Working Paper

Patient vs. Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care

Martin Benjamin Hackmann, R. Vincent Pohl
CESifo, Munich, 2018

CESifo Working Paper No. 7373

How do patient and provider incentives affect mode and cost of long-term care? Our analysis of 1 million nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays when capacity binds to admit more profitable out-of-pocket payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients, so moving to episode-based provider reimbursement is more effective in shortening Medicaid stays than increasing resident cost-sharing. Moreover, we do not find evidence for health improvements due to longer stays for marginal Medicaid beneficiaries.

CESifo Category
Public Finance
Industrial Organisation
JEL Classification: H510, H750, I110, I130, I180, J140