Working Paper

Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time

Yin-Wong Cheung, Daniel Friedman
CESifo, Munich, 2008

CESifo Working Paper No. 2420

We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) weaker fundamentals increase the likelihood of successful speculative attacks and hasten their onset, and (b) contrary to some theory, success is enhanced by public access to information about either the net speculative position or the fundamentals. The presence of a larger speculator further enhances success, and experience with large speculators increases small speculators’ response to the public information. However, giving the large speculator increased size or better information does not significantly strengthen his impact.

CESifo Category
Monetary Policy and International Finance
Keywords: currency crisis, speculative attack, laboratory experiment, coordination game, pre-emption, large player
JEL Classification: C730,C920,F300