Working Paper

Fighting Mobile Crime

Rosario Crinò, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo
CESifo, Munich, 2019

CESifo Working Paper No. 7446

Two countries set their enforcement non-cooperatively to deter native and foreign individuals from committing crime in their territory. Crime is mobile, ex ante (migration) and ex post (fleeing), and criminals hiding abroad after having com- mitted a crime in a country must be extradited back. When extradition is not too costly, countries overinvest in enforcement: insourcing foreign criminals is more costly than paying the extradition cost. When extradition is sufficiently costly, in- stead, a large enforcement may induce criminals to flee the country whose law they infringed. The fear of paying the extradition cost enables the countries coordinating on the efficient outcome.

CESifo Category
Labour Markets
Empirical and Theoretical Methods
JEL Classification: K140, K420