Working Paper
Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments
Thomas Eichner, Rüdiger Pethig
CESifo, Munich, 2014
CESifo Working Paper No. 4909
CESifo, Munich, 2014
CESifo Working Paper No. 4909
Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.’s model.
CESifo Category
Public Finance
Public Finance
Keywords: global tax coordination, repeated game, sustainability, stability
JEL Classification: H710, H770