Working Paper

Who Should Pay for Certification?

Konrad O. Stahl, Roland Strausz
CESifo, Munich, 2011

CESifo Working Paper No. 3365

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier’s profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market.

CESifo Category
Industrial Organisation
Keywords: asymmetric information, certification, information acquisition, inspection, lemons, middlemen, signaling
JEL Classification: D400, D820, L140, L150