Working Paper

Platform Liability and Innovation

Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili, Leonardo Madio
CESifo, Munich, 2022

CESifo Working Paper No. 9984

We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovative products. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare when the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).

CESifo Category
Industrial Organisation
Economics of Digitization
Keywords: platform, liability, intellectual property, innovation
JEL Classification: K400, K420, K130, L130, L220, L860