Working Paper

Do Professional Norms in the Banking Industry Favor Risk-taking?

Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, Michel André Maréchal
CESifo, Munich, 2017

CESifo Working Paper No. 6398

In recent years, the banking industry has witnessed several cases of excessive risk-taking that frequently have been attributed to problematic professional norms. We conduct experiments with employees from several banks in which we manipulate the saliency of their professional identity and subsequently measure their risk aversion in a real stakes investment task. If bank employees are exposed to professional norms that favor risk-taking, they should become more willing to take risks when their professional identity is salient. We find, however, that subjects take significantly less risk, challenging the view that the professional norms generally increase bank employees’ willingness to take risks.

CESifo Category
Behavioural Economics
Keywords: risk culture, banking industry, experiment
JEL Classification: G020, M140, C930