

# VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE 2019



Workshop to be held on the island of San Servolo in the Bay of Venice, Italy

## The Future of Europe: Structural Reforms, Growth and Globalization

5 – 6 June

Organisers: Nauro F. Campos, Balazs Egert & Jan-Egbert Sturm

**Who appreciates the peace-keeping role of international organizations? Historical roots of EU support and Euroscepticism**

KAI GEHRING (University of Zurich)

# Who appreciates the peace-keeping role of international organizations?

## Historical roots of EU support and Euroscepticism

Kai Gehring (University of Zurich, CESifo)

April 2019

### **Abstract**

There is little causal evidence about deep-rooted sources of support for shifting power from nation-states to international organizations. Focusing on the European Union, arguably the most ambitious peace project in recent human history, I test whether citizens in a treated area that was historically more negatively exposed to the actions by nation-states exhibit higher EU support. Specifically, I use the case of Alsace-Lorraine in France as a natural experiment to implement a geographical regression discontinuity design at the municipal level within these historically homogeneous regions. The results document persistently higher EU support in three important referenda, as well as a lower share of eurosceptic parties in the treated area. There is no evidence that migration, or differences in socio-economic factors and public good provision are driving the persistent differences. Instead, various survey measures suggest a stronger European Identity as the main mechanism. This stronger identity does not seem to be driven by perceived economic benefits from the EU, and does not come at the expense of a weaker national or regional identity.

*Keywords:* European Union, European Union Support, European Identity, Persistence, Group Identity, International Organizations.

*Acknowledgments:* I thank Christian Bjornkov, Katharina Michaelowa, Marco Steenbergen and Stephanie Walter for detailed comments, as well as seminar participants at Central European University and the University of Zurich, and participants at the European Public Choice Society Meeting in Jerusalem. I also thank Ulrich Doraszelski, Raphael Franck, Franz Zobl, Noel Johnson, Eunhye Kim and the département archives in Alsace and Lorraine for sharing data and verifying historical sources, and Lukas Willi and Dante Povinelli for excellent research assistance. I acknowledge financial support from an Ambizione grant by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).

# 1 Introduction

In times of an anti-globalist backlash and disintegration tendencies, where populism and tensions between and within nations are on the rise, mechanisms to maintain peace and stability are of crucial importance. According to [Russett, Oneal, and Davis \(1998\)](#), there are three pillars of a Kantian perpetual peace. Economic interdependence ([Gartzke et al., 2001](#)), representative democracy and in the modern era international organizations. International organizations can facilitate peace by fostering economic cooperation and by constraining the actions of their member states ([McLaughlin Mitchell and Hensel, 2007](#)). Arguably the most ambitious and deepest such international organization in recent history is the European Union (EU), established after World War 2 in a continent that was for many centuries plagued by repeated conflicts.

The EU enjoyed widespread success and little resistance until the treaty of Maastricht in 1992 ([Moravcsik, 1991](#)), but a failure to convince voters in various national referenda, the rise of eurosceptic parties, and finally the Brexit plan indicate deep problems of the organization. A large number of studies in political science and related disciplines investigate attitudes towards the EU, but they are mostly focusing on individual psychological or socio-economic features or on contemporary domestic politics. Despite the immense importance of this question, there is little evidence about deep-rooted factors explaining existing spatial differences, and most of the extant evidence is of a correlational nature. Building on the peace-keeping aspect of international organizations, I hypothesize that attitudes towards the EU are influenced by the importance assigned to this function.

An increasing number of studies documents how history shapes identities ([Fouka, 2018, 2019; Posner, 2004](#)) and political behavior ([Mazumder 2018 AJPS](#)). While Posner's seminal work is mostly concerned with the salience of multiple cross-cutting cleavages like ethnicity or religion, the relevant identities like European, national and regional identity are nested in each other in my framework. My argument, building on [Posner \(2005\)](#), is that history shapes how identities are constructed and influences the incentives of individuals

to emphasize one identity rather than the other when it comes to political decisions.

I am interested in testing whether support for the EU as the over-arching level in the European governance model in a region is affected by the degree to which it was exposed to conflicts between nation-states or the repressive policies by their respective central nation-state. In the EU, South Tyrol in Italy is an example of the former category, and regions like Catalonia or the Basque country in Spain, or Corse in France are examples of the latter category. Prior research suggests that the large majority these regions are strong EU supporters (Jolly, 2007). The problem with these examples, however, is that the lack of a suitable counterfactual makes it hard to assign a causal interpretation. South Tyrol, for instance, was occupied and forcefully integrated into Italy, but today can also only be observed in another country than the northern parts of Tyrol. Catalonia was exposed to more repression by the central nation-state during the Franco-area than many other Spanish regions, but it also differs from them in many other dimensions. Similarly, the lack of counterfactual and plausibly exogenous variation also plague many of the existing studies about European Union support or European identity (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Jolly, 2007; Hobolt and De Vries, 2016), which is why Ciaglia et al. (2018) and Hobolt and de Vries (2016) in their review articles explicitly highlight the need for more causal analyses.

This paper exploits the case of the historically homogeneous French-German border regions of Alsace and Lorraine as a natural experiment, which were split after the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. This is a particularly suitable natural experiment for the question at hand, as one part of the regions was both exposed more negatively to the conflict between nation-states, as well as to more repressive policies by the central nation-states. Specifically, the treated part was occupied by Germany for about 50 years, and also suffered from repressive policies after the reintegration into France until the 1950s. Since then, however, tensions have calmed down, and we can observe both parts of the historical regions in the same institutional environment today.

To establish causality, I show that the exact border location between the two areas does not follow (i.) the prior *département* borders, (ii.) any older historical border (iii.), nor the historical linguistic border between French and German dialect speakers. The reason for this surprising decision were tensions between the political and military German leadership, which led to a division of the regions that was driven by pride rather than strategic decisions, and ignored local circumstances. I corroborate these historical facts by showing that there are no discontinuities in geographic and socio-economic pre-treatment indicators.

The French context allows me to study two referenda about European integration as well as electoral support for Eurosceptic parties at the municipal level. Using a geographic regression discontinuity design, I find that there is significantly higher support for the EU in the treated area. To verify the causal interpretation of the effect, I also conduct two placebo tests. First, I show that the differences I observe are not simply picking up the fact that border *départements* are different than the more central ones. Second, I show that there are no effects at the prior pre-treatment border within the regions. Finally, because in some parts the treatment and the historical language border coincides, I show that excluding areas that were formerly German-dialect speaking does not affect the result.

Finally, I show that these differences seem to be driven by changes in European identity that are unrelated to perceived monetary benefits of EU membership. There is no support for alternative explanations like migration or changes in the socio-economic structure caused by the natural experiment. The higher European identity does not come at the cost of a lower national identity in the treated area, and a stronger European identity is even associated with stronger regional attachment.

The paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, the large and growing literature examining differences in European identity (Buscha et al., 2017; Capello, 2018), support for the European Union (e.g. Gabel, 1998; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000), and Euroskepticism (De Vries, 2018; McLaren,

2002; Treib, 2014; van Spanje and de Vreese, 2011). <sup>1</sup>While the existing literature, summarized by Ciaglia et al. (2018) and Hobolt and de Vries (2016), has yielded many important insights, it has mostly focused on correlational evidence regarding individual level or current domestic politics as explanatory factors. In comparison, this paper sheds light on a deep structural cause of existing differences.

Second, by considering the attitudes and resistance towards shifting decision-making to a super-ordinate, more international level, I also relate to the growing literature on regional integration (Schneider, 2017), but also on anti-globalist populism, opposition to a multilateral approach to international politics and papers studying Brexit (Becker et al., 2017). Relating to McLaren (2002), my results show that understanding tensions between nation-states and the regions they are composed also helps to understand the willingness to delegate decision-making to an international level (Jolly, 2007). Historical negative experiences with the actions of nation-states as an intermediate level of decision-making can thus plausibly lead to a higher willingness of affected regions to accept a multinational order that constraints national decision-making (cf. Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Moreover, my findings suggest that national identities are an obstacle to European Integration, contrasting prior correlational work (Carey, 2002; Fligstein et al., 2012).

Third, my theoretical framework around the role of international organizations as constraining the political action space of their member states relates to a growing literature (e.g. Carnegie and Carson, 2018; Carnegie, 2014; Schneider, 2019, 2017). International organizations were, for instance, found to constrain national governments and reduce discrimination in public procurement (Rickard and Kono, 2014). The EU can constrain national governments through its own legislation, but also by using the European Court of Justice to solve disputes with member states (c.f., Abbott et al., 2000).

