take-up in either model, and, moreover, that an interior stationary equilibrium that allows for the coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up is unstable in the model of statistical discrimination view welfare stigma, but it is stable in the model of the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma. This difference arises from the different nature of stigma cost functions in these two models.

CESifo Category
Public Finance
Behavioural Economics
Keywords: stigma, replicator dynamics, incomplete take-up, welfare fraud, non-take-up
JEL Classification: H310, H530, I380