Working Paper
Government Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Analysis
Axel Dreher, Justina A.V. Fischer
CESifo, Munich, 2009
CESifo Working Paper No. 2699
CESifo, Munich, 2009
CESifo Working Paper No. 2699
Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
CESifo Category
Public Choice
Public Choice
Keywords: terrorism, decentralization, federalism, governance quality, government effectiveness
JEL Classification: D740,H400,H700