---

<sup>1</sup> There is also a large related literature about the “democratic deficit” in the European Union (Featherstone, 1994). While various scholars defended the EU’s output legitimacy (e.g. Crombez, 2003; Moravcsik, 2002), input legitimacy is threatened by the relatively weak role of the EU parliament (Follesdal and Hix, 2006) and low participation rates in European parliamentary elections. Another branch of papers evaluates the decision-making processes and redistribution in the EU (e.g., Becker et al., 2010; Gehring and Schneider, 2018; Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; Schneider, 2013; Schneider., 2019)

Fourth, I relate to the literature on nationalism (Gellner and Breuilly, 2008; Anderson and O’dowd, 1999), the formation of common identities (Bisin et al., 2011; Wendt, 1994; Fouka et al., 2018) and the definition of a social identity (Shayo, 2009). Prior studies have examined various factors that affect identity, from political competition (Eifert et al., 2010), to institutional differences (Posner, 2005), and military service (Mazumder, 2018). (Hooghe and Marks, 2004) and (Hooghe and Marks, 2005) already study the effect of existing identities, but cannot move beyond correlational evidence. This study contributes to the small number of papers exploiting plausibly exogenous variation caused by historical natural experiments to learn more about identity formation (Posner, 2004; Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2018; Dehdari and Gehring, 2018; Fouka, 2019). Similar to Fouka (2018) and Mazumder (2018), I document how differences in historical exposure to specific aspects lead to a persistent difference, potentially even many years after the actual treatment ended (e.g., Becker et al., 2015)

The rest of the paper follows following structure. Section 2 provides the theoretical background, Section 3 presents the data and identification strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the main results, as well as placebo and robustness tests. I conclude the article by trying to put those results into perspective, discussing potential policy implications and sketching room for further research.

## 2 Theory and historical background

### 2.1 Theory and related literature

Posner (2005) describes the formation of group identities in two steps: Identity construction and identity choice. Identity construction refers to the historical process that determines which choice of identities is available. In this regard, it is important that this paper considers a within-regional comparison, so that the people in the control and treated area can choose from their regional Alsatian or Lorrainian, their French and their European

identity. Regarding identity choice, Posner argues that the most salient identities are the ones that serve the actors' interests best when being aggregated at the relevant political level.

I define identity based on [Shayo \(2009\)](#) and [Dehdari and Gehring \(2018\)](#) so that each person can be a member of multiple groups, that are potentially nested in each other. How strong an individual identifies with a group depends on the weight she puts on the features that she shares with the respective group compared to the features they do not have in common. The weights then determine the salience of each identity.

I argue that these weights, and accordingly the salience of identities, is shaped by history. If avoiding conflict between nation states and taking pre-cautious measures against intrusive actions by nation states against regions is more salient, the identity that is in line with this aim will be stronger. Hence, if the EU can constrain the actions its member states can take, this makes a European identity more desirable for those exposed more negatively to comparable actions in the past.

International organizations can constrain the choice set of its member states by setting conditions for access, and by setting up and enforcing rules for its members. Regarding the question whether an IO does promote peace, prior scholars emphasized the importance of democratic rules ([Pevehouse and Russett, 2006](#)) and the existence of sophisticated institutional structures ([Boehmer et al., 2004](#)). The EU certainly fulfills these criteria. One aspect that is particularly relevant for regions which are concerned about being exposed to discriminatory policies by the central state is the European Court of Justice. After initial doubts about its legitimacy ([Caldeira and Gibson, 1995](#)), scholars agree about its importance in restraining member state governments ([Mattli and Slaughter, 1995](#); [Sweet and Brunell, 2012](#)). [Garrett \(1995, p.171\)](#) explains that “European law has supremacy over domestic laws” and the court exercises judicial review (..) over the behavior of governments within their national boundaries.”

Many empirical papers have documented how differences in historical exposure to cer-



tain events lead to persistent differences in political and economic attitudes. These differences can persist through vertical transmission from parents to children, also particular institutions or associations that remain different over time. In the case of Alsace-Lorraine, both channels are plausible. While the treated area today again belongs to the same region as the control area, some institutional differences remain. The actual legal differences associated with these so-called local laws became smaller and smaller over time, which is why I would not expect that their economic impact causes persistent differences.<sup>2</sup> Still, an emerging literature shows how history can be reactivated (e.g., [Ochsner and Roesel, 2017](#)), which is more easy to achieve if certain actual differences remain. In this regard, the local laws can also have a symbolic value and point towards the specific history of the treated area.

Identities are transmitted from parents to their children, and in addition remaining institutional differences like the local laws, even though limited in their actual effects, contribute to maintaining these differences.<sup>3</sup> This is in line with a constructivist view of identity as “fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic and political processes” ([Chandra 2001](#)), as well as with Posner idea that the institutional environment influences identity choices. In addition to this more rational approach to choosing identities, as in [Laitin \(1998, 1995\)](#), the changes in the weights assigned to different aspects could also happen unconsciously and still be transmitted across generations. In a rationalist cost-benefit framework, the additional weight put on the peace-keeping aspect of the European Union would increase the benefits that citizens in a specific region assign to the EU.


---

<sup>2</sup> ([Glenn, 1974](#), p.772) stated already in the 1970s that “local doctrine is generally of declining importance. There are few, if any, local jurists remaining (...) and the local law is taught only in two or three optional courses (...). Moreover, French courts refused to make any reference to German jurisprudence and interpret local laws according to French standards and principles. Some differences still exist with regard to a small number of welfare policies (including payments to sick employees), which remain more generous in Alsace-Lorraine and include two additional days of vacation. Other differences exist with regard to personal bankruptcy law and voluntary associations.

<sup>3</sup> Language could also be an important cleavage in the initially bilingual region, however after WW2 the importance of German has dramatically declined. Today, linguistic differences are not a politically salient cleavage, most likely because the share of young people who actually speak German is very low today. I will exploit the fact that the linguistic border does not coincide with treatment border to rule out historical linguistic differences are driving the results.

My hypothesis about the causal mechanisms is illustrated in Figure 1. After a common pre-treatment history, differences in exposure to the negative actions of nation-states during the treatment period lead to persistent differences in support for the EU between the treated and control area. I hypothesize that one main mechanism is the higher salience of a common European identity. An alternative, contrasting hypothesis is that the treatment period changed the composition of the population in the treated and control group, for instance through in- or out-migration, or led to differences in département-level public good provision. Another, more subtle, alternative hypothesis would be that it is not the peace-keeping aspect specifically, but the EU generally is seen in a more positive light. For instance, the economic benefits associated with the EU might be perceived more positively.

Figure 1: Temporal Structure



Notes: Author's creation.

## 2.2 Treatment definition

This paper is interested in the long-term effect of a region's exposure to conflicts between nation-states or to repressive, discriminatory policies by their respective central nation-state. Answering this question holistically for each region in the European Union is beyond the scope of this paper. It is clearly a worthwhile endeavor for future research, but the challenges are to select the relevant time period for which conflicts need to be accounted for, to define the relevant set of discriminatory policies across countries and periods, and

to find exogenous variation and suitable counterfactuals.

Instead, I focus on the historical division of Alsace and Lorraine, which is a useful case for several reasons. This setting has several advantages. First, it allows me to exploit variation in historical exposure within formerly homogeneous regions. Prior to its division, both parts to a large degree share a common history, but one part was then clearly more exposed to conflicts between nation-states and to repressive, discriminatory policies by the respective central nation-state. Second, the exogenous location of the border dividing the two parts allows me to estimate a causal effect in a geographical RDD design. Finally, the treated and control area are today again observable in the same country and institutional environment today, so that I can conduct valid comparisons.

On the first point, what is most relevant is that at the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870/71, all of the regions had been French for more than a century. In earlier history, both regions have been autonomous political entities as far back as the 7th century. Under Charles the Bald, all of modern Lorraine and Alsace were united for the first time in the Duchy of Lotharingia. After several changes during the times of the Holy Roman Empire, the whole area finally became French in 1767. This means that, starting with Napoleon, they also experienced the same French nation-building policies and there is no reason to expect that identities differed systematically within the regions.

After 1871, approximately half the area of the region was occupied and annexed by Germany, and remained German for about half a century until WW1. Afterwards, the regions were integrated into France again, which, as historians describe, was accompanied by a series of discriminatory and repressive policies. Finally, during WW2 the Alsace-Lorraine region was occupied by German military together with the rest of the more northern part of France that was not governed by the Vichy regime.

After WW2, the region was reintegrated into France again. There were again some tensions regarding the treatment of soldiers from the region, who had to fight for the Nazi side during the war. Nonetheless, discriminatory policies comparable to the post-WW1

period were not imposed, and most observers describe that tensions with the nation-state calmed down after the Bordeaux trial in the 1950s declared an amnesty on war participants. Thus, we can observe both areas as a part of the same administrative region in France today. The section Outcomes describes the measures that are used to measure support for the EU as an international organization associated with overcoming the conflict that plagued the region for over a century.

One note on the limitations of this paper is warranted. First, it will not necessarily be possible to extrapolate the results to other regions in Europe. Still, these French-German border regions are far from being exotic cases in European history. Many other regions suffered from nation-state conflict or the actions of nation-states. Extant research shows that regions with a strong regional identity that experienced tensions with the respective nation-state often exhibit a strong European identity and support the EU (Jolly, 2007).

Second, the nature of the historical experiment does not allow distinguishing between the effects of suffering from conflict between nation-states through occupation and switching nation-status, and the effect of being exposed to more discriminatory policies by the central state. Again, drawing on the examples of South Tyrol in Italy, or Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain, the effect of both types of exposure on EU support seems to point in the same direction. Still, it is important to acknowledge this limitation; future research can hopefully shed more light on this.

