Working Paper

How Do Banks and Households Manage Interest Rate Risk? Evidence from the Swiss Mortgage Market

Christoph Basten, Benjamin Guin, Cathérine Tahmee Koch
CESifo, Munich, 2017

CESifo Working Paper No. 6649

We exploit a unique data set that features both un-intermediated mortgage requests and independent offers from multiple banks for each request. We show that households typically are not prudent risk managers but prioritize the minimization of current mortgage payments over the risk of possible hikes in future mortgage payments. We also provide evidence that banks do influence the contracted mortgage rate fixation periods, trading off their own exposure to interest rate risk against the borrowers’ affordability and credit risk. Our results challenge the implicit assumption of the existing mortgage choice literature whereby fixation periods are determined entirely by households.

CESifo Category
Behavioural Economics
Empirical and Theoretical Methods
Keywords: Fixed-Rate Mortgage (FRM), Adjustable-Rate Mortgage (ARM), fixation period, maturity mismatch, interest rate risk, credit risk, duration
JEL Classification: D120, E430, G210