Working Paper

Control Aversion in Hierarchies

Alessandro De Chiara, Florian Engl, Holger Herz, Ester Manna
CESifo, Munich, 2022

CESifo Working Paper No. 9779

Companies typically control various aspects of their workers’ behaviors. In this paper, we investigate whether the hierarchical distance of the superior who imposes such control measures matters for the workers’ ensuing reaction. In particular, we test, in a laboratory experiment, whether potential negative behavioral reactions to imposed control are larger when they are implemented by a direct superior rather than a hierarchically more distant superior. We find that hierarchical proximity indeed magnifies such control aversion and discuss several potential channels for this result.

CESifo Category
Industrial Organisation
Behavioural Economics
Keywords: control aversion, hierarchies, delegation, principal-agent-problem
JEL Classification: C920, D230, M120