## 3 Identification and Data

### 3.1 Identification

The left hand side of Figure 2 shows the regions of Alsace and Lorraine prior to 1870. The yellow border indicates the dividing line that was negotiated between the newly-founded German state and France in the peace treaty of Versailles following the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. I refer to the left side, that always remained French, as the control area.

The right side is referred to as the treated area.

The annexed, treated area was incorporated into the German Empire as the *Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen*. In Alsace, the départements already in place during French rule were converted into the German districts of *Oberelsass* and *Untereisass*, corresponding to the current départements *Haut-Rhin* and *Bas-Rhin*. In Lorraine, out of parts of the former départements *Moselle* and *Meurthe*, the district *Lothringen* was created, corresponding to today's département *Moselle*. France created the départements of Meurthe-et-Moselle and Meuse out of the remaining parts of Lorraine. This delineation was kept after WW2 until today.

Most historians presume that the Franco-Prussian war (July 19, 1870 to May 10, 1871) was an attempt by Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of Prussia, to unite all German states against the arch-enemy of France (Wawro, 2005). Thanks to superior tactics and organization, the German army won the war surprisingly quickly. A march to and siege of Paris followed, until a peace treaty was to be negotiated with the newly-elected French leader Adolphe Thièrs. The German position was strong, but there were disagreement in the German leadership about the goals of the treaty. The independent military leadership under the charismatic general Helmut von Moltke was very interested in territorial expansion (Förster, 1990), and keeping the whole region of Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck's thought of this as a major folly and the potential source of a future war, and, if anything, wanted to restrict expansion to only the German-dialect speaking parts of Alsace and Lorraine (Lipgens, 1964).

The negotiation process is described as being influenced by pride than specific strategic considerations (Wawro, 2005). For instance, while Bismarck was willing to hand over Metz and the surrounding areas, Moltke refused to return it as he considered this occupation a major military achievement. Bismarck, "quite uncharacteristically wilted under the pressure" (Wawro, 2005, p.305), and the final border was a compromise decided upon centrally in Versailles, without taking account of local circumstances (Messerschmidt,

1975). As Figure 2 show, it does (i.) not follow the historical linguistic border between French an German dialect speakers, (ii.) not follow the existing department borders, (iii.) nor any older historical border <sup>4</sup>


To augment this historical evidence, Figure 3 shows that there are no discontinuities in geographical factors that would suggest strategic features or the aim to secure valuable cropland influenced the exact local position of the border. I also gathered data from various sources to show that there are no pre-treatment discontinuities socio-economic variables like population (Motte et al., 2003), cropland and grazing land (from HYDE v.3.2), road length (Perret et al., 2015), and railroad connection and quality (Mimeur et al., 2018). The absence of significant discontinuities further suggests that local economic conditions did not drive the decision that was taken centrally in Versailles. <sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> This was verified using various maps from different medieval periods.

<sup>5</sup> There also exists indicators like industrial production and wages, but only at the larger arrondissement level. This results in too few observations to conduct an RDD test, but Table 8 uses a T-test to show that there are also no significant differences between the treatment and control area with regard to income p.c., worker, firm productivity, and the share of child laborers.

Figure 2: Historical Maps: before and after division in 1870/71




A.) Division does not follow historical Department borders.

B.) Division does not follow historical dialect border.

**Notes:** Moselle is the treated department in the region of Lorraine. Meuse and Meurthe-et-Moselle are the untreated counterfactuals. Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin compose the treated Alsace region, and Vosges (Lorraine region) serves as their counterfactual..

Figure 3: Smoothness in Pre-Treatment Variables at the border



**Notes:** Coefficients with 95% confidence interval. Detailed results in Table 7.

## 3.2 Outcomes

### 3.2.1 EU Support and Eurosceptic parties

The following paragraphs provide a short description of the main outcomes. The fact that the treated and control region both belong to France allows using the results of nationwide referenda for comparison. The share of Eurosceptic parties is also comparable, as the same parties ran for election in both parts. Appendix Table 1 to 3 describe all variables in detail and provide descriptive statistics.

**Referendum about the European Communities enlargement, 1969** A referendum on the enlargement of the EC was held in France on 23 April 1972. Voters were asked whether they approved of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom joining the EC. The proposals were approved by 68.3% of voters in France, with a turnout of 60.2%. Data for this referendum is only available at the the département level.

**Referendum about the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992** The Maastricht Treaty (also known as Treaty of the European Union TEU) introduced the three pillar structure of the EU, augmenting economic cooperation with a common foreign and security policy and with regard to justice and home affairs. Generally, it greatly expanded the competences and means of the Union, outlined the creation of the Euro. It is widely seen as the end point to the until then furthest reaching integration steps in EU history (Moravcsik, 1998). Three countries that were obliged to do so by their constitution held a referendum to ratify the treaty, including France. In France, a close majority of 50.8% approved the treaty in the end. Voting outcomes and the respective turnout is available at the municipal level from the French interior ministry.

The treaty clearly resulted in the shifting of some nation-state powers to subnational authorities \citep{Jeffery2000}, visible in its legal rules and political institutions \citep{mandrino2008,tatham2008}. In addition to the subsidiarity principle, the Treaty



established a \textit{Committee of the Regions} as a part of the European institutional structure. This undermines the dominance of the national level (Bullmann 1997)

### **French referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2005**

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE; commonly referred to as the European Constitution or as the Constitutional Treaty) was an unratified international treaty intended to create a consolidated constitution for the European Union (EU). It would have replaced the existing European Union treaties with a single text, given legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and expanded Qualified Majority Voting into policy areas which had previously been decided by unanimity among member states. It was rejected by 55% of French voters; and later replaced by the Lisbon Treaty.

All referenda, especially the latter two relate to nation states giving up some of the power at the expense of an over-arching international organization. For citizens in regions that had more negative experiences with nation-states, the introduction of the subsidiarity principle was also important. This codified the aim of decision-making at the lowest feasible level of authority in the EU (Treaty on the European Union, 1992), which often meant at the regional instead of the national level and undermines the dominance of the national level (Jeffery, 2015).

**Eurosceptic parties** I also examine the share of Eurosceptic parties in all the three European elections taking place between the referendum in 1992 and the one in 2005. To classify a party as Eurosceptic, I use the manifesto project database (Volkens et al., 2018), which provides time-varying assessments of a party's stance towards the European Union.<sup>6</sup> The first definition of a Eurosceptic party weighs pro-European and Eurosceptic manifesto content, defining a party only as Eurosceptic if the net score is positive.

One issue with this measure is the party Front National. It is an important part of the Eurosceptic group, but at the same time changes its attitude towards the EU over

---

<sup>6</sup> See <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu>, last accessed April 29, 2019.

time, and also captures controversial positions in many other dimensions. Hence, including it might add considerable noise to the results, which is why I also conduct a test excluding the party. Finally, one issue with the prior definitions is that they rely on binary distinctions which somehow arbitrarily define a party as Eurosceptic or not. To construct a more continuous measure of Euroscepticism, the last measure multiplies the vote share of each party running in the elections with the Euroscepticism score assigned to the party in the manifesto database.<sup>7</sup>

**Survey measures** By far the best sources, in terms of coverage at a sub-national level in France, are the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP), available at the département level. I use questions selected from the years between 1987 until 2003. Some questions appear only once, other are combined from two or more survey waves. Details on questions are provided in the respective section, table or figure.

**Other** I use several other pre- and post-treatment variables, some relating to geography and others to socio-economic or political aspects. They are also described in more detail in the appendix or the respective section where they are applied.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 EU support

I begin by considering differences in European Union support between the treatment and control area in the 1972 referendum about the European Communities enlargement. Even absent municipal level data, it is clearly visible in Figure ?? that the average agreement to

---


<sup>7</sup>Note that I make one adjustments to the database. In 1999, the "Union pour l'Europe des nations" ran as an independent joint list, still representing the parties Rassemblement pour la République (RPF) and Mouvement pour la France (MPF), with the leader Charles Pasqua. The list was clearly eurosceptic, but not presented in the manifesto database as it was not related to a single party. It received about 13% of the votes in France in the 1999 election, so that omitting it would severely bias the results. Thus, the party is contained as a Eurosceptic party for this election (but not used for my last measure as there is no score).

the referendum of about 80% is considerably higher in the treated area than in the control area, where only about 70% voted yes. Although this comparison does not allow a direct causal interpretation, it is useful to assess this referendum to study the persistence of the differences I am interested in over time.


The first set of causal results then considers the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. Figure 4 on the upper right hand side gives an indication that the share of yes votes was considerably higher in the treated area. I proceed by verifying the causal nature of this correlation with the geographical regression discontinuity design. The graph on the left-hand side shows that there also is a clearly visible jump at the treatment border. Appendix Figure ?? shows that the higher support for the EU is not driven by differences in turnout for the referendum.

Figure 4: EU Support and Euroscepticism - Maps and RD Plots

a.) Agreement in EU Referendum 1972 ( Share “Yes” in %)



b.) Agreement in EU Referenda 1992 & 2005 (Average Share “Yes” in %)



c.) Vote Share Eurosceptic Parties in Eur. Parliamentary Elections 1994-2004 (average in %)




Table 1 quantifies this result for two bandwidths: one using 10kms and one based on the mean square error (Calonico et al., 2015). 10kms is the smallest sensible bandwidth based on the average size of a municipality polygon, comparing only directly neighboring municipalities to each other.<sup>8</sup> This alleviates potential concerns about underestimating the standard error by choosing a bandwidth that is too large. The coefficient for the 1992 referendum (columns 1 and 2) varies between 4.395 and 5.242 percentage points difference between treated and untreated area. Relative to the mean outcome of about 54, this is a meaningfully large difference corresponding to about half a standard deviation. The effects are also statistically significant with p-values below 0.01. There is a smaller difference of about 2.5 percentage points for the referendum in 2005 (columns 3 and 4) with p-values slightly above 0.1. This smaller effect must also be put in relation to the fact that the average agreement was also about ten percentage points lower in 2005. When considering both referenda together in column 5 and 6, the treatment effect is between 4 and 4.7, a sizable effect that is also clearly statistically significant. Accordingly, being exposed more negatively to the actions by nation states in the past led to a persistent and sizable positive effect on European Union support.

## 4.2 Eurosceptic parties

This section uses the three different definitions of political support for Eurosceptic parties outlined in the data section. Table 1, Panel B, shows each result for the lowest possible bandwidth of 10 km and the respective efficient bandwidth.

Columns 1 to 6 clearly show that the vote-share of Eurosceptic parties is indeed lower in the treated area. The effect sizes differ between the estimations, and need to be interpreted in relation to the mean of the outcome. In column two, the vote share is 1.7 percentage

---

<sup>8</sup> Distances have to be computed based on the centroid of a municipality, using ArcGIS. Once we move below 10 km, municipalities start to be dropped from the estimations even though their polygon directly touches the treatment border, if the centroid is further away.

Table 1: RDD results - EU Support and Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005)

<b>Panel A</b>		<b>EU Support (Share Yes-Votes 1992 and 2005)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>1992</b>		<b>2005</b>		<b>1992 &amp; 2005</b>	
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.242 (1.818) [0.004]	6.254 (1.812) [0.001]	2.787 (1.954) [0.154]	2.787 (1.954) [0.154]	4.012 (1.357) [0.003]	4.728 (1.330) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	13.419	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.530
Observations	619	813	618	618	1237	1517
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.08	43.51	43.50	48.08	48.40

<b>Panel B</b>		<b>Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties</b>	<b>w/o Front National</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index</b>			
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086 (0.707) [0.124]	-1.735 (0.617) [0.005]	-1.873 (0.675) [0.006]	-2.339 (0.619) [0.000]	-3.898 (1.968) [0.048]	-4.643 (1.874) [0.013]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	14.369	10.000	17.819	10.000	16.675
Observations	1855	2623	1855	3174	1855	2967
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.44	7.51	7.21	16.07	15.53


**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In Panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In Panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

points lower relative to a mean of about 14. As expected, the estimations are much more precise when excluding the Front National. It is interesting that the effect is also larger. Against a baseline of about 7% vote share for Eurosceptic parties, their share is between 1.8 and 2.3 percentage points higher in the treated area. For both measures, the effect is statistically significant with p-values below 0.005 when using the efficient bandwidth. Finally, columns 5 and 6 use the overall weighted Euroscepticism index score as the most

comprehensive definition. Again, there is clearly less support for Eurosceptic positions in the treated area, with the difference again being statistically significant with p-values of 0.048 or lower.

### 4.3 Robustness to linguistic border

Figure 5: Robustness: Modified border excluding overlaps with linguistic border



**Notes:** The coefficient plot displays the main and alternative treatment coefficients. The outcome for the two coefficients on the left is the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. The outcome for the two coefficients on the right is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. For each outcome, the regression is run once with the complete border (left) and once with a shorter border, having removed the sections overlapping with the language border and those border sections with no counterfactuals on the other side. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse.

## 5 Mechanisms


The results so far document a causal effect of being historically more negatively affected to the actions of nation-states. This section explores whether these persistent differences are caused by migration, socio-economic factors, or public good provision. Alternatively, I test whether the treatment period that way persistent change in the salience of identities. Specifically, as I hypothesized above, European identity should be stronger in the treatment area if citizens in this area think of it as more useful to achieve their political

goals.

## 5.1 Socio-economics, public good provision and migration

Historians document at least two big migration waves in and out of the treatment area as a whole. Based on census-data, I can examine whether there was also a discontinuity in population changes at the treatment border.

Figure 6: RDD: Treatment effect on socio-economic variables, public good provision and population changes



**Notes:** Coefficients with 95% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita.

## 5.2 European Identity

Given that material changes in the composition of the population and in département policies cannot explain the differences in EU support, I hypothesize that the differences could be explained by a stronger European identity in the treated area. As [Ciaglia et al.](#)



(2018) carefully describe, European identity and European Union support need not to be identical. It could be the case that citizens who perceive themselves as European still oppose the EU as a political entity, for instance either for being too neoliberal (the extreme left view) or for being too interventionist (the argument by some Brexiteers). Nonetheless, the idea that European identity positively influences support for European Integration is already emphasized by Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005), who find that group identities can explain a sizable share of the variation in European Union support.

Table 2 explores the effect of being more negatively affected by nation state policies on European Identity. Two aspects should be noted. First, European Identity is not identical to European Union Identity. Europe is more than the member states of the European Union, and which countries are perceived as part of Europe can differ between individuals. Still, this is the closest proxy for an identity linked to the EU. Second, identity is arguably a complex construct that is not perfectly captured by a singly survey question. For that reason, I use one common question, but show results for other similar questions as well. Also, as noted in the data section, the survey data are available at the département instead of municipal level.

Panel A thus begins by considering a question about attachment to Europe, a definition that is very commonly used to proxy for identity and was asked in several repeated surveys. In contradiction to the first hypothesis, citizens in the treated area still express a stronger European identity. When using a survey question about attachment to Europe, as well as when setting attachment to Europe in relation to attachment to France, European identity remains between a quarter and a third of a standard deviation stronger in the treated area. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.

Panel B uses two alternative questions relating to whether respondents perceive themselves as European citizens and whether they are proud of being European. With regards to both questions, there is a consistently stronger European identity in the treated area. The differences are meaningfully large in size, and statistically highly significant. To sum

up, the higher EU support and lower share of Eurosceptic parties is also reflected in a stronger European identity in the part of the region historically more negatively affected by the actions of nation-states.

Table 2: European Identity

	<b>A. European Identity</b>	
	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>European Identity/ French National Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]	0.231 (0.029) [0.000]
Observations	5553	5547
	<b>B. European Identity (alternative)</b>	
	<b>European Citizen</b>	<b>European Pride</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.201 (0.022) [0.000]	0.258 (0.063) [0.000]
Observations	10023	1347

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). "*X*" *Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe and the nation (France in this case), asked in separate questions (95, 97, 99 and 01). *European Citizen*: "I see myself as a European citizen." (87, 89, 93, 96, 97, 01 and 03). The higher the value, the more favorable are respondents to the claim. *European Pride*: "How proud of being European are you?" (98). The higher the value, the prouder the respondent.

**Notes:** All variables were standardized with mean zero. Positive values indicate that people in treated area agree more with the statement. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below.

Table 3: Are European identity differences caused by perceived economic benefits for treated area

	Europ. Citizen	Europ. Identity	Europ. Pride
Region benefits from Treatment vs. Control	0.286 (0.042) [0.000]	0.121 (0.039) [0.002]	0.217 (0.062) [0.000]
- Common Market	0.153 (0.035) [0.000]		
- EU (generally)		0.504 (0.032) [0.000]	
- Interregional cooperation in EU			0.189 (0.060) [0.002]
Interaction	0.059 (0.043) [0.172]	0.001 (0.037) [0.976]	0.000 (0.075) [0.996]
Observations	2399	2536	1294

Notes: Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *European Citizen*: "I see myself as a European citizen." (89 and 93). The higher the value, the more favorable are respondents to the claim. *Common Market*: "Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic difficulties of your region?" (89 and 93). The higher the value, the more beneficial the common market is perceived by respondents. *European Pride*: "How proud of being European are you?" (98). The higher the value, the more proud the respondent. *Cooperation Regions*: "Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions?" (98). The higher the value, the more respondents want regions to cooperate with other European regions. *European Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to Europe *EU Impact*: Opinion of respondents towards the impact of the European project on their region (95 and 97). The higher the value, the more positive the respondent's opinion. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

### 5.3 Relation between Multiple Identities

One crucial question when discussing about contributing to a stronger identity of a supra-national identity like the European Union is whether this has necessarily to come at the cost of weaker lower-level identities. Although there is a literature about the possibility of dual identities, in particular in border regions, it seems that this is often implicitly assumed. To examine this, I also evaluate the effect of the treatment on regional and

national identity. Such an approach is not entirely new and relates to existing studies. [Hooghe and Marks \(2004\)](#), for instance, find that individuals stating a stronger national identity correlates with a stronger European identity using Eurobarometer data.

It is not straightforward to evaluate the relationship between identities at different levels using survey measures as proxies for the real identity. Using the OIP surveys, for instance, there is a positive correlation between identities at all levels. However, this is hard to interpret as it could be related to an individual-specific error term, like a general tendency to answer more positively or negatively. In addition to studying correlations at the individual level, we can also examine the correlations between département level regional, national and European identities. This way, the individual-specific error terms are canceled out. The result still suggests a positive correlation between the identities at different levels. Nonetheless, a causal interpretation could still be problematic as the differences cannot be distinguished from département-specific error terms.

Ideally, we would want to use real panel data, to examine how the European identity of the same individual changes as her national or regional identity changes. Instead of such a panel, examining the effect of the treatment on the identities at all three levels is of equal interest. Given that we can interpret the treatment effect as the change within formerly homogeneous regions, we can also examine whether the observed increase in European identity comes at the cost of a lower national or regional identity.

[Table 14](#) shows the results. First, even though the treated areas was historically more negatively affected by the French nation state, the stronger European identity does not come at the expense of a strongly weaker national identity. French identity is only minimally weaker, and the difference is clearly statistically insignificant. When examining regional identity, there is even a positive effect. That means, both European identity and regional identity are strengthened. This is explained by [Dehdari and Gehring \(2018\)](#). Due to the European Union being perceived as fostering the cause of regions in the 1990s and early 2000s, regional and European identity are perceived as aligned; in economic terms

they could be described as substitute. Using the terminology in Hooghe and Marks (2004), individuals defined their regional identity as inclusive with regard to European identity.<sup>9</sup>

Table 4: Nested Identities: EU, national, and regional level (Alsace & Lorraine)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>	<b>Strength of Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.179 (0.029) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
<b>Panel B</b>	<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>
V.o.I. X Treatment vs. Control	0.002 (0.030) [0.941]	0.009 (0.033) [0.776]	0.064 (0.031) [0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). "*X*" *Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Panel B of Table 14 explores for each possible identity pair, whether the relationship between two identities is stronger or weaker in the treated compared to the control area. To do so, I regress one identity on another, also include the treatment dummy variable, as well as the interaction between the two. Note that in this regression only the interaction between the treatment dummy and the other identity can be causally interpreted.

The results show that the differences between treatment and control area are not explained by a stronger relationship between regional and French, as well as French and

<sup>9</sup> Also note that the positive correlation between regional and European identity is much stronger in the treated area than in the rest of France.

European identity. There is a significant interaction when considering the relationship between European and regional identity. The correlation between the two is significantly stronger in the treated area than in the control area. Hence, the joint increase in both identities in panel a can be explained by the fact that both identities seem to be stronger substitutes in the treated area.

## 6 Placebo tests and sensitivity

I conduct three placebo tests. The first examines to what degree the prior results could be driven by general differences between border departments and the rest of the country. For this purpose, I created a placebo border between all border departments and the next adjacent departments further towards the center (excluding the departments in my main analysis).

The second test uses the old department border from prior to 1870. This is helpful with regard to two aspects. First, how likely it is that there is a significant difference within the regions of Alsace and Lorraine, for a border that is no meaning anymore today. Second, to show whether differences between departments before 1870 have any effect on European Union support today.

The third the placebo test is similar in spirit to the first test. It basically takes the treatment border, but moves it one step further towards the center of France. Here, we are hence comparing the control departments to their adjacent neighboring departments. This provides an idea to what degree the whole region might be somehow special or different than the rest of the country. For instance, one could imagine that the region generally had stronger tensions with the central nation-state.

Figure 7 (a) to (c) visualize the respective placebo borders in yellow. Figure 7 (d) shows the effects at all three borders, focusing on the combined 1992 and 2005 effect for the referenda, and the Euroscepticism score as the preferred outcomes. None of the placebo

effects turns out to be significant, and they are also all considerably smaller than the actual treatment effects. The largest estimates occur for comparing the Alsace-Lorraine region to the rest of the country, but even those are far from being statistically significant. Hence, I conclude that there is no evidence that the facts I measure are driven by pure chance, border departments generally being different, or something specific about the region.


The results are also robust to a large variety of tests, shown in the accompanying online appendix: For instance, instead of using segment fixed effects and distances to the main cities as controls, the results are unaffected by omitting controls (Table 9), controlling for latitude and longitude (Table 12), and even slightly stronger when additionally conditioning on the pre-treatment variables (Table 11). Moreover, the main effects are still statistically significant when clustering standard errors at the larger cantonal level (Table 10, but note that the number of clusters is quite small then). Finally, as bandwidth choice is an important issue in RDD estimations, I show the main results for a range of bandwidths both smaller and larger than the efficient bandwidth (Figure 1)

## 7 Conclusion

I examine the European Union in its role as a peace project between formerly opposed nation states and with regard to the functioning of its representative democracy. This relates to the literature on whether IOs promote peace ((Pevehouse and Russett, 2006) and the democratic peace theory (e.g. Kinsella, 2005; Rosato, 2003, 2005). This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to provide causal evidence that within Europe, within a historical homogenous region, the part historically more negatively exposed to the actions by and between nation states are more supportive of the European Union and vote less for Eurosceptic parties. The empirical evidence suggests that this persistent difference is driven by a stronger European identity.

Future research should examine the link and mechanisms between historical nation

Figure 7: Placebo Borders



**Notes:** Map A shows the departments at the French border (black) and their adjacent departments (grey). This excludes the departments that constitute Alsace and Lorraine and the second-row department Haute Marne. Haute Marne has no counterfactual on the first-row side due to this exclusion of the Alsace and Lorraine regions. The border separating first and second row departments is used as a placebo border (bold orange line). Map B displays the border between the former departments Meurthe and Moselle before 1871 (bold orange line). Map C shows the border between the departments composing the control area in the main regression and their adjacent departments inland (bold orange line). The coefficient plot displays the placebo treatment coefficients. *EU Support* is the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. *Euroscepticism* is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse.



---

state conflict exposure and European Union support more comprehensively. Moreover, the extent to which a common European identity is a prerequisite for a successful political union has not been resolved. The factors and measures that might contribute to such a common identity are controversially being discussed by academia and politicians. The fact that an increase in European identity does not come at the cost of a weaker national identity in the treated area is evidence that identities, and changes in identities, need not to be substitutes. This suggests that fostering a stronger joint European identity is not automatically achieved by weakening national identities; instead it seems important to find an institutional framework that aligns interests between the regional, national and European level.

## References

- Abbott, K. W., R. O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter, and D. Snidal (2000). The concept of legalization. *International Organization* 54(3), 401–419. 1
- Anderson, J. and L. O’ Dowd (1999). Borders, border regions and territoriality: Contradictory meanings, changing significance. *Regional studies* 33(7), 593–604. 1
- Becker, S. O., K. Boeckh, C. Hainz, and L. Woessmann (2015). The empire is dead, long live the empire! long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy. *The Economic Journal*. 1
- Becker, S. O., P. H. Egger, and M. Von Ehrlich (2010). Going NUTS: The effect of EU structural funds on regional performance. *Journal of Public Economics* 94(9-10), 578–590. 1
- Becker, S. O., T. Fetzner, and D. Novy (2017, 10). Who Voted for Brexit? A Comprehensive District-level Analysis. *Economic Policy* 32(92), 601–650. 1
- Bisin, A., E. Patacchini, T. Verdier, and Y. Zenou (2011). Formation and persistence of oppositional identities. *European Economic Review* 55(8), 1046–1071. 1
- Boehmer, C., E. Gartzke, and T. Nordstrom (2004). Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace? *World Politics* 57(1), 1–38. 2.1
- Buscha, F., D. Muller, and L. Page (2017). Can a common currency foster a shared social identity across different nations? the case of the euro. *European Economic Review* 100, 318–336. 1
- Caldeira, G. A. and J. L. Gibson (1995). The legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European Union: Models of institutional support. *American Political Science Review* 89(2), 356–376. 2.1
- Calonico, S., M. D. Cattaneo, and R. Titiunik (2015). Optimal data-driven regression discontinuity plots. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (just-accepted). 4.1
- Capello, R. (2018). Cohesion policies and the creation of a European identity: The role

- of territorial identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 56(3), 489–503. 1
- Carey, S. (2002). Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to european integration? *European union politics* 3(4), 387–413. 1
- Carnegie, A. (2014). States held hostage: Political hold-up problems and the effects of international institutions. *American Political Science Review* 108(1), 54–70. 1
- Carnegie, A. and A. Carson (2018). The spotlight’s harsh glare: Rethinking publicity and international order. *International Organization* 72(3), 627–657. 1
- Ciaglia, S., C. Fuest, and F. Heinemann (2018). What a feeling?! how to promote ‘european identity’. *EconPol Policy Report*. 1, 1, 5.2
- Crombez, C. (2003). The democratic deficit in the european union: Much ado about nothing? *European Union Politics* 4(1), 101–120. 1
- De Vries, C. E. (2018). *Euroscepticism and the Future of European Integration*. Oxford University Press. 1
- Dehdari, S. H. and K. Gehring (2018). The origins of common identity: Evidence from alsace-lorraine. *CESifo Working Paper No. 7410*. 1, 2.1, 5.3
- Depetris-Chauvin, E., R. Durante, and F. R. Campante (2018). Building nations through shared experiences: Evidence from african football. (w24666). 1
- Eifert, B., E. Miguel, and D. N. Posner (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), 494–510. 1
- Featherstone, K. (1994). Jean monnet and the ”democratic deficit” in the european union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 32(2), 149–170. 1
- Fligstein, N., A. Polyakova, and W. Sandholtz (2012). European integration, nationalism and European identity. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, 106–122. 1
- Follesdal, A. and S. Hix (2006). Why there is a democratic deficit in the eu: A response to majone and moravcsik. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(3), 533–562. 1

- Förster, S. (1990). General-feldmarschall helmuth von moltke und die kriegsgeschichtlichen folgen des deutsch-französischen krieges. *Pariser Historische Studien* 29, 86–91. 3.1
- Fouka, V. (2018). Backlash: The unintended effects of language prohibition in US schools after World War I. *Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming*. 1, 1
- Fouka, V. (2019). How do immigrants respond to discrimination? the case of germans in the us during world war i. *American Political Science Review* 113(2), 405–422. 1, 1
- Fouka, V., M. Soumyajit, and M. Tabellini (2018). From immigrants to americans: Race and assimilation during the great migration. *mimeo*. 1
- Gabel, M. (1998). Public support for european integration: An empirical test of five theories. *The Journal of Politics* 60(2), 333–354. 1
- Garrett, G. (1995). The politics of legal integration in the European Union. *International Organization* 49(1), 171–181. 2.1
- Gartzke, E., Q. Li, and C. Boehmer (2001). Investing in the peace: Economic interdependence and international conflict. *International organization* 55(2), 391–438. 1
- Gehring, K. and S. A. Schneider (2018, February). Towards the greater good? eu commissioners' nationality and budget allocation in the european union. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 10(1), 214–39. 1
- Gellner, E. and J. Breuilly (2008). *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press. 1
- Glenn, H. P. (1974). Local law of alsace-lorraine, a half century of survival. *Int'l & Comp. LQ* 23, 769–781. 2
- Hobolt, S. B. and C. De Vries (2016). Turning against the union? the impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European parliament elections. *Electoral Studies* 44, 504–514. 1
- Hobolt, S. B. and C. E. de Vries (2016). Public support for european integration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1), 413–432. 1, 1
- Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2004). Does identity or economic rationality drive public

- opinion on european integration? *PS: Political Science & Politics* 37(3), 415–420. 1, 1, 5.2, 5.3
- Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2005). Calculation, community and cues: Public opinion on european integration. *European Union Politics* 6(4), 419–443. 1, 1, 5.2
- Jeffery, C. (2015). *The Regional Dimension of the European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe?*, Chapter Bullmann, U.: The politics of the third level. London.: Routledge. 3.2.1
- Jolly, S. K. (2007). The europhile fringe? regionalist party support for european integration. *European Union Politics* 8(1), 109–130. 1, 1, 2.2
- Kinsella, D. (2005). No rest for the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 453–457. 7
- Lipgens, W. (1964). Bismarck, die öffentliche meinung und die annexion von elsaß und lothringen 1870. *Historische Zeitschrift* 199(JG), 31–144. 3.1
- Marks, G. and M. R. Steenbergen (2004). *European Integration and Political Conflict*. Cambridge University Press. 1, 1
- Mattli, W. and A.-M. Slaughter (1995). Law and politics in the European Union: A reply to garrett. *International Organization* 49(1), 183. 2.1
- Mazumder, S. (2018). Becoming white: How mass warfare turned immigrants into americans. *mimeo*. 1
- McLaren, L. M. (2002). Public support for the european union: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat? *Journal of Politics* 64(2), 551–566. 1, 1
- McLaughlin Mitchell, S. and P. R. Hensel (2007). International institutions and compliance with agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4), 721–737. 1
- Messerschmidt, M. (1975). *Militär und Politik in der Bismarckzeit und im Wilhelminischen Deutschland*, Volume 43. Wiss. Buchges. 3.1
- Mimeur, C., F. Queyroi, A. Banos, and T. Thévenin (2018). Revisiting the structuring

- effect of transportation infrastructure: an empirical approach with the french railway network from 1860 to 1910. *Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History* 51(2), 65–81. 4
- Moravcsik, A. (1991). Negotiating the single european act: national interests and conventional statecraft in the european community. *International organization* 45(1), 19–56. 1
- Moravcsik, A. (1998). *The choice for Europe*. na. 3.2.1
- Moravcsik, A. (2002). Reassessing legitimacy in the european union. *JCMS: journal of common market studies* 40(4), 603–624. 1
- Motte, C., I. Séguéy, C. Théré, and D. Tixier-Basse (2003). *Communes d’hier, communes d’aujourd’hui. Les communes de la France métropolitaine, 1801-2001. Dictionnaire d’histoire administrative*. Paris: Institut National d’Études Démographiques. 4
- Ochsner, C. and F. Roesel (2017). Activating history – the turkish sieges of vienna, anti-turkish campaigns, and the rise of right-wing populism. *mimeo*. 2
- Perret, J., M. Gribaudo, and M. Barthelemy (2015). Roads and cities of 18th century france. *Scientific data* 2, 150048. 4
- Pevehouse, J. and B. Russett (2006). Democratic international governmental organizations promote peace. *International organization* 60(4), 969–1000. 2.1, 7
- Posner, D. N. (2004). The political salience of cultural difference: Why chewas and tumbukas are allies in zambia and adversaries in malawi. *American Political Science Review* 98(4), 529–545. 1, 1
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press. 1, 1, 2.1
- Rickard, S. J. and D. Y. Kono (2014). Think globally, buy locally: International agreements and government procurement. *The Review of International Organizations* 9(3), 333–352. 1

- Rosato, S. (2003). The flawed logic of democratic peace theory. *American Political Science Review* 97(4). 7
- Rosato, S. (2005). Explaining the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 467–472. 7
- Russett, B., J. R. Oneal, and D. R. Davis (1998). The third leg of the kantian tripod for peace: International organizations and militarized disputes, 1950–85. *International Organization* 52(3), 441–467. 1
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). The political basis of support for European integration. *European Union Politics* 1(2), 147–171. 1, 1
- Schneider, C. J. (2013). Globalizing electoral politics: Political competence and distributional bargaining in the european union. *World Politics* 65(3), 452–490. 1
- Schneider, C. J. (2017). The political economy of regional integration. *Annual Review of Political Science* 20, 229–248. 1
- Schneider, C. J. (2019). Public commitments as signals of responsiveness in the European Union. *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming. 1
- Schneider., C. J. (2019). Sources of government accountability in the european union. evidence from germany. *The Review of International Organizations (forthcoming)*. 1
- Shayo, M. (2009). A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution. *American Political Science Review* 103(02), 147–174. 1, 2.1
- Sweet, A. S. and T. Brunell (2012). The european court of justice, state noncompliance, and the politics of override. *American Political Science Review* 106(1). 2.1
- Treib, O. (2014). The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the eurosceptic vote in the 2014 european elections. *Journal of European Public Policy* 21(10), 1541–1554. 1
- van Spanje, J. and C. de Vreese (2011). So what’s wrong with the EU? motivations underlying the eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections. *European Union Politics* 12(3),

405–429. 1

Volken, A., W. Krause, P. Lehmann, T. Matthiess, N. Merz, S. Regel, and B. Wessels (2018). The manifesto data collection. version 2018b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). 3.2.1

Wawro, G. (2005). *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871*. Cambridge University Press. 3.1

Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. *American political science review* 88(2), 384–396. 1



# Appendix (for online publication)

## List of Tables

1	Variable Description and Sources 1 . . . . .	2
2	Variable Description and Sources 2 . . . . .	3
3	Survey questions (i.) . . . . .	4
4	Descriptive Table . . . . .	5
5	Descriptive Table . . . . .	6
6	Identities as Substitutes (All of France w/o Alsace & Lorraine) . . . . .	8
7	RDD Smoothness Test: Pre-Treatment Variables . . . . .	9
8	RDD Smoothness Test: 1860 Economic Indicators (Level of Arrondissement) . . . . .	10
9	RDD Specification - No Controls . . . . .	11
10	RDD Specification - No Clusters . . . . .	12
11	RDD Specification - Baseline Plus Pre-Treatment Controls . . . . .	13
12	RDD Specification - Coordinate Controls . . . . .	14
13	Nested Identities: EU, national and regional level (all of France; extensive table) . . . . .	16
14	Nested Identities: EU, national, and regional level (Alsace & Lorraine; extensive table) . . . . .	17

## List of Figures

1	Robustness Check: Bandwidth Choice . . . . .	15
---	--	----

# A Descriptive Table

Table 1: Variable Description and Sources 1

Variable	Definition	Source
<i>Dependent Variables</i>		
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	Share of Yes votes in the 1992 referendum (Maastricht Treaty)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	Share of Yes votes in the 2005 referendum (European Constitution)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Eurosceptic Parties	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) with a larger EU-Negativity than Positivity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
w/o Front National	Vote Share of Eurosceptic Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) excluding Front National	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
Euroscepticism Index	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) weighted by their EU-Negativity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Distance to German Border		
Distance to Metz		
Distance to		
Distance to		
Distance to		
X-Coordinate		
Y-Coordinate		

**Notes:** Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.

Table 2: Variable Description and Sources 2

Variable	Definition	Source
<b><i>Pre-Treatment Variables</i></b>		
Ruggedness	Index of variance in elevation in each municipality	Global elevation data set
Elevation	Meter over sea level	NASA SRTM data set
St. Dev. Elevation	Variation in elevation instandard deviations	NASA SRTM data set
Suitability (Potato)	Soil suitability for production of potatoes (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Wheat)	Soil suitability for production of wheat (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Barley)	Soil suitability for production of barley (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Sunflower)	Soil suitability for production of sunflower (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Onion)	Soil suitability for production of onion (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
River Length	Total length of all rivers (in meters)	Andreadis et al., 2013
Population	Population in 1866	French Census 1866
Population Density	Population in 1866 divided by area (in square km)	French Census 1866
Cropland	total area of arable land and permanent crops in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Grazing Land	total land area used for mowing or grazing livestock in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Road Length	Total length of road network in the municipality in 1860	Perret et al., 2015
Railway Station	Presence of railway station in municipality in 1860	Mimeur et al., 2018
Railway Quality	Linear hierarchy about the infrastructure in the municipality in 1860 (0 : no / 1 : fast / 2 : / 3 : slow infrastructure)	Mimeur et al., 2018
<b><i>Post-Treatment Variables</i></b>		
Income	Median income in municipality in 2008	INSEE
Age	Mean age in municipality in 2008	INSEE
Education	Share of people over 15 years old with a high school degree in 1999	INSEE
Employment	Share of blue-collar workers in 2006	INSEE
Health Care	Number of health care establishment (medium-term stay) per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
High School	Number of high schools with general and/or technological education per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Vocational School	Number of secondary schools with vocational training per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Post Office	Number of post offices per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Change Population 1866-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1866 and 1946	
Change Population 1916-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1916 and 1946	
Change Population 1926-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1926 and 1946	
Change Population 1936-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1936 and 1946	

**Notes:** Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.

Table 3: Survey questions (i.)

Variable	Question	Categories/Scale	Source
French Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to France?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European relative to National Identity		Relation of the two identities; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
Regional Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to [Insert Region]?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Citizen	"I see myself as a European citizen."	The higher the value, the more favorable are respondents to the claim.	OIP 1987/89/93/96/97 & 2001/03
European Pride	"How proud of being European are you?"	The higher the value, the prouder the respondent.	OIP 1998
Interregional cooperation in EU	"Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions?"	The higher the value, the more respondents want regions to cooperate with other European regions.	OIP 1998
EU (generally)	Opinion of respondents towards the impact of the European project on their region.	The higher the value, the more positive the respondent's opinion	OIP 1995/97
Common Market	"Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic difficulties of your region?"	The higher the value, the more benetial the common market is perceived by respondents.	OIP 1989/93
Evaluation of European Union	"Generally, do you think the fact that France is part of the EU is a good or a bad thing?"	1 = good thing; 0 = bad thing; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	PEF2002 V2
Evaluation of Democracy in EU	"And in the European Union, do you believe that democracy is working very well, rather well, not very well or not well at all?"	4 = very well; 3 = rather well; 2 = not very well; 1 = not well at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 2000 Q10

**Notes:** Description of survey questions from the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP), as well as the Panel électoral français. The values of the categories are reversed compared to the original question categories. Questions were originally in French and have been translated.

Table 4: Descriptive Table

	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>Treatment &amp; Distance Variable</b>					
Treatment (Dummy)	3237	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Distance to Border (in km)	3237	31.33	21.43	0.26	92.82
<b>Dependent Variables</b>					
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	3230	53.59	11.78	0.00	100.00
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	3235	45.65	10.28	0.00	100.00
Eurosceptic Parties 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
Eurosceptic Parties 1999	3233	25.38	7.94	0.00	75.00
Eurosceptic Parties 2004	3235	13.97	6.40	0.00	50.00
w/o Front National 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
w/o Front National 1999	3233	17.03	7.17	0.00	66.67
w/o Front National 2004	3235	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Euroscepticism Index 1994	3230	17.33	7.87	0.00	82.25
Euroscepticism Index 1999	3233	24.10	16.44	0.00	210.94
Euroscepticism Index 2004	3235	28.75	9.96	0.00	85.89
<b>Control Variables</b>					
Distance to German Border (in km)	3237	51.76	35.66	0.33	141.55
Distance to Metz (in km)	3237	83.12	44.02	1.60	203.16
Distance to Strasbourg (in km)	3237	108.62	50.57	0.02	223.02
Distance to Nancy (in km)	3237	73.61	34.71	0.06	164.98
Distance to Mulhouse (in km)	3237	125.88	58.08	0.00	258.53
Treatment Border Segment 1 (Dummy)	3237	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 2 (Dummy)	3237	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 3 (Dummy)	3237	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 4 (Dummy)	3237	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 5 (Dummy)	3237	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00

**Notes:** This table presents the following statistics for the components of the running variable, as well as the dependent and control variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table A1.

Table 5: Descriptive Table

	Obs.	Mean	St. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>Pre-Treatment Variables</b>					
Elevation	3237	300.79	118.86	110.80	1039.54
Ruggedness	3237	68.28	62.80	2.29	549.24
St. Dev. Elevation	3237	32.06	35.49	0.00	301.98
River Length (in km)	3237	75.10	112.81	0.00	2507.36
Road Length (in km)	3237	4.42	5.83	0.00	74.39
Railway Station	3229	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
Railway Quality	3229	0.11	0.37	0.00	2.00
Cropland	3237	20.45	11.40	0.00	51.89
Grazing Land	3237	23.37	13.10	0.00	45.43
Population Density 1866	3229	84.64	117.67	0.00	3234.54
Population 1866	3229	823	2526	0	84167
Suitability (Barley)	3206	5585	1771	794	10000
Suitability (Maize)	3206	3118	1783	0	7776
Suitability (Onion)	3206	5091	1584	0	8988
Suitability (Wheat)	3206	5801	1788	798	10000
Suitability (Potato)	3206	3713	1047	730	5882
Suitability (Sunflower)	3206	5105	1721	0	8887
<b>Post-Treatment Variables</b>					
Change Population 1866-1946	3226	52	2305	-4495	91348
Change Population 1916-1946	3222	-88	642	-13928	8814
Change Population 1926-1946	3228	-38	336	-8332	4429
Change Population 1936-1946	3232	-80	545	-17604	1111
Age	3237	39.71	3.21	28.26	69.38
Income	2647	31559.20	5998.64	17691.00	53547.00
Education	3234	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.50
Employment	3236	0.19	0.08	0.00	1.00
Health Care	3143	0.01	0.11	0.00	3.33
High School	3143	0.01	0.09	0.00	2.50
Vocational School	3143	0.01	0.06	0.00	2.50
Post Office	3143	0.08	0.32	0.00	10.00

**Notes:** This table presents the following statistics for the Pre- and Post-treatment variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table A1.

## B Relation between multiple identities - Extended

Table 6 explores the relationship between different identities in more detail, now using the same survey data for all of France, only excluding the area examined so far. Panel a explores whether each pair of identity variables is correlated positively at the individual level. This is clearly the case, there is a positive relationship for all three pairs, which is stronger for identity pairs that are conceptually closer to each other. That means, regional and French identity, as well as French and European identity are closer related with each other than European and regional identity. All individual level results are robust to including department- and year-fixed effects.

Of course, these individual level results might be driven by any omitted variable at the individual level; or framed differently an individual specific error term. To overcome this concern as well as possible with the data at hand, I average the identity variables at the department level for panel C and D. With a sufficiently high a number of observations per department, in this case about 100, the individual specific error terms should cancel each other out when averaging. Using a pooled cross section in panel C yields rather different results. The relationship between regional and French identity is no statistically insignificant, and the relationship between European and regional identity becomes negative. When including department and year fixed effects in panel D, and thus estimating off of only changes in the explanatory variables by department, the results change again. Regional and French identity are a gain positively correlated, and European and regional identity positive but statistically insignificant.

The most robust positive relationship might come as a surprise for many politicians and scientific observers. National French identity and European identity are positively correlated in each specification. This holds even when identifying the effect only with changes over time in panel D. Hence, when thinking achieving a stronger European identity in the future, at least the evidence from France suggests that a stronger national identity seems helpful rather than an obstacle to achieving this.

Table 3 shows that the stronger European identity in the treated area does not seem to be driven by the perception of stronger economic benefits. Thus, it appears to be driven by a psychological change relating to the value of the EU in other non-economic dimensions; potentially its role in maintaining peace.

Table 6: Identities as Substitutes (All of France w/o Alsace & Lorraine)

Dependent Variable Variable of Interest	Regional Identity French Identity	French Identity European Identity	European Identity Regional Identity
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
<b>Individual level</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.358 (0.005) [0.000]	0.178 (0.005) [0.000]	0.062 (0.005) [0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
<b>Panel B</b>			
<b>Individual level (Departement- and year-fixed effects)</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.368 (0.005) [0.000]	0.177 (0.005) [0.000]	0.074 (0.005) [0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
<b>Panel C</b>			
<b>Departemental level</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.077 (0.095) [0.416]	0.182 (0.050) [0.000]	-0.100 (0.042) [0.018]
Observations	300	300	300
<b>Panel D</b>			
<b>Departemental level (Departement- and year-fixed effects)</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.440 (0.058) [0.000]	0.157 (0.091) [0.089]	0.123 (0.101) [0.227]
Observations	300	300	300

Notes: Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). "X" Identity: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.



# C Robustness: Smoothness and Regression Specification

Table 7: RDD Smoothness Test: Pre-Treatment Variables

	Barley	Wheat	Potato	Onion	Sunflower
Treatment vs. Control	49.089 (445.953) [0.912]	145.863 (443.440) [0.742]	-69.233 (242.320) [0.775]	10.633 (364.771) [0.977]	59.347 (441.175) [0.893]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.000	11.537	10.000	10.000
Observations	614	614	706	614	614
	Elevation	St. Dev. Elev.	Ruggedness	Pop. Density	Population
Treatment vs. Control	5.367 (33.568) [0.873]	5.496 (11.621) [0.636]	17.329 (20.605) [0.400]	382.246 (234.538) [0.103]	9.646 (10.370) [0.352]
Bandwidth (km)	13.146	11.085	12.479	18.554	10.863
Observations	795	681	757	1098	670
	River Length	Road Length	Grazing Land	Cropland	
Treatment vs. Control	3404.949 (14492.769) [0.814]	954.125 (858.652) [0.266]	0.844 (3.135) [0.788]	-0.973 (1.380) [0.481]	
Bandwidth (km)	12.619	13.394	10.000	10.000	
Observations	764	811	619	619	
	Railway Station	Railway Quality			
Treatment vs. Control	-0.000 (0.026) [0.987]	-0.073 (0.056) [0.194]			
Bandwidth (km)	13.944	11.089			
Observations	846	681			

**Notes:** Tests for discontinuities in pre-treatment variables for the whole border. *Ruggedness* is the mean index of the variation in elevation, while *Elevation* is the mean elevation. *St. Dev. Elev.* is the standard deviation of *Elevation*. *Potato*, *Wheat*, *Maize*, *Sunflower* and *Barley* refer to the soil suitability for potato, wheat, maize, sunflower and barley production, respectively. *Population* is the municipality's population 1866. *Pop. Density* is *Population* divided by its area (in square km). *River Length* is the total length of all rivers in a municipality. *Road Length* is the total length of all historical roads in a municipality. *Grazing Land* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for grazing. *Cropland* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for crop production. *Railway Station* is a dummy variable whether a municipality has a railway station. *Railway Quality* is a 4-stage variable measuring the quality of the railway infrastructure. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. The bandwidth is optimally selected in regards to the Mean Square Error (Calonico et al. 2017). Only if the bandwidth falls below 10km, we set 10km as the bandwidth. Standard errors are in brackets and p-values are positioned below them.

Table 8: RDD Smoothness Test: 1860 Economic Indicators (Level of Arrondissement)

	Mean (Treatment)	Mean (Control)	T-test
Share Children	0.052	0.050	0.875
Income PC	178.353	187.329	0.387
Worker Productivity	6625.835	6968.153	0.728
Firm Productivity	1.30e+05	98487.290	0.418

**Sources:** This table shows the t-test for four variables measuring economic conditions on the arrondissement-level in the region of Lorraine. The data set comprises of seven arrondissements in the control and five arrondissements in the treatment group. *Share Children* measures the share of children in the workforce. *Income PC* is the average income of a worker in the arrondissement. *Worker Productivity* measures the average production output per worker. *Firm Productivity* shows the average production output per firm.

Table 9: RDD Specification - No Controls

**Panel A**

**EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992 (1)	Yes Share 1992 (2)	Yes Share 2005 (3)	Yes Share 2005 (4)	Yes Share 92 & 05 (5)	Yes Share 92 & 05 (6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.029 (2.132) [0.018]	5.990 (1.996) [0.003]	2.255 (2.820) [0.424]	1.893 (2.413) [0.433]	3.641 (1.499) [0.015]	4.182 (1.357) [0.002]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.866	10.000	14.548	10.000	17.347
Observations	619	1162	618	878	1237	2055
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.47	43.51	44.26	48.07	48.91

**Panel B**

**Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties (1)	Eurosceptic Parties (2)	w/o Front National (3)	w/o Front National (4)	Euroscepticism Index (5)	Euroscepticism Index (6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.442 (0.966) [0.135]	-2.186 (0.704) [0.002]	-2.290 (1.140) [0.045]	-2.612 (0.856) [0.002]	-4.098 (3.490) [0.240]	-5.403 (2.797) [0.053]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	22.659	10.000	23.517	10.000	20.568
Observations	1855	3930	1855	4080	1855	3624
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.05	16.07	15.25

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In Panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In Panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table 10: RDD Specification - No Clusters

**Panel A**

**EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992 (1)	Yes Share 1992 (2)	Yes Share 2005 (3)	Yes Share 2005 (4)	Yes Share 92 & 05 (5)	Yes Share 92 & 05 (6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.242 (1.544) [0.001]	6.969 (1.262) [0.000]	2.787 (1.606) [0.083]	2.787 (1.606) [0.083]	4.012 (1.275) [0.002]	4.447 (1.104) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.369	10.000	10.000	10.000	13.369
Observations	619	924	618	618	1237	1611
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.13	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.58

**Panel B**

**Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties (1)	Eurosceptic Parties (2)	w/o Front National (3)	w/o Front National (4)	Euroscepticism Index (5)	Euroscepticism Index (6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086 (1.184) [0.359]	-1.915 (0.813) [0.018]	-1.873 (1.008) [0.063]	-2.387 (0.631) [0.000]	-3.898 (1.974) [0.048]	-5.886 (1.185) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	21.121	10.000	25.135	10.000	25.470
Observations	1855	3726	1855	4344	1855	4410
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.00	16.07	14.96

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In Panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In Panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table 11: RDD Specification - Baseline Plus Pre-Treatment Controls

**Panel A**

**EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

Dependent Variable	Yes Share 1992		Yes Share 2005		Yes Share 92 & 05	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.858 (1.489) [0.000]	5.948 (1.485) [0.000]	3.219 (1.876) [0.086]	3.219 (1.876) [0.086]	4.534 (1.211) [0.000]	4.620 (1.187) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.188	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.362
Observations	614	621	613	613	1227	1487
Mean of Outcome	52.62	52.65	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.35

**Panel B**

**Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

Dependent Variable	Eurosceptic Parties		w/o Front National		Euroscepticism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.201 (0.715) [0.093]	-1.667 (0.505) [0.001]	-2.022 (0.673) [0.003]	-2.347 (0.564) [0.000]	-4.082 (1.935) [0.035]	-4.794 (1.788) [0.007]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.995	10.000	18.893	10.000	12.821
Observations	1840	3486	1840	3321	1840	2317
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.35	7.51	7.17	16.07	15.89

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In Panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In Panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects, as well as all variables used in the pre-treatment balance test. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table 12: RDD Specification - Coordinate Controls


<b>Panel A</b>		<b>EU Support (1992 and 2005)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992</b>		<b>Yes Share 2005</b>		<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05</b>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.071 (1.749) [0.004]	6.552 (1.678) [0.000]	2.251 (2.109) [0.286]	2.049 (1.936) [0.290]	3.661 (1.365) [0.007]	3.809 (1.278) [0.003]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.247	10.000	12.282	10.000	13.961
Observations	619	920	618	743	1237	1695
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.09	43.51	43.78	48.07	48.61

<b>Panel B</b>		<b>Eurosepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Euroseptic Parties</b>		<b>w/o Front National</b>	<b>Eurosepticism Index</b>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.025 (0.705) [0.146]	-1.578 (0.587) [0.007]	-1.725 (0.669) [0.010]	-2.174 (0.629) [0.001]	-3.348 (1.994) [0.093]	-4.314 (1.906) [0.024]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.238	10.000	18.464	10.000	15.050
Observations	1855	2754	1855	3276	1855	2724
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.43	7.51	7.18	16.07	15.63

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In Panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In Panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: the coordinates on the x- and y-axis and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Figure 1: Robustness Check: Bandwidth Choice



**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using all Municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The treatment effect for the main variables capturing EU support and Euroscepticism using a range of bandwidths smaller and larger than the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonica et al., 2018). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level.

Table 13: Nested Identities: EU, national and regional level (all of France; extensive table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
	<b>Strength of Identities</b>		
Dependent Variable	Regional Identity	French Identity	European Identity
Treatment vs. Control	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]
Observations	44379	44408	43696
<b>Panel B</b>			
	<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>		
Dependent Variable	Regional Identity	French Identity	European Identity
Variable of Interest	French Identity	European Identity	Regional Identity
Treatment vs. Control	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]
Variable of Interest	0.365 (0.005) [0.000]	0.180 (0.005) [0.000]	0.071 (0.005) [0.000]
Interaction	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]	0.000 (.) [.]
Observations	44325	43658	43616

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). "X" *Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.



Table 14: Nested Identities: EU, national, and regional level (Alsace & Lorraine; extensive table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
<b>Strength of Identities</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.179 (0.029) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
<b>Panel B</b>			
<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>
Variable of Interest	0.426 (0.025) [0.000]	0.231 (0.027) [0.000]	0.114 (0.026) [0.000]
Treatment vs. Control	0.122 (0.049) [0.013]	0.126 (0.052) [0.015]	0.307 (0.072) [0.000]
Interaction	0.002 (0.030) [0.941]	0.009 (0.033) [0.776]	0.064 (0.031) [0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). "*X*" *Